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Abstract
Cloud storage provides cost-efficient storage services in an era of increased demands on data
generation and reliance. However, since cloud storage providers might not be trusted by end
users, security and privacy are a major concern to data owners. Although cryptography is
traditionally used to support data confidentiality, integrity and availability, data access control
is yet another potential field. Cryptography can help achieve access control and authentication
effectively.
Data access control can be achieved by two major approaches: server-mediated access con-
trol and cryptographically-enforced access control. In server-mediated access control, servers
receive access attempts and grant permissions based on pre-defined policies. This requires
storage servers to be fully trusted, which is not the case in many storage environments.
Cryptographically-enforced access control does not require the storage servers to be fully trusted
since the data stored on storage servers is encrypted. Data access control is enforced through
the management of decryption keys. If the key distribution process is not managed by cloud
service providers directly, data secrecy and user privacy will be protected in untrusted cloud
storage environments. However, if data owners are directly involved in key distribution, access
control could become cumbersome to operate in a cloud storage environment. Therefore, scal-
able and flexible access control schemes are necessary for securing storage systems in untrusted
clouds.
Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) provides both cryptographically-enforced confidentiality
and access control in cloud storage environments. This allows data to be protected with auto-
matically enforced access policies. Key distribution can be delegated to attribute authorities
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that do not require the direct involvement of data owners. However, current access control
schemes associated with existing ABE schemes are inflexible and have limitations concerning
dynamic user and attribute revocation, key refreshing and revocation, and key escrow.
Attribute-based signature (ABS) schemes can also be used to facilitate anonymous access con-
trol and allow users to sign messages without disclosing their identities. However, access control
schemes associated with existing ABS schemes also have practical limitations concerning dy-
namic user and attribute revocation, in particular anonymous user revocation.
In this thesis, we improve the practicality of access control mechanism for securing data stored
on untrusted cloud storage. We adopt existing attributed-based cryptography and provide them
with more flexible user and attribute management capability. We propose two deployment
models and three systems that can be used with existing ABE and ABS schemes with no, or
minor, modifications. Those adaptations reduce the management overheads and improve the
scalability of attributed-based cryptography deployment to support security in cloud storage
environments.
5
Contents
1 Introduction 12
1.1 Motivation and Research Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2 Our Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3 Outline of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2 Security Services and Techniques Suitable for Distributed and Cloud Storage
Systems 22
2.1 Distributed Data Storage Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 Data Protection Challenges in Distributed Data Storage Systems . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 Threats to Distributed Data Storage Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.1 Threats to Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3.2 Threats to Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3.3 Threats to Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.4 Threats to Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4 Data Protection Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.1 Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.2 Confidentiality Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.3 Integrity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4.4 Data Availability and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4.5 Auditing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5 Cloud Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5.1 Cloud Storage Security Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5.1.1 Trust in CSPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5.1.2 Multi-Tenant Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6
2.5.2 Requirements for Protecting Data Secrecy and User Privacy in Cloud
Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.6 Existing Access Control and Data Protection Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.6.1 Server Mediated Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6.2 Cryptographically-Enforced Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.6.2.1 Access Control with Symmetric-Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . 44
2.6.2.2 Access Control with Asymmetric Cryptography . . . . . . . . . 46
2.6.2.3 Attribute-Based Encryption and Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3 Cryptographic Preliminaries and Background 52
3.1 Abstract Algebra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2 Modern Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.1 Principles of Modern Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.1.1 Formal Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.1.2 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2.1.3 Security Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2.2 Computational Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.2.1 Perfect Indistinguishability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2.2.2 Computational Indistinguishability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3 Complexity Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3.1 Diffie-Hellman Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.3.2 The Bilinear Maps and Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumptions . . . . . . . 67
3.3.2.1 The Definition of Bilinear Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.3.2.2 Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4 Provable security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4.1 Game-Based Security Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4.2 Types of Security Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.4.2.1 Standard Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.4.2.2 Random Oracle Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4 Attribute-Based Cryptography 78
7
4.1 Attribute-Based Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.1.1 ABE Scheme Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.1.1.1 Access Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.1.1.2 Definition of a KP-ABE Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.1.1.3 Definition of a CP-ABE Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.1.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2 Attribute-Based Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2.1 ABS Scheme Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2.3 Construction of an ABS Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5 Generic User Revocation Systems for ABE in Cloud Storage 91
5.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.2 Our Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.3 Accumulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3.1 A Bilinear Map based Accumulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3.2 Dynamic Accumulator (DA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.3.2.1 Data Structure Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.3.2.2 Algorithm Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.4 Generic User Revocation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.4.1 Algorithm Definition and Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.4.2 User Revocation via Ciphertext Re-Encryption (UR-CRE) . . . . . . . . 114
5.4.2.1 Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4.2.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.4.2.3 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.4.3 User Revocation via Cloud Storage Providers (UR-CSP) . . . . . . . . . 129
5.4.3.1 Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.4.3.2 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.4.3.3 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.5 User Revocation Overhead Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
8
6 A Generic Attribute Revocation System for ABE in Cloud Storage 147
6.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.2 Our Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.3 The Attribute Revocation System (AR-ABE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.3.1 Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.3.2 Algorithm Definition and Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.3.2.1 Data Structure Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.3.2.2 Algorithm Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.3.3 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.3.4 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
6.4 Attribute Revocation Overhead Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7 An Anonymous User Revocation Model for ABS in Cloud Storage 178
7.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
7.2 Our Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
7.3 Anonymous User Revocation Model (AUR-ABS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
7.3.1 Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
7.3.2 Algorithm Definition and Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
7.3.2.1 Data Structure Definition and Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
7.3.2.2 Algorithm Definition and Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
7.3.3 Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
7.3.4 System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
7.4 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
7.5 Performance Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
7.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
8 Concluding remarks 206
Bibliography 209
9
List of Figures
2.1 NIST Cloud Computing Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2 Cloud Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.1 Access Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.1 Trust Model of User Revocation via Ciphertext Re-encryption for ABE in Cloud Storage115
5.2 Interaction Diagram of User Revocation via Ciphertext Re-encryption for ABE in
Cloud Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.3 Trust Model of User Revocation via Cloud Service Providers for ABE . . . . . . 131
5.4 Interaction Diagram of User Revocation via Cloud Service Providers for ABE . . 139
5.5 Overhead Comparison of User Revocation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.1 Trust Model of Attribute Revocation System for ABE in Cloud Storage . . . . . 154
6.2 Attribute Accumulator Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.3 Interaction Diagram of Attribute Revocation System for ABE in Cloud Storage 170
6.4 Overheads of the Attribute Revocation System (AR-ABE) . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7.1 Trust Model of Anonymous User Revocation Model for ABS in Cloud Storage . 185
7.2 Interaction Diagram of Anonymous User Revocation Model for ABS in Cloud Storage 197
7.3 Performance Comparison of ABS and AUR-ABS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
10
List of Tables
5.1 DA Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2 User Revocation System Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.1 Attribute Revocation System Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.1 Anonymous User Revocation Model Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
11
Chapter 1
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The need for distributed data storage has been driven by distributed computing environments
and data sharing demands. Distributed data storage is the result of advances in network
infrastructures and technologies of the past decades [78]. Over the years storage systems have
rapidly evolved. They have become one of the most important components in every business,
as well as something of significance to individual users. As the amount of electronically stored
data increases rapidly every day, tremendous pressure has been placed on storage infrastructure
to scale well with the growth of data while continuing to provide high performance.
The amount of electronically stored sensitive data, such as healthcare records, customer records
or financial data, has also increased rapidly. Since data tends to be shared, replicated, and re-
tained online in order to satisfy various information system requirements, such as performance,
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availability, and recovery, storage systems are becoming much more complicated and vulnerable
to security breaches. The goals of storage security are to protect data from unauthorized access
and changes and to prevent data secrecy from being disclosed.
Cloud-based storage is a newly emerged service model to both businesses and individual users
for either paid or free storage resources. Due to its friendly accessibility, unlimited capacity,
and economic benefits, users find it attractive. The advantage of cloud storage over distributed
storage systems (see Section 2.1) is its ability to leverage virtualization techniques to provide
a storage service composed of thousands of different types of networked storage devices, dis-
tributed storage systems, and storage middleware. This enables on-demand service, capacity,
and management to users anywhere via the Internet.
Since most cloud storage is provided by third-party service providers, the trust required for the
providers (CSPs) and the shared multi-tenant environment, resulting in storage virtualization,
presents special challenges for data protection and access control [78]. These unique challenges
also raise the concerns of user privacy protection for data access. Although user privacy protec-
tion is not the most obvious goal of storage security, we will explain why it becomes important
in untrusted storage environments in Section 2.5.1.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), a type of public key encryption, has a one-to-many rela-
tionship between a public encryption key and a set of decryption keys. ABE not only protects
data secrecy, but also has ciphertexts or decryption keys associated with fine-grain access poli-
cies that are automatically enforced during the decryption process. This enforcement puts data
13
access under control at each data item level. Descriptive access policy is not directly tied in to
an individual user’s identity, but rather to a set of common attributes among users who need
the access. This attribute indirectly provides a kind of anonymous data access for user privacy
protection. ABE schemes can be classified into two categories: key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) (see
Section 4.1.1.2) and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) (see Section 4.1.1.3 ).
Although ABE seems to be an ideal choice for meeting data protection goals in an untrusted
storage environment, existing ABE schemes have practical limitations when they are directly
used in cloud storage systems. These limitations include the lack of support for dynamic user
and attribute revocation, key refreshing, and an inbuilt and potentially undesirable key escrow.
Inspired by ABE, Attribute-Based Signature (ABS) schemes enable anonymous authentication
and signature generation. Since CSPs can be untrusted, we do not want CSPs to manage user
identities which can contain or be associated with users’ personal identifiable information (PII),
or user accounts with passwords for authentication. Using ABS schemes, CSPs only need a
public key and its associated access policy (referred to as predicate) to authenticate users. There
is no need for CSPs to know or store user identities or login information. Although ABS seems
to be an ideal anonymous authentication mechanism, existing schemes also have limitations
concerning the lack of dynamic user revocation, especially anonymous user revocation.
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1.1. MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH STATEMENT
1.1 Motivation and Research Statement
Motivated by the practical limitations of ABE and ABS, in this thesis we pose the following
central research question:
How can practical ABE and ABS schemes be constructed to enforce distributed data and user
privacy protection efficiently and flexibly in untrusted cloud storage environments?
Throughout this thesis we assume that CSPs are not fully trusted, meaning that they are
trusted to do what they are supposed to do, but are also curious to learn the secrecy of data
or user identities (see Section 2.5.1). Using ABE and ABS schemes to protect data and user
privacy in these kinds of cloud environments requires:
• ABE schemes to be capable of preventing revoked users or attributes from decrypting
data;
• ABS schemes to be capable of revoking user access rights;
• User access control to be anonymous with respect to untrusted cloud storage or CSPs
and not require any administration of user management from CSPs.
The solutions to the above requirements require enabling of the following features:
• ABE schemes: dynamic user and attribute revocation. These features need to avoid
15
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expensive re-issuing of users’ private keys, and the revocation processes need to have
built-in user privacy protection.
• ABS schemes: dynamic user revocation. The revocation process avoids expensive re-
issuing of users’ private (signing) keys and is anonymous in that the authenticating party
should be able to distinguish the signatures from the revoked users without being able to
link any signature to any particular user.
Although issues concerning user and attribute revocation in ABE schemes have been studied
in the literature, most of the proposed schemes work for only one type of ABE scheme. User
privacy protection has been left out from those revocation systems. Since each ABE scheme has
its own strengths, it is more desirable that the developed mechanism is as generic as possible so
that it can be directly adapted by any ABE scheme to address user and attribute revocation. In
addition, a revocation process should have built-in user privacy protection in untrusted cloud
storage systems.
The existing ABS user revocation schemes often need to uncover a user’s identity during the
signature verification process in order to distinguish if the signatures are generated by revoked
users or not. Many existing schemes employ a trusted entity to maintain and identify user
identities in order to distinguish the signatures from revoked users. We argue that this setting
conflicts with the anonymity property of ABS. The user revocation process should also be
anonymous in that the signatures of revoked or non-revoked users should be distinguishable
with neither knowledge of an individual’s identity nor signature verification by a third party.
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1.2. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
1.2 Our Contributions
In this thesis we propose practical systems and adaptable models for using ABE and ABS
schemes in untrusted cloud storage. Those models and systems enable ABE and ABS to
overcome the possible limitations and make them more suitable for untrusted cloud storage
environments. Before we describe our proposed models and systems, we want to clarify two
things:
1. Model versus System: Although all the proposed mechanisms are schemes, we use model
to indicate that a proposed scheme does not treat an ABE or ABS scheme as a black
box. A model needs to be adapted to fit an ABE or ABS scheme, ideally with only minor
modification to the scheme. A system is a scheme that treats an ABE or ABS scheme
as a black box. It builds a wrapper outside an ABE or ABS scheme, which can then be
directly applied without modification.
2. Characteristics of proposed models and systems:
• Flexible: the proposed model can work directly for a scheme with at most minor
modifications to the scheme.
• Generic: the proposed system can be directly applied to a scheme with no modifi-
cation to the scheme.
• Dynamic: the proposed model or system can avoid user private or signing keys
needing to be re-issued as well as data needing to be re-encrypted.
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• User privacy protection: the proposed model or system has built-in user privacy pro-
tection that allows a user to access data anonymously or to be verified anonymously
by cloud storage service providers.
We highlight our main contributions as follows:
1. A survey of distribute storage systems. This survey investigates the security issues and
challenges concerning distributed and cloud storage systems. It then identifies the secu-
rity requirements for data and user privacy protection in untrusted cloud storage envi-
ronments.
2. Two generic user revocation systems for ABE with user privacy protection. The two
systems, UR-CRE and UR-CSP, work with any type of ABE scheme to dynamically
revoke users.
3. A generic attribute revocation system for ABE with user privacy protection (AR-ABE).
AR-ABE works with any ABE scheme to dynamically revoke attributes. Any attribute
revoked from a user does not impact the same attribute used by other users.
4. An Anonymous user revocation model (AUR-ABS) for ABS with user privacy protection.
An ABS scheme with AUR-ABS model enables CSPs to anonymously identify whether a
signature is generated by a revoked user or not during the signature verification process.
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1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2: Security Services and Techniques Suitable for Distributed and Cloud Storage
Systems
We survey the existing distributed and cloud storage systems and identify the security services
and techniques suitable for data protection and access control in these environments. We
then define the special requirements of data and user privacy protection in untrusted cloud
storage environments. Based on these requirements, we compare existing data and user privacy
protection mechanisms and their possible shortcomings in cloud storage environments. Most
of the content of this chapter was published in [144].
• Chapter 3: Cryptographic Preliminaries and Background
We present relevant background material and notation necessary to understand the remainder
of the thesis. We start with a brief introduction to relevant notions from mathematics. We then
review the concepts of modern cryptography and complexity theory that will be used later.
• Chapter 4: Attribute-Based Cryptography
We introduce attribute-based encryption (ABE) and attribute-based signature (ABS) schemes.
19
1.3. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
We begin with a description of the concept of ABE followed by related work. We then introduce
the concept of an ABS scheme and describe the construction of a threshold ABS scheme [83],
which will be used in Chapter 7.
• Chapter 5: Generic User Revocation Systems for ABE in Cloud Storage
In this chapter we propose two dynamic user revocation systems that are generic for any ABE
scheme. These systems have user privacy protections and are suitable to be used in untrusted
cloud storage environments.
• Chapter 6: A Generic Attribute Revocation System for ABE in Cloud Storage
We propose a user attribute revocation system that meets the requirements of being generic,
dynamic, and having built-in user privacy.
• Chapter 7: An Anonymous User Revocation Model for ABS in Cloud Storage
We propose an anonymous user revocation model (AUR-ABS) for ABS schemes. Our user
revocation model is dynamic and open for adaptation by ABS schemes. The model not only
removes the involvement of a third party in the path of signature generation or verification,
but also makes the user revocation completely anonymous. The content of this chapter was
published in [143].
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• Chapter 8: Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we briefly talk about our research journey, conclude the thesis and suggest
future directions for research.
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The rapid growth of data and data sharing has driven an evolution in distributed storage
systems. The need for data protection and greater capacity for handling massive data volume
has encouraged research to develop secure and scalable storage. In this chapter we identify
major security issues and requirements of data protection related to distributed data storage
systems, in particular to cloud storage systems.
2.1 Distributed Data Storage Systems
Distributed data storage can be built from many small-scale unreliable, or low availability,
distributed hosts. Users access distributed data storage though their local networks or the
Internet.
Generally speaking, there are four types of common storage infrastructures [66]: Direct Attached
Storage (DAS) [4], Network Attached Storage (NAS) [54], Storage Area Networks (SAN) [54],
and Object Storage [96]. Most current distributed storage systems are built on these common
storage infrastructures.
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From a data formatting point of view, we classify different types of storage as file, block, and
object (also referred to as object-based) storage. File storage stores data in individual files
organized by folders and file hierarchy [119]. Block storage splits data or files into evenly sized
blocks, with each block associated with its address within disk sectors and track [2]. Object
storage splits data or files into data objects. Each object is self-contained with its metadata
and a globally unique identifier [50]. The data sizes and formats of objects can vary with no
hierachy structure. This makes object storage be more efficient on data searching, mining, and
analytics. Amazon S3 [3] is an example of cloud-based object storage systems.
From the user and application standpoints, we classify distributed data storage systems into
centralized, decentralized or hybrid storage systems [144]. In a centralized storage system, data
and files are managed by a central component. A uniform interface provides a single point
of view to the underlying storage system. In a distributed management system, data and file
management are distributed to individual storage servers or devices. Users have to access each
individual storage server to locate or access data. A hybrid storage system separates data access
and metadata management from the data I/O path. Data access is through a central compo-
nent, while data retrieval can be conducted directly from individual storage servers or devices
simultaneously. This hybrid approach allows data to be split into data blocks. These data
blocks are stored on different network servers, which allows unlimited sizes of data files. In ad-
dition, simultaneously retrieving data blocks from different network servers achieves maximum
throughput.
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2.2 Data Protection Challenges in Distributed Data
Storage Systems
Although distributed data storage provides many benefits, protecting distributed data storage
introduces many challenges:
1. Data is highly distributed across a network, thus increasing management complexity and
introducing more vulnerability points with respect to data integrity and privacy.
2. A decentralized system can be built on different sub-systems. Those sub-systems may
use different storage infrastructures, data or file formats, and storage technologies. This
complexity creates more vulnerability to security breaches, as different storage infrastruc-
tures may be vulnerable to different security threats. The security of the whole system
depends on the security of the weakest sub-system.
3. Highly distributed storage systems can consist of storage systems residing anywhere, pos-
sibly even across different security domains or regions. Therefore, sensitive data protection
in distributed storage systems not only serves to control who can access the data, but
also needs to secure data in transit and at rest in different domains and regions. Some
legislation and regulatory requirements for data access and protection may be different.
4. Legislation has placed more security demands for the preservation and retrieval of long-
term stored data. Extended retention time provides wider time windows for attackers
to discover or damage data. Dramatically increased computing power and resources can
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result in the strength of encryption algorithm used for encrypting the archived data (when
the data was stored) being regarded as weaker over time. Backward compatibility after
data migration, data format translation, re-encryption of data without any violation of
secrecy policy due to the weaker strength of the used encryption algorithm, authorized
integrity correction due to the corruption or malicious attacks, and data recovery due to
delete of, are examples of long-term data protection issues.
5. Although there are many data protection mechanisms available today, no single method
can protect a distributed data storage system and address all vulnerabilities. For example,
encryption can protect data secrecy but cannot address data recovery and availability.
Authentication and authorization can prevent unauthorized data access, but cannot re-
place integrity and confidentiality protection. The use of data replication may provide
availability and fault tolerance but may also increase storage complexity and exposure to
confidentiality and integrity attacks.
Different distributed data storage systems are vulnerable to different threats. When selecting
and designing a distributed data storage system, we have to weigh trade-offs of security counter-
measures, system performance, and network overheads within specific environments. Therefore
it is very important to understand the threats to a specific distributed data storage system
before implementing any security features.
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2.3 Threats to Distributed Data Storage Systems
The goals of storage security are to protect data from unauthorized access and alteration as well
as prevent sensitive data from being disclosed to non-legitimate users or applications at rest or in
transit. Understanding threats at each entry point and layer is essential to selecting the right
protection strategies. Distributed data storage protection includes trade-offs. For example,
encryption can impact performance, usability, and capability for data recovery. Data replication
provides availability, but can open up more entry points for attacks. Storage standards which
define interoperability for various storage systems also need to be considered when selecting
the right countermeasures.
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA triangle) are defined by the Committee on Na-
tional Security Systems (CNSS) as the three core characteristics of protecting critical data [139].
The CIA triangle has long been an industry “model” for computer and data security. Although
the CIA triangle model is still mentioned as the industry standards for data protection, it does
not adequately address today’s environments. While CIA deals with data protection, data also
needs to be accessed by users. Data security also needs consideration of access control, which
restricts un-authorized users or entities from accessing data. Data access control should consist
of authentication (a process of identifying users who want to access data) and authorization (a
process to prevent the data from unauthorized access or modification). In untrusted storage
environments, an authentication mechanism also needs to protect user privacy for the reasons
explained in Section 2.5.1.
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In this thesis, we consider data security in four dimensions: confidentiality, integrity, availabil-
ity, and access control (CIAA). Hasan et al. [66] classifies storage threats based on the four
dimensions as follows.
2.3.1 Threats to Confidentiality
General threats to confidentiality include sniffing storage traffic, snooping on buffer caches,
deleting storage blocks, de-allocating memory, and file system profiling [110] (an attack that uses
system metadata to gain knowledge of system’s operational information, such as Input/Output
performance, file accessing protocols, CPU power, etc. The metadata information can assist
attacking on accessing decrypted data, or encryption keys). Storage and backup media can be
stolen in order to access the data or brute force keys.
2.3.2 Threats to Integrity
General threats to integrity include storage jamming (a malicious but surreptitious modification
of stored data) to modify or replace the original data, metadata modification to disrupt a storage
system, subversion attacks to gain unauthorized OS level access to modify critical system data,
man-in-the-middle attacks to change data contents in transit, exploitation of storage backup
procedures or applications, hardware failures, and long-time data preservation providing a large
time window for adversaries to find collisions of hash values.
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2.3.3 Threats to Availability
General threats to availability include denial-of-service (DoS) or distributed DoS (DDoS), disk
fragmentation, network disruption, and file deletion. Buffer overflows in applications have al-
lowed attackers to take control of systems, execute malicious code, and launch DoS attacks.
Centralized data location management or indexing of servers can be points of failure or victims
of DoS attacks. For long-term data archive systems, data retention introduces additional chal-
lenges such as long-term key management for encrypted data, constant protection against new
threats, backward system compatibility, new technology adoption, and data recovery [125].
2.3.4 Threats to Access Control
General threats to access control include privilege escalation to access unauthorized data, ses-
sion hijacking, man-in-the-middle attacks, authentication token theft, and replay attacks that
trick the system into performing unauthorized operations.
2.4 Data Protection Mechanisms
Common mechanisms for preventing or minimizing the risks posed by those threats listed in
section 2.3 are access control, confidentiality protection, integrity protection, data availability
and recovery mechanisms, and auditing.
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2.4.1 Access Control
Access control typically includes authentication and authorization. The access control type
can be either centralized or decentralized. In both types, the control validates legitimate
entities (authentication) for accessing data according to pre-defined policies (authorization).
The access privileges of an entity need to be periodically reviewed or re-granted to prevent
replay and impersonation attacks, as well as to remove excessively granted privileges from an
entity if those privileges are no longer needed.
2.4.2 Confidentiality Protection
Encryption and secret sharing are commonly used methods for confidentiality protection. En-
cryption uses keys to encrypt data. Key management is critical, in addition to key or encryption
algorithm strength. A widely distributed environment requires the key management to be flex-
ible and adaptable for key distribution, refreshing and revocation. Secret sharing splits secrets
into multiple shares. It protects data without the use of keyed encryption. Thus, it replaces key
management with secret share management. However, those secret shares also require periodi-
cal secure transfer, access, and renewal. Since a secret sharing mechanism can generate multiple
data shares, with each share potentially being the same size as or larger than the original data
size, more storage space and additional network communication are required. These overheads
may impact system performance.
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2.4.3 Integrity Protection
Integrity mechanisms protect data from unauthorized modification, while non-repudiation mech-
anisms prevent an entity from denying a modification of the data. Storage integrity violation
has two different aspects: hardware or software malfunctions and malicious intentions [61].
Integrity protection against hardware or software malfunction is typically provided by tech-
nologies, such as mirroring, parity, erasure codes, or hash functions. Integrity despite malicious
attacks requires digital signatures or message authentication codes (MAC). Both mechanisms
can detect unauthorized modification of data, while digital signatures additionally provide non-
repudiation verification.
2.4.4 Data Availability and Recovery
Data availability and recovery functionality are very important to critical data for users and
applications. Availability is particularly important to accessibility to critical long retention
data. Recovery mechanisms repair damaged data or re-encrypt the data when a key gets
lost, a key is compromised, or selected encryption algorithms become vulnerable to known
attacks. Replication or data redundancy provides both data availability and recovery capability.
Intrusion detection or prevention mechanisms detect or prevent malicious activity aimed at
stealing or damaging data.
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2.4.5 Auditing
Maintaining audit logs is critical for storage systems. Audit logs not only provide evidence
of compliance but also form the basis for system recovery, intrusion detection, and computer
forensics.
2.5 Cloud Storage
Cloud storage is a form of distributed storage that provides massive storage resources and
services to meet on-demand data center growth for corporations as well as remote storage for
small businesses and individuals. Cloud storage is a service model provided by cloud computing
[67, 94, 137], which is a computing paradigm that uses Internet-based services to support
business needs. It allows consumers to pay for IT services on a utility-like basis, using a shared
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g. networks, servers, storage, applications, and
services). The main attributes of cloud computing include rapid deployment, low start-up
costs and capital investment, costs based on usage and subscription, and multi-tenant sharing
of services and resources. Figure 2.1 shows the NIST cloud computing model [94].
As a type of infrastructure as a service (IaaS) offered by cloud computing, cloud storage pools
and consolidates storage resources that can be administered on demand. It is a storage model
that may run on different storage infrastructures, multiple devices, in many application do-
mains, or with the inclusion of many services [149]. Cloud storage provides consumers with a
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Figure 2.1: NIST Cloud Computing Model
unified interface that abstracts the different storage infrastructures and physical locations of
the storage, making whether the storage is local or remote (or hybrid) irrelevant. This means
that cloud storage is by default shared by many users on many layers of the storage stack. This
shared environment is referred to as multi-tenancy. Figure 2.2 shows a typical infrastructure
diagram for cloud storage. Examples of cloud storage providers include Dropbox [5], Amazon
S3 [3], and Google Drive [6].
As a type of cloud service model, cloud storage inherits the benefits of cloud computing [33, 55,
98] and is argued by many people to offer a range of advantages over traditional owned storage
systems. Those potential benefits include:
• Cost savings. Using cloud storage, a company does not need to undertake the capital
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expense of purchasing or maintaining storage equipment or physical servers.
• Mobility and Accessibility. Cloud storage allows consumers to access data via the Internet,
using any device, independent of current location.
• Flexibility. Cloud storage is capable of adapting to on-demand storage capacity changes
by provisioning and deprovisioning resources quickly. Consumers only pay for the server
space they use, rather than the space they might eventually need.
• Reliability and Availability. Virtualization technologies enable cloud storage to poten-
tially supply unlimited storage space to users. Since data can be duplicated and backed
up to cloud storage, when one server goes down, other servers can immediately be put
into service. In the event of catastrophic data loss, data can be rapidly restored.
• Agility. Cloud storage enables rapid development, deployment, and change management.
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• Collaboration and Sharing. Cloud storage services facilitate simpler data sharing between
companies and organizations.
While the benefits of cloud storage are compelling, cloud storage does have its potential down-
sides and risks, as follows [1]:
• Cost. Cloud storage services may have a specific bandwidth allowance. If an organization
surpasses the given allowance, the additional charges could be significant.
• Mobility and Accessibility. Reliance on Internet connectivity at the customer’s end might
create a single point of failure.
• Insecure or incomplete data deletion. Data duplication and redundancy provide reliability
and availability, but can also result in insecure or incomplete data deletion.
• Lock-in. Cloud storage standards are not yet fully established, particularly with regard
to portability of data, applications, and services. Consumers thus face difficulties if they
migrate from one storage provider to another.
• Data protection and security. As data is outsourced to a third party storage system, data
owners lose physical control of their data. Data security is thus a big concern when using
cloud storage.
In this thesis, we focus on the last of these issues by extending data protection mechanisms
suitable for cloud storage. In particular we consider data protection and access control in
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untrusted cloud storage environments.
2.5.1 Cloud Storage Security Challenges
In addition to the discussed security issues of distributed storage systems, cloud storage has
unique challenges [41, 111, 131, 55] that arise from two major aspects: trust in the cloud storage
providers (CSPs) and the shared storage environments (multi-tenancy). Those unique security
challenges have special requirements for data protection and access control.
2.5.1.1 Trust in CSPs.
In traditional storage systems, storage servers are trusted to protect the data stored on the
servers. This kind of trust does not necessarily exist in a cloud storage environment. After
data is outsourced to cloud storage, data owners lose physical control of it. Data confidentiality
and integrity are thus at increased risk.
Although sensitive data can be encrypted before it is sent to cloud storage, key distribution and
management become more complicated. The mobility and accessibility of cloud storage enable
users to access data at any time from anywhere in the cloud. Any adopted encryption mech-
anism must be suitable for dynamic environments and users. As the CSPs may be untrusted,
data owners need to take responsibility for key distribution and management. This approach
presents a number of performance and scalability issues, especially when a potentially large
number of users desire fine-grained access to the data.
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As encryption has key distribution and management overhead, it is undesirable for non-sensitive
data. Data protection for non-sensitive data should be more focused on access control, and
unauthorized modification or corruption. Although data integrity can be achieved by the
mechanisms mentioned in Section 2.4.3, verifying correctness of data in the cloud may be
challenging because the original copy of the data may no longer be held by the data owners.
User privacy or personal information is a further issue of concern [12]. Traditionally storage
servers are trusted to mediate user access to stored data. User access management is typically
via user account management, which can store or link to user personal information. This
personal information can include a range of data items, such as user or account names, email
addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, social security numbers, etc., which are combined to
form Personally Identifiable Information (PII) data [92]. PII data is treated as sensitive data,
which can be used or linked to an individual’s identity. As CSPs may not be fully trusted,
relying on a CSP’s administration of user accounts, or sharing/storing user PII data at CSPs,
is problematic.
2.5.1.2 Multi-Tenant Environments
In traditional storage systems, the data stored on the servers is typically from the same security
domain or shared by users in the same organization. In cloud storage, virtualization (enabling
multi-tenancy) allows data from different security domains to be stored on the same physical
server, or a single data owner’s data to be stored on multiple servers, which can reside in
different security domains. The risk of unauthorized data access to other user’s data in such
37
2.5. CLOUD STORAGE
an environment is a big concern [39].
In multi-tenant storage environments, the hypervisor of the virtualization may have privileged
access to the hardware’s physical resources. In the event that a hypervisor is compromised, it
may be possible to intercept the contents of memory, virtual network traffic, and other forms of
communication that occur from other virtualization environments hosting different applications
on the same physical server [55]. This can lead to user privacy disclosure of other applications,
as well as information about their data access patterns. Data access patterns can be used by
malicious insiders or external attackers in order to gain knowledge of the possible importance
of files, which can then be either damaged or manipulated in order to achieve malicious goals,
such as denial-of-service attacks (DoS).
2.5.2 Requirements for Protecting Data Secrecy and User Privacy
in Cloud Storage
Motivated by the special needs of data protection and access control in a cloud storage environ-
ment, in this thesis we study effective and efficient access control mechanisms to protect data
secrecy and user privacy. We assume that the cloud storage trust model consists of at least
three parties in general:
• Cloud Storage Provider (CSP). These CSPs provide cloud storage services to users. They
are not fully trusted. They are assumed to faithfully perform the required tasks, but are
curious to learn the secrecy of data or user identities.
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• Users. Users access the data stored on cloud storage. They are untrusted.
• Data owners (DO). Data owners store data in cloud storage. They are responsible for
protecting the data.
Due to the trustworthiness of cloud storage systems, data needs to be capable of “self-protection”.
We refer to this as data-centric access control. In data-centric access control, sensitive data
is encrypted before it is sent to cloud storage. Thus data-centric access control requires the
following characteristics:
• Fine-grained protection. The data access policy is defined at a data-item level. The
access policy should be enforced at each access attempt, with or without the data owner’s
involvement.
• Dynamic access rights management. The granting or revoking of user access rights to a
particular data item should be straightforward to conduct and should, ideally, be per-
formed almost instantaneously.
• Efficient key management. Critical key management operations such as key distribution,
key revocation, and key refreshing should be conducted in an efficient manner that scales
well and is appropriate for the highly dynamic and heterogeneous nature of a cloud storage
environment.
User access control and management in untrusted cloud storage should consider user privacy
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protection. We refer to this as the user-centric access control. We argue that it requires the
following characteristics:
• Anonymous access control. Access control mechanisms should authenticate users anony-
mously.
• Dynamic user management. User access granting or revocation should be anonymous,
dynamic, and instantaneous to CSPs. CSPs should not need to know any user’s actual
identification information (PII) or administrate any user information that can be directly
or indirectly linked to the user’s true identity.
• Fine-grained policy. Access policies should be fine-grained and expressive. They should
not contain or be able to hint at any user’s identification information and should be
enforced by CSPs.
As data is accessed by users, a data access control mechanism in an untrusted cloud storage
should be concerned with both the requirements of data and user-centric controls.
2.6 Existing Access Control and Data Protection Tech-
niques
Existing access control mechanisms consist of a large set of technologies. Depending on the
trustworthiness of a server, there are two general approaches: server-mediated and cryptographically-
enforced access control.
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To understand how those approaches work in an untrusted cloud storage environment, let us
first take a look at the following scenario:
Suppose a small global company XYZ wants to use cloud storage for storing their HR data. Their
HR personnel from different offices worldwide can access it through the Internet. Depending
on the responsibility of the HR personnel, the access to the data may need to be controlled.
Company XYZ is concerned about whether its data will be properly protected or not. It is also
concerned with the protection of employee identities and PII data during the account creation
and authentication process.
2.6.1 Server-Mediated Access Control
Server-mediated access control is the traditional approach [123], which is mainly based on the
reference monitor concept [11]. It requires the servers who mediate access to be fully trusted.
Server-mediated access control typically includes traditional authentication and authorization
mechanisms, in which users establish a trusted server to store data in the clear and then
delegates that server to perform authentication and authorization checking on every access
request. The most commonly used authentication methods include username and password
as well as certificate-based techniques that normally use Public key Infrastructure (PKI) [8].
Username and password authentication relies on identity management systems to maintain
and validate user credentials and their associated data, which can include PII data. Although
certificate-based authentication does not depend on an identity management system, both user
certificates and certificates of trusted authorities need to be managed and distributed. In
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addition, user certificates can contain user identification information.
Traditional authorization models utilize user capabilities, roles, or resource access control lists
(ACLs) for granting access rights. The access policies define the rules by which access control
must be regulated. Policies can be grouped into classes, such as [118]:
• Discretionary (DAC): the policies enforce the rules that define who is, or is not, authorized
to carry out which actions on which resources.
• Mandatory (MAC): the policies control access based on mandated regulations determined
by a central authority.
• Role-based (RBAC): the policies control access depending on the roles that users have
within the system, and on rules stating what access is allowed to users in given roles.
While server-mediated access control is an acceptable way to protect data access, it requires
company XYZ to fully trust CSPs. For untrusted CSPs, company XYZ may have the following
concerns:
1. Data privacy. If the data is not encrypted, XYZ’s HR data can be accessed by anyone
who can access the server. While this may not be an issue if the stored data is pub-
lic information, it is a concern if the data contains sensitive information, such as PII
information.
2. Access policy enforcement. Server-mediated access control is only implemented at the
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server level instead of the data item level. The data access policies may not be enforced
when XYZ’s HR data is transferred across the network or is temporarily cached on an
intermediate server.
3. User privacy. The server needs to manage user accounts and access, which could contain
or use PII data. If XYZ does not fully trusted the server, the company may want to
protect their employees’ privacy with anonymous access control.
Due to the above concerns, sever-mediated access control does not naturally fit in an untrusted
cloud storage environment.
2.6.2 Cryptographically-Enforced Access Control
An alternative approach is to use cryptographically-enforced access control [56, 65, 97], which
is access control provided through cryptographic “sealing”. A data owner encrypts data using
an encryption technology. The decryption key is controlled by an access policy or a trusted
party to ensure that only appropriate parties can obtain it. Cryptographically-enforced access
control allows users to store their data on an untrusted server.
Using cryptographically-enforced access control, company XYZ can first encrypt HR data with
a key and map an access policy to the decryption key. After that, the encrypted HR data is
stored on cloud storage. Since the data is encrypted, only users who are given the decryption
key can decrypt and access the data. The data is self-protected in the sense that the access
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policy is also bound to the data. This is important since data could be stored and replicated
anywhere on the servers within the cloud storage environment. In some situations, this could
mean that the same data resides on servers in different countries.
There are two types of data encryption approach: symmetric encryption and asymmetric en-
cryption. We now discuss how these encryption approaches can be used by company XYZ
to enforce its access policies. We will also analyze the limitations that motivate our research
objectives.
2.6.2.1 Access Control with Symmetric-Key Encryption
Symmetric encryption, such as [10, 43], uses the same key to encrypt and decrypt data. It is also
known as secret-key encryption since the encryption key must be kept secret and only shared
amongst the legitimate users. Company XYZ can use symmetric encryption to protect their
data and enforce access control policies through key distribution. Two possible, but flawed,
approaches are:
1. The company can generate one secret key and encrypt all their HR records with the same
key. It only needs to distribute the key privately to the employees who need to access the
data. The limitation of this approach is that the data sharing is “all-or-nothing.” The
company does not have the flexibility to choose a fine-grained access policy. For example,
a salary record can only be viewed by managers and above. Another drawback is that
the company has to distribute the same secret key to all intended users. If only one user
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is compromised with the distributed key, all the HR records are potentially exposed.
2. Alternatively the company can generate a different set of keys, with each key encrypting
a set of records. Different keys are thus shared among different groups of users. Although
this approach overcomes the all-or-nothing problem, the key management becomes com-
plicated. For example, if the company wants to allow n record sets with different access
rights, then it has to create and securely distribute n keys. In addition, if a data item is
shared among all of them, it has to be encrypted n times.
In both approaches, key distribution and access control need to be performed by data owners.
This means that data owners have to be online all the time to mediate access to the data. This
is not feasible and scalable in a highly distributed environment. Thus symmetric encryption
does not exactly meet the requirements of data-centric protection.
Encryption has performance and key distribution overhead. For some internal data such as
company XYZ’s general announcements that are not sensitive and only used by internal em-
ployees, it is more efficient to store these unencrypted. Authentication can be used to control
who can access the data. Symmetric encryption can also be used for user authentication. Us-
ing Message Authentication Code (MAC) [21], a unique secret key is shared between users and
an authentication server. A user is authenticated by sending to the authentication server a
randomly generated message (the challenge) encrypted by the secret key. If the server can
match the received encrypted message (the response) using its shared secret key, the user is
authenticated.
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Although company XYZ can use symmetric encryption authentication for access control of
insensitive data, it is unfeasible to share a secret with untrusted CSPs.
2.6.2.2 Access Control with Asymmetric Cryptography
Asymmetric encryption [9, 46], also referred to as public-key encryption (PKE), uses a pair of
public and private keys. The public key is public, and mathematically related to its private key
that is kept secretly. Data is encrypted under the public key and decrypted by the private key.
Public-key encryption can also be used to support user authentication using digital signatures
[112]. In a digital signature scheme, a user is required to sign a piece of information using a
private signing key. Only the public verification key associated with the private signing key is
able to validate the signature. This implies that the signature is genuinely generated by the
user. Digital signatures can also validate the integrity of data, but they do not protect the
secrecy of data.
Using PKE, company XYZ can protect its sensitive HR data as follows:
• A manager first generates a pair of keys. The manager uses the public key to encrypt
all the HR data and stores it on the storage server. When someone needs to access the
data, the manager will download and decrypt the data, then re-encrypt the records using
the employee’s public key based on the HR access policy. The issue with this approach
is that the manager has to remain on-line to mediate the requests.
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• Another way to do this is for the manager to encrypt the records using the employees’
public keys based on their HR access control policies. However, the manager needs to
obtain all the employees’ public keys ahead of time in order to encrypt the data. This
is difficult to manage because employees can move on to other groups or new employees
can join. Also, PKE tends to be a one-to-one relationship, meaning that one key pair is
owned by one user. If a record is shared by n users, the record will need to be encrypted
n times.
For protecting its internal data, company XYZ can implement user authentication as follows:
• Every employee is issued with a digital signature key pair. The company sends all the
public verification keys to the CSP. At the time when the CSP authenticates an employee,
the CSP randomly generates a piece of information for the employee to sign. The CSP
validates the signature with the employee’s public key.
As we can see, there are two main benefits of using asymmetric cryptography over symmetric
cryptography. Firstly the public key is readily available to the public. In fact, public keys
are often published in public directories on the Internet so that they can be easily retrieved.
This simplifies key distribution efforts. Secondly it enables user authentication with digital
signatures, which does not require a secret to be shared with CSPs. Moreover, the verification
keys are also public keys and publicly available. However, the issues with using public-key
cryptography are as follows:
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• Encryption. Data has to be encrypted multiple times using all the public keys of each
user who needs to share the data. The data owner has to know who will require access to
the data ahead of time. Multiple encryption also introduces a large overhead if the data
needs to be shared among large group of users. Furthermore, since the access control
policy (regarding who can decrypt data) is separated from the ciphertext, it cannot be
directly enforced by CSPs.
• Authentication. Although digital signatures are a viable authentication method for cloud
storage, they still require CSPs to keep all users’ public keys. As each public key can be
linked to an employee’s identity, this may still be an issue when it comes to protecting
employees’ privacy.
2.6.2.3 Attribute-Based Encryption and Signatures
The notion of Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) was introduced by Sahai and Waters [116]
in 2005. It is a type of public-key encryption, which has a one-to-many relationship between a
public key and a set of decryption keys. ABE is a generalization of Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE) [25], in which data is encrypted by a public key and a set of system parameters. The
decryption keys or decryption process is associated with an access policy. A user can encrypt
data addressed to a group of users that fit a specific set of requirements without knowing
each individual user in the group ahead of time. Users who have the attributes satisfying the
access policy can decrypt the data. All the ciphertexts or decryption keys are associated with
fine-grained access policies that are automatically enforced in the decryption process.
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When using ABE to protect sensitive data, company XYZ can use one public key to encrypt
the data just once. It then defines different access policies so that different users are granted
access to different sets of HR records. Since the access policy can be automatically enforced
during the decryption process, it does not need data owners or a third party, such as a CSP,
to mediate the data access. Furthermore, when data is backed up on different servers in the
cloud, the access policy is also transferred and enforced. ABE seems to be the ideal choice
for data-centric protection in a cloud environment. However, it does come with the following
practical limitations on user management:
• Dynamic user revocation. An access policy in ABE defines a group of users who share
the same set of attributes. When an employee leaves the company or switches to another
department, the employee may no longer be entitled to access the data. But the employee
may still hold a valid private key to decrypt the data. In order to revoke the employee’s
rights, company XYZ will have to re-generate the public key and re-issue new private
keys to other employees in the same group (or groups). Also the data will need to be
decrypted and re-encrypted under the new key.
• Dynamic user attribute revocation. A user can have their status changed over time. Those
changes can invalidate one or multiple attributes of the user. Attribute revocation can
be more granular than user revocation, because a user may still hold other attributes
that can satisfy other access policies. Any revoked attribute from a user could be valid
for other users. The revocation should not impact the attribute usage of other users.
Like user revocation, a user’s attribute revocation requires key re-generation and data
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re-encryption can significant impact the usability and scalability of ABE.
Inspired by ABE, Attribute-Based Signatures (ABS) schemes [90] enable anonymous authenti-
cation and signature generation. In ABS a set of system attributes are used to define predicates
in a similar way to the access policy in ABE. A public key is used to validate signers who have
the attributes complying to a predicate. To authenticate a user, a user uses his private key to
sign a piece of data according to the predicate. The signature can only be validated if the user
has attributes complying with the predicate. CSPs only need the public key and associated
predicate to authenticate users with no need of knowing individual user identity or certificate
information.
Using ABS, company XYZ first generates a public key and system parameters. Every employee
is issued with a signing key based on their attributes (or roles). Company XYZ then defines a
predicate that is expressed by attributes, such as {employee ∧ HR Department}. The CSP is
then given the public key and predicate. At the time when a user requests data access, the CSP
randomly generates a message (challenge) and asks the user to sign it (response). The user
generates the signature based on the predicate using his signing key. The CSP validates the
signature only if the user has the attributes conforming to the predicate. In this way the CSP
only knows that the user is one of the employees from the HR Department. The CSP cannot
link the signature to any individual user; even if the same user generates the signatures on the
same message multiple times. ABS seems to meet the requirements of user-centric protection.
However, like ABE, ABS also suffers from the issue of dynamic user revocation, especially
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anonymous user revocation. In ABS, a signature attests that a user belongs to a group who
share the same subset of attributes according to a predicate. Although each user is issued with
his own signing key, those individual signing keys are all derived from the same master secret.
This kind of setting makes a user anonymous in the process of signature verification, but leads
to issues with revoking a user from the group since the revoked user can still generate valid
signatures that can be used for authentication. Therefore the signing keys of non-revoked users
need to be re-generated.
2.7 Conclusions
ABE and ABS meet the requirements of data and user centric protection in untrusted cloud
storage systems. However, they have practical limitations when directly applied. In this chapter
we have identified these limitations. In the following chapters, we will propose deployment
models and systems designed to overcome the user and attribute revocation limitations of ABE
and ABS schemes. In doing so, we make them more practical for deployment in untrusted cloud
storage environments.
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In this chapter we provide a brief background of the cryptography necessary for the the remain-
der of the thesis. We start with a brief introduction to the necessary abstract algebra. We then
touch on the necessary concepts of modern cryptography and related complexity assumptions
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upon which our schemes are analyzed. We then describe provable security and relevant security
models.
3.1 Abstract Algebra
A group G, sometimes denoted by {G, ?}, is a set of elements with a binary operation denoted
by ?. A group G satisfies the four group axioms: closure, associativity, the identity property,
and the inverse [124]. When the group G has a finite set of elements, G is called a finite group.
The number of elements in G is called the order of the group. A cyclic group is a group that
can be generated from a single element of the group, g ∈ G. Assuming the binary operation is
multiplication, then G = 〈g〉 = {gi | i ∈ Z }, which implies that for any y ∈ G there exists an
integer i such that gi = y. Given a non-empty subset H of the group G defined under binary
operation (?), H is a subgroup of G, if H is also a group under (?).
Let Zn be the set of integers {0, 1, . . . , n - 1}, where n is a positive integer. If the operation
+ in Zn is addition modulo n, then {Zn, +} is a group and n is the order of the group. If the
operation × in Zn is multiplication modulo n, then {Zn, ×} is not a group, since not every
element in Zn has a multiplicative inverse. But if n is a prime and Z?n = Zn \ {0}, then {Z?n ,
×} is a group [124].
A field F, sometimes denoted {F, +, ×}, is a set of elements with two binary operations,
addition and multiplication. A field satisfies the following axioms: associativity, commutativity,
distributivity, the identity property, and the inverse property [124]. The number of elements
53
3.2. MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY
in a field F is called the order of the field. If the order is finite, the field is called a finite field.
Examples of fields include the real numbers R and the complex numbers C.
3.2 Modern Cryptography
The goal of modern cryptography is to design cryptographic schemes (e.g. encryption, message
authentication, etc.) with security properties that can be proven based on the robustness of
computational assumptions, such as the assumption of factorization, or discrete logarithm [77].
Modern cryptography evolved from classical cryptography [57], which is viewed as an art with
the focus of designing and using codes (also called ciphers) to enable two parties to communicate
secretly in the presence of an eavesdropper who can monitor all communication between them.
The security of classical encryption schemes relies on a secret (or a secret key) that is shared
by the communicating parties in advance and unknown to the eavesdropper. There was no
systematic way of defining what constituted a good code or proving it to be secure. In the late
1970s to early 1980s, a rich set of theories began to emerge enabling a more rigorous study
of cryptography as a science and a mathematical discipline. This perspective led to modern
cryptography.
Modern cryptography is concerned with the rigorous analysis of a cryptographic system that
should resist malicious attempts to abuse it. It is the scientific study of techniques for securing
digital information, transactions, and distributed computations. This scientific approach dis-
tinguishes modern cryptography from classical cryptography. It made cryptography go from a
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heuristic set of tools to ensure secret communication for the military to a science that helps
secure systems for ordinary people. In addition, modern cryptography has a much broader
scope. It has been extended from symmetric key encryption and data secrecy protection to also
include public-key cryptography, data integrity protection, and non-repudiation verification.
3.2.1 Principles of Modern Cryptography
Modern cryptography follows three principles: formal definitions, precise assumptions, and
proofs of security [77].
3.2.1.1 Formal Definitions
A security definition defines what a scheme can possibly achieve or what the security goal of the
scheme is. The importance of security definitions is to define security guarantees for a scheme;
provide guidance on design, construction, and usage of cryptographic primitives; and enable a
way to evaluate and analyze the security of the scheme. A security definition consists of two
components: a threat model and security guarantees.
The threat model describes the power of an adversary, or the possible attacks from the adver-
sary, but does not place any restriction on the adversary’s strategy. In other words, the threat
model only assumes an adversary’s abilities but does not assume anything as to how it uses
those abilities. For example, a threat model can assume the following attacks in the context of
encryption [77]:
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• Ciphertext-only attack : refers to a scenario where the adversary just observes one or mul-
tiple ciphertexts in an attempt to determine information about the underlying plaintext
(or plaintexts).
• Known-plaintext attack : refers to an adversary being able to learn one or more plain-
text/ciphertext pairs generated by an encryption key. The adversary attempts to deduce
information about the underlying plaintext of some other ciphertexts encrypted by the
same key.
• Chosen-plaintext attack : is a similar attack to a known-plaintext, except that an adversary
can obtain plaintext/ciphertext pairs for the plaintexts of the adversary’s choice.
• Chosen-ciphertext attack : refers to an adversary having the additional ability to obtain
information about the decryption of ciphertexts of the adversary’s choice, e.g. whether
the decryption of some ciphertexts chosen by the adversary yields a valid message or not.
Choosing the right threat model to use depends on the environment in which an encryption
scheme is deployed.
The security guarantee defines what the scheme intends to prevent an attacker from doing
or what constitutes a successful attack on the scheme. Based on Kerckhoffs’s principle, a
cryptographic system should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is
public knowledge. For example, when we define the security guarantee of an encryption scheme,
the goal of the scheme might be the following:
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• An attacker should not be able to recover the decryption key;
• The ciphertext should make it impossible for an attacker to recover the plaintext entirely
or partially, regardless of any information the attacker already has.
Semantic security [58] and ciphertext indistinguishability [99] are commonly used definitions
for secure encryption. These are essentially equivalent, and formal definitions will be given in
Section 3.2.2.
3.2.1.2 Assumptions
Modern cryptography relies on computation theory, mathematical modeling, and proofs to ar-
gue that a cryptosystem or construction is secure. Certain assumptions need to be introduced
to establish our security arguments. Those assumptions must be made explicit and mathemat-
ically precise. Examples of the assumptions include how powerful the adversary is in terms of
run time or computer resources and what the mathematical theory or known assumptions are.
3.2.1.3 Security Proofs
Security proofs provide evidence as to whether proposed constructions are secure, based on
their security definitions and assumptions. For example, either no attacker will succeed or one
will have a certain probability of breaking the system. Although security proofs in modern
cryptography are much more formal than the heuristic approach in classical cryptography,
proofs are still relative to their definitions and assumptions. If a security guarantee does not
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match the security definition, or the threat model does not capture the adversary’s true abilities,
then the proof may be irrelevant. Similarly, if an assumption turns out to be false, then the
proof of security is meaningless.
3.2.2 Computational Security
Computational security is used by modern cryptography to prove the security of a cryptographic
scheme. It uses computation theory to argue how feasibly a given adversary can break the
scheme. Computational security allows cryptographic schemes to limit the computational power
of attackers and achieve a small probability of failure.
Computational security is a weaker notion than the information-theoretic security introduced by
Shannon [122]. Information-theoretic security requires that no information about an encrypted
message be leaked, even to an eavesdropper with unlimited computational power. Information-
theoretic security is considered to be the ideal security for a cryptosystem. However, this kind
of security is also considered to be too difficulty to achieve in practice [77].
There are two types of encryption systems. In symmetric encryption, the encryption and
decryption keys are the same. Public-key encryption has distinct encryption and decryption
keys, with the encryption keys (public keys) being publicly known, and the decryption keys
being kept secret. We will proceed by explaining symmetric encryption schemes, and will define
public-key encryption in Section 3.4.
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3.2.2.1 Perfect Indistinguishability
To better understand computational security, we will explain what we mean by a small prob-
ability of failure with bounded computational power of an attacker. The security of perfect
indistinguishability [77] is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.1. A symmetric key encryption scheme is defined by three algorithms Gen,
Enc, and Dec, with a specification of a (finite) message space M where the length of M is
larger than 1: |M | > 1:
• Gen: A probabilistic key generation algorithm. We denote K as the key space (typically
a finite set), the set of all possible keys k is chosen uniformly from K, and output by Gen
→ k ∈ K.
• Enc: Taking a key k and a message m ∈ M as inputs, it outputs a ciphertext c. We
denote Enck(m) the encryption of the plaintext m using the key k. If Enc is proba-
bilistic algorithm, Enck(m) might output a different ciphertext c each time it runs. We
denote Enck(m) → c to indicate the possibly probabilistic process by which message m
is encrypted using k to output c. Let C denote the set of all possible ciphertexts that
can be output by Enck(m), for all possible choices of k ∈ K and m ∈ M . Here K and
M are assumed to be independent. The selection of k is completely independent from
message selection m. Note: in case Enc is deterministic, we emphasize this by writing c
:= Enck(m).
59
3.2. MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY
• Dec: Taking a key k and a ciphertext c as inputs, it outputs a plaintext m. We denote the
decryption of the ciphertext c using the key k by Deck(c). We assume perfect correctness,
meaning that for every key k output by Gen and every message m ∈ M , it holds that
Deck(Enck(m)) := m with probability 1.
Let Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme, and A be an adversary (eavesdropper) with
message space M and |M | > 1. We define the randomized experiment PrivKevaA,Π as follows:
1. The adversary A outputs a pair of messages m0, m1 ∈ M .
2. A key k is generated using Gen, and a uniform bit b ∈ {1, 0 } is chosen. The ciphertext
Enck(mb) → c is computed and given to A. We refer to c as the challenge ciphertext.
3. A outputs a bit b
′
.
4. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if b
′
= b, and 0 otherwise. We write
PrivKA,Π = 1 if the output of the experiment is 1 and we say that A succeeds.
Definition 3.2.2. (Perfect Indistinguishability) Encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) with
message space M is perfectly indistinguishable if for every A it holds that:
Pr
[
PrivKevaA,Π = 1
]
= 1
2
.
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3.2.2.2 Computational Indistinguishability
As perfect indistinguishability is not considered to be practical, computational indistinguisha-
bility relaxes it in two aspects: allowing a small probability of security failure, and only con-
sidering efficient adversaries (attackers). Two general approaches are used to define those
relaxations: the concrete approach and asymptotic approach.
The concrete approach [17] takes the following form of definition:
Definition 3.2.3. A scheme is (t, ε)-secure if any adversary running for time at most t succeeds
in breaking the scheme with probability at most ε.
Although a concrete approach can provide concrete guarantees of a cryptographic scheme in
terms of exact running time t and possible breaking probability ε, it is arguably difficult to
achieve those guarantees [77, 114]. For example, it may be necessary to precisely specify what
computational power an adversary has (i.e. the type of computer, or the type of operating
system, and etc.); and whether or not to consider future advances in computing power and
technology.
Instead of binding any particular computational mode to an adversary, an asymptotic approach
introduces an integer-valued security parameter (denoted by n) that parameterizes both cryp-
tographic schemes as well as all involved parties, including both honest parties and adversaries.
One of the important aspects of using the security parameter n is that the security level of
a scheme can be adjusted, i.e., n is set to different values. Also, n can be viewed as the key
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length shared by parties, including adversaries. With this security parameter n, the security
failure is defined as the probability in n, and an adversary’s running time is in a polynomial
form of n. As efficient algorithms run in polynomial time in complexity theory, an adversary is
referred as an efficient one if its execution time is bounded by polynomial time.
Definition 3.2.4. A polynomial-time algorithm is an algorithm whose worst-case running time
function is of the form O(nk), where n is the input size and k is a constant.
Definition 3.2.5. A probabilistic algorithm A is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algo-
rithm if the running time of A(x ) is bounded by p(|x |) where p is a polynomial. The running
time is measured by the number of steps in the model algorithm (i.e. the number of steps in a
probabilistic Turing machine). Tossing a coin is one step in this model.
Definition 3.2.6. A function f is negligible, if for every polynomial p, there is an N such that
for all integers n > N it holds that f(n) < 1
p(n)
.
Definition 3.2.7. (Redefining Definition 3.2.1 using Asymptotic Approach) A symmetric key
encryption scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec) such that:
• Gen(1n): takes as input 1n (i.e. the security parameter written in unary), outputs a
random key Gen(1n) → k. Without loss of generality, we assume the length of k is |k| >
n.
• Enc(k, m): takes as input a key k and a plaintext message m ∈ {0, 1}?, and outputs a
ciphertext c. As Enc may be randomized, we denote Enck(m) → c.
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• Dec(k, c): takes as input a key k and a ciphertext c, and outputs a message m or an
error. Dec is assumed to be deterministic: m := Deck(c) (without error), or ⊥ when
there is an error.
Let Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a scheme defined as above with a security parameter n. An
adversary (eavesdropper) A’s indistinguishability experiment PrivKevaA,Π (n) is defined as follows:
1. A is given an input 1n, and outputs a pair of messages m0, m1 with message lengths: |m0|
= |m1|.
2. A key k is generated by running Gen(1n), and a uniform bit b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen. Ci-
phertext c ← Enc(k, mb) is computed and given to A. We refer to c as the challenge
ciphertext.
3. A outputs a bit b
′
.
4. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if b
′
= b, and 0 otherwise. If PrivKevaA,Π
(n) = 1, we say that A succeeds.
Definition 3.2.8. A private-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) has indistinguishable
encryptions in the presence of an adversary (eavesdropper), or is EAV-secure (eavesdropping
secure), if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A there is a negligible function negl
such that, for all n,
Pr
[
PrivKevaA,Π(n) = 1
] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(n),
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where the probability is taken over the randomness used by A and the randomness used in
the experiment (for choosing the key and the bit b, as well as any randomness used by Enc
algorithm).
We also use  to denote the output of negl(n). The above definition requires that no PPT
adversary can determine which of two messages was encrypted, with probability significantly
better than 1
2
. This is equivalent to a definition called semantic security [58, 59].
Definition 3.2.9. A private-key encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) is semantically secure in
the presence of an eavesdropper if for every PPT algorithm A there exists a PPT algorithm A
′
such that for any PPT algorithm Samp and polynomial-time computable functions f and h,
the following is negligible:
|Pr [A(1n, Enck(m), h(m)) = f(m)]| -
∣∣Pr [(A′(1n, |m| , h(m)) = f(m)]∣∣,
where the first probability is taken over uniform k ∈ {0, 1}n, m output by Samp(1n), the
randomness of A, and the randomness of Enc while the second probability is taken over m
output by Samp(1n) and the randomness of A
′
.
3.3 Complexity Assumptions
In computational complexity theory, a reduction is an algorithm for transforming one problem
into another problem [128]. A reduction from one problem to another may be used to show that
the second problem is as difficult as the first. For example, problem A is reducible to problem
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B if an algorithm for solving problem B efficiently (if it exists in polynomial time) could also
be used as a subroutine to solve problem A efficiently. When this is true, solving A cannot be
harder than solving B. We denote this as A 6m B.
Reduction is very useful to prove that a cryptographic scheme is secure. That is, if we can
prove that breaking a scheme means finding a solution to an assumed intractable problem,
then it is also intractable to break the scheme. We refer to the assumed intractable problem as
a complexity assumption. In the following sections we define complexity assumptions that will
be used for analyzing the security of the systems in this thesis.
3.3.1 Diffie-Hellman Assumptions
The Diffie-Hellman assumptions are closely related to the difficulty of computing the discrete
logarithm problem over a cyclic group [93].
Let IG be a polynomial-time algorithm that takes security parameter 1n as input and outputs
the tuple 〈G, p, g〉, where G is cyclic group, p is the order of G, and g is a generator of G.
Definition 3.3.1. The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) in 〈G, p, g〉 is defined as follows:
given (g, ga), compute a, where a is randomly chosen from Zp. A polynomial-time adversary
A has advantage  in solving the DLP in 〈G, p, g〉 if :
Pr[A(g, ga) = a] ≥ , where the probability is over the random choice of a ∈ Zp and the
random bits used by A.
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A group G satisfies the DLP if there is no such adversary A with non-negligible advantage.
Definition 3.3.2. The Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDH) [22] in 〈G, p, g〉 is
defined as follows: given (g, ga, gb), where a, b are randomly selected from Zp, compute g
ab.
A polynomial-time adversary A has advantage  in solving the CDH problem in 〈G, p, g〉 if
Pr
[
A(g, ga, gb) = gab
] ≥ , where the probability is over the random choice of a, b ∈ Zp and
the random bits used by A.
We say that a group G satisfies the CDH if there is no such adversary A with non-negligible
advantage.
Definition 3.3.3. The Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption (DDH) [22] in 〈G, p, g〉 is de-
fined as follows: given (g, ga, gb, gc), where a, b, c are randomly selected from Zp, determine
whether c = ab. A polynomial-time adversary A has advantage  in solving the DDH prob-
lem in 〈G, p, g〉 if ∣∣Pr [A(g, ga, gb, gab) = 1] − Pr [A(g, ga, gb, gc) = 1]∣∣ ≥ , where the
probability is over the random choice of a, b, c ∈ Zp , and the random bits used by A.
We say that a group G satisfies the DDH if there is no such adversary A with non-negligible
advantage.
It is not difficult to see that the DLP, CDH, and DDH are related. If an algorithm can solve
DLP, it can also resolve the CDH and DDH. An algorithm which solves the CDH problem can
be used to solve the DDH problem. But if an algorithm can solve the DDH, it is unknown
whether it can solve the CDH or not. The DDH is a very important assumption for proving
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security of cryptographic systems [22]. If an adversary can solve the DDH, it can break the
indistinguishability property of a scheme.
3.3.2 The Bilinear Maps and Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumptions
Many cryptographic schemes are constructed using bilinear maps [73, 129], such as the CP-
ABE scheme of [20]. Computational complexity assumptions for bilinear maps, such as Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman assumptions, are thus used for arguing the security of the schemes. We will use
bilinear maps to construct our security systems.
3.3.2.1 The Definition of Bilinear Maps
Let G1 , G2 , and GT be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g1 and g2 be
generators of G1 and G2 . A mapping e: G1 × G2 → GT is said to be bilinear if it has the
following properties [23]:
• Bilinearity : for all u ∈ G1 , v ∈ G2 , and a, b ∈ Zp, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab
• Non-degeneracy : e(g1, g2) 6= 1
Throughout this thesis, we consider G1 = G2, or e: G × G → GT .
The existence of a bilinear map e: G × G → GT has two direct implications for the groups
involved:
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• The MOV Reduction [95]: the DLP is no harder in G than it is in GT . To see this, let
P , Q ∈ G . We would like to find a ∈ Zp , such that Q = P a. Let g = e(P , P ) and h =
e(P , Q). Then h = ga. Therefore we reduce the DLP in G to the DLP in GT .
• The DDH is easy [74]: The DDH in G is to distinguish between the distributions (g, ga,
gb, gab) and (g, ga, gb, gc), where a, b, c ∈ Zp are randomly selected. The DDH in GT
is easy. To see this, observe that: given g, ga, gb, gc ∈ G?, we have c = ab mod q ⇐⇒
e(g, gc) = e(ga, gb).
3.3.2.2 Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumptions
The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions will be used for arguing the security of our proposed
systems.
Definition 3.3.4. The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption (BDH) [24] in 〈G ,GT , p , g , e〉 is
defined as follows: given g, ga, gb, gc, where a, b, c are randomly selected from Zp, compute
e(g, g)abc. A polynomial-time adversary A has advantage  to solve the BDH problem in
〈G, GT , p, g, e〉 if
∣∣Pr [A(g, ga, gb, gc) = e(g, g)abc]∣∣ ≥ ,
where the probability is over the random choice of a, b, c ∈ Zp and the random bits used by A.
We say that the group G and GT satisfy the BDH if there is no such adversary A with non-
negligible advantage.
Definition 3.3.5. The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption (DBDH) [24] is defined
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as follows: given g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z, where a, b, c, z are randomly selected from Zp, determine
if z = abc. A polynomial-time adversary A has advantage  in solving the DBDH problem in
〈G, GT , p, g, e〉 if
∣∣Pr [A(g, ga, gb, , gc, e(g, g)abc) = 1] − Pr [A(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z) =
1 | ≥ ,
where the probability is over the random choice of a, b, c, z ∈ Zp and the random bits used by
A.
We say that the group G and GT satisfy the DBDH if there is no such adversary A with
non-negligible advantage.
3.4 Provable security
Provable security aims to provide a mathematical basis to argue whether a scheme is secure
or not based on its definition. As modern cryptography is mainly based on the hardness
of computational security, which is based on computational complexity, it allows a negligible
possibility of security failures, but should be infeasible to break the security of the cryptosystem
by any known practical means. How to properly model the power of adversaries and precisely
specify assumptions become critical to security proofs.
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3.4.1 Game-Based Security Models
Modern cryptography security definitions include a complexity-bounded adversary. To argue
the possibility of an adversary being able to break the cryptosystem, we need to define a model
to measure its complexity. The model specifies the type of an adversary and the adversary’s
power over a cryptosystem. The type of an adversary can be classified by whether the adversary
is polynomial-bounded or not, how the adversary interacts with a security game or simulation
system, etc. The adversary’s power over a cryptosystem defines whether the adversary has
access to a single ciphertext, multiple ciphertexts, multiple keys, etc. It also defines precisely
what constitutes a break of the cryptosystem.
There are two general approaches to forming security models: game-based and simulation-based
[45, 107]:
• In the game-based security model, an adversary is modeled by a security game. During
the game an adversary interacts with a hypothetical probabilistic algorithm called a chal-
lenger. The challenger generates keys used in the system, and may respond to queries
made by the adversary. The game terminates when the adversary terminates, and we
assess whether the adversary has met the condition for breaking the cryptosystem. Typ-
ically a reduction (see Section 3.3) is used to prove that if there exists an adversary
capable of breaking the security algorithm, then that adversary is also able to solve a
computationally intractable problem - a complexity assumption that is believed to be
hard.
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• In the simulation-based model, the environment in which the cryptographic scheme will be
used is simulated. In a simulated environment, an arbitrary PPT adversary can interact
with the algorithms of the cryptosystem in an arbitrary PPT environment. This includes
all the parties that may have access to the algorithms of the cryptosystem. An idealized
version of the cryptosystem that can never be broken is produced. The model generally
involves using an abstract third party who can always be trusted to transport and/or
vouch for data and whose operation is outside of the view of both the environment and
the adversary. The assumption is that if the outputs of the environment and adversary are
almost the same when the idealized cryptosystem is used in place of the real cryptosystem,
then the real cryptosystem should be secure. Hence, this implies that the cryptosystem
is secure if the probability of being able to tell the difference between these two outputs
is small.
In this thesis we use game-based models and assume PPT adversaries. As this thesis concerns
attribute-based encryption, a type of public-key cryptosystem, we will introduce the concept
of game-based models for public-key encryption. To better understand the security games, we
start off with the definition of public-key encryption.
Definition 3.4.1. A public-key encryption scheme is a triple of probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec) such that:
• Gen(1n): takes the security parameter 1n as input and outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk),
where pk is the public key and sk is the private key. For convenience we assume that |pk|
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≥ n, |sk| ≥ n, and n can be determined from pk, sk.
• Enc(pk, m): takes a public key pk and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ as inputs and outputs a
ciphertext c: Encpk(m) → c.
• Dec(sk, c): takes a private key sk and a ciphertext c as inputs and outputs a message m
or ⊥ for failure: m = Decsk(c).
CPA− Security [77]: CPA stands for chosen plaintext attack. It is also referred as indistin-
guishability CPA (IND-CPA). In this security game, an adversary can query the encryption
oracle multiple times for the messages the adversary chooses. The encryption oracle is a “black
box” to the adversary. The adversary is modeled by a PPT Turing machine, meaning that it
must complete the game and output a guess within a polynomial number of steps. The CPA
game for a public-key encryption algorithm is as follows:
Let a public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) and an adversary be A, consider the
following experiment:
• The challenger sets up the system and generates a key pair (pk, sk) by running Gen(1n),
where n is the security parameter of the system. The challenger publishes pk to the
adversary, and keeps sk secret.
• A submits two distinctly chosen plaintexts m0, m1 of the same length (|m0| = |m1|) to
the challenger.
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• The challenger selects a bit b ∈ { 0, 1} uniformly at random, and sends the ciphertext
Encpk(mb) → cb back to A.
• The adversary is free to request a polynomially-bounded number of additional encryptions
of messages other than m0, m1.
• Finally, A outputs a guess b′ for the value of b. If b′ = b, then A wins the game.
Definition 3.4.2. A public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is CPA-secure if for
all PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl such that:
Pr
[
PubKCPAA,Π (n) = 1
] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(n).
CPA-Security is the basic requirement of any public-key encryption scheme [136]. The security
guarantee is that learning anything about the plaintext from the ciphertext is almost infeasible
for a PPT adversary. CPA-Security can resist two types of adversaries: a passive adversary that
only eavesdrops, and an active adversary who carries out a chosen-plaintext attack. However,
it falls short for more active attacks where an attacker tampers with a ciphertext in order to
modify the plaintext.
There is a general consensus within the cryptographic research community that in virtually ev-
ery practical application, we require security against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA-Security)
[109], whereby an adversary is given the access of decryption oracle to obtain the decryption of
arbitrary ciphertexts of its choice. CCA-security provides security guarantees against powerful
attackers who can alter encrypted messages. Therefore CCA-security has become the accepted
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goal for building secure encryption schemes in the real world.
CCA− Security: CCA-Security is also referred as indistinguishability CCA (IND-CCA) [77].
Let a public-key encryption scheme be Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) and an adversary be A, consider
the following experiment:
• The challenger sets up the system and generates a key pair (pk, sk) by running Gen(1n),
where n is the security parameter of the system. The challenger publishes pk to the
adversary, and keeps sk secret.
• A gets access to black boxes of Enc and Dec.
• A submits two distinct chosen plaintexts m0, m1 of the same length to the challenger.
• The challenger selects b ∈ { 0, 1} randomly, and sends A the ciphertext:Encpk(mb)→ cb.
• A may make further calls to Dec for any message with the restriction that cb cannot be
submitted to the Dec.
• Finally, A outputs a guess for the value of b′ . A wins the game if b = b′ .
Definition 3.4.3. A public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is CCA-secure if for
all PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl such that:
Pr
[
PubKCCAA,Π (n) = 1
] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(n).
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3.4.2 Types of Security Models
Security assumptions are critical in proving the security of a cryptosystem. Several models
have been proposed with each making certain assumptions about properties of some parts of
the scheme or the power of adversaries. In this section we briefly introduce two models that
are generally used in security proofs.
3.4.2.1 Standard Model
In security proofs, reduction is often used to prove that if a scheme can be broken, then the
same technique that breaks the scheme can be used to break a known complexity assumption.
If we prove a scheme based on complexity assumptions, then we say that the scheme is secure
in the standard model.
A proof by reduction in the standard model proceeds as follows: Suppose we want to prove the
security of scheme S. First we assume that a computational problem P is hard to solve. Then
we fix a polynomial-time algorithm A against the scheme S. We also fix a polynomial-time
algorithm B trying to solve P. If A breaks the scheme S with a non-negligible probability, then
B solves the hard computational problem P with a non-negligible probability. However, since
we have assumed that the computational problem P is hard to solve, we get a contradiction.
At this point, we have “proved” the security of S.
Proving the security of schemes in the standard model is usually difficult. Sometimes a given
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construction is hard to construct a reduction algorithm which reduces the problem of breaking
the scheme to the problem of breaking a standard complexity assumption. In addition, practice
has shown that most schemes with a security proof in the standard model are not practical [42].
As an alternative to proving security in the standard model, a number of practical schemes are
proven secure in idealized models, including the random oracle model [18].
3.4.2.2 Random Oracle Model
Bellare and Rogaway [18] proposed the random oracle model which has been used to prove
the security of numerous cryptosystems. In cryptography, a random oracle is an oracle (a
theoretical black box) that answers every query with a random response chosen uniformly from
its output domain. If a query is repeated, the response remains the same each time.
The random oracle model is a heuristic that assumes the existence of a truly random function
accessed by all parties in a protocol. Since in reality no such function exists, random oracles
are instantiated with hash functions which have been heuristically assumed to be capable of
replacing the theoretical random oracles. The random oracle model allows us to prove the
security of a cryptosystem with practical efficiency [7] .
In the random oracle model, an attacker only has the oracle access and can compute values
only by querying the oracle. The oracle is simulated as follows:
• A simulator answers the adversary’s queries and maintains a list of all queried inputs {xi}
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and their corresponding random values {yi}:
– For each query xi:
∗ If the query xi has been previously asked by the adversary, then the random
oracle will output the same value yi;
∗ Otherwise the simulator generates a fixed length random output yi, returns it
to the adversary, and records xi and its output yi.
Similarly to the standard model, reduction is used for proving security. If there is an adver-
sary that can break the cryptographic scheme using the random oracle, then the reduction
contradicts a complexity assumption. Hence, the cryptographic scheme is argued to be secure.
However, Canetti et al. [28] show the existence of encryption and signature schemes that are
secure in the random oracle model, but are insecure for any instantiation of the random oracle
as a hash function. Despite Canetti et al.’s finding, using random oracles instantiated with
hash functions for security proving is still widely used and considered viable.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have provided the background information for the rest of the thesis. We
briefly described groups, fields, elliptic curves and bilinear maps. We have reviewed some of the
fundamental concepts in modern cryptography, and introduced the idea of security models.
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Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) and Attribute-Based Signature (ABS) schemes are emerging
cryptographic primitives. ABE schemes are used to protect data secrecy with fine-grained access
policies being automatically enforced during the decryption process. ABS schemes allow users
to generate anonymous signatures over a set of attributes, which can protect user privacy during
the process of authentication. In this chapter we formally introduce ABE and ABS schemes
and provide the prerequisite information about them which is necessary to understand our
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proposed models and systems in the subsequent chapters.
4.1 Attribute-Based Encryption
In their landmark work [116], Sahai and Waters proposed Fuzzy Identity Based Encryption
(FIBE) which allows error-tolerance in Identity Based Encryption (IBE) for biometric applica-
tions. Every identity is viewed as a set of descriptive attributes ω. A user is able to decrypt
a ciphertext encrypted by identity attributes ω
′
if and only if his identity attributes ω overlap
with ω
′
for at least a pre-determined threshold value d (ω ∩ ω′ ≥ d). This idea of designing
fine-grained data protection was later formalized as ABE.
In ABE, an attribute authority (AA) is used to issue private keys (in the form of key shares) to
users. When the system is initialized, a public key, a master secret, and system parameters are
generated. Data is encrypted by the public key and system parameters. The master secret is
used to derive user private keys that are used to decrypt data. There are two major classes of
ABE schemes: key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE). In KP-ABE
schemes, a user’s private key is issued based on an access policy. The ciphertext is associated
with a set of attributes defined by the encryptor. A user is able to decrypt data if the attributes
associated with the data’s ciphertext comply with the access policy associated with the user’s
private key. The idea is reversed to CP-ABE schemes, where the AA issues a private key based
on the attributes held by a user. A ciphertext is associated with an access policy defined by an
encryptor. A user can decrypt a ciphertext if the user has the attributes satisfying the access
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policy of the ciphertext.
One of the crucial security features of ABE is collusion-resistance. Since user private keys
are all derived from the same master secret, it is important that each user’s private key is
randomized sufficiently to prevent users from pooling their partial private keys (attribute key
shares) together to decrypt any ciphertext.
A KP-ABE scheme controls which decryption keys can decrypt a ciphertext. The access policy
is used to derive private keys. CP-ABE controls which users can decrypt a ciphertext. The
access policy controls the data decryption process. Thus CP-ABE represents a more intuitive
way of protecting data in a distributed system.
Throughout this thesis we sometimes interchange the terms decryption key, attribute key shares,
and user private keys. They all refer to the keys that users use to decrypt the data in an ABE
scheme.
4.1.1 ABE Scheme Definition
In this section we formally define KP-ABE and CP-ABE schemes. We begin by introducing the
access control structure (tree) that is used by most ABE schemes for expressing access policies.
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4.1.1.1 Access Structure
An access policy can be expressed in terms of a monotone boolean formula or monotone access
structure.
Definition 4.1.1. Let P = {P1, ... , Pn} be a set of parties. A collection A ⊆ 2{P1, ... , Pn} is
monotone if ∀ B, C: if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C then C ∈ A. A monotone access structure is a
monotone collection A of non-empty subsets of P, i.e. A ⊆ 2P \ {Ø}. The sets in A are called
authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called unauthorized sets.
Access structures can be represented by access trees [16]. Access trees are n-ary trees in which
leaves are attributes and inner nodes are AND (∧) and OR (∨) boolean operations. An inner
node can also be a threshold gate consisting of a set of nodes (children) and a threshold value.
For example, suppose an inner node x is a threshold node (gate), if numx is the number of
children of x, and tx is the threshold value of x, then 0 < tx ≤ numx. In fact AND and OR
can be seen as special cases of threshold gates, where AND is the gate of tx = 2, numx = 2,
and OR is the gate of tx = 1, numx = 2.
Intuitively, an access tree expresses an access policy specifying which combination of attributes
satisfies the access policy. Consider an example, where data can be accessed by the following
access policy. The policy dictates that the data can be accessed by either an analyst in the
marketing department, or a personnel in the IT, Operation, and Support Department. The
access tree is illustrated in Figure 4.1:
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Figure 4.1: Access Tree
Γdata = ( (Analyst ∧ Marketing Department) ∨ (one of the personnel in one of the following
departments: IT, Operation, Support))
In ABE, instead of parties, we use attributes where the access structure A contains the set of
authorized attributes. Most ABE schemes use secret sharing schemes [76, 101, 121] to realize
access trees for splitting and re-constructing a secret.
4.1.1.2 Definition of a KP-ABE Scheme
A KP-ABE scheme typically consists of four algorithms as follows:
• Setup (1n): takes the security parameter 1n as input and outputs the public parameters
pk and a master secret mk.
• KeyGen(Γ, mk): takes an access structure Γ and the master key mk as inputs, and
outputs a decryption key sk.
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• Enc(pk, m, S): takes public parameters pk, a message m, and a set of attributes S as
inputs. It outputs a ciphertext c.
• Dec(sk, c, S): takes a private key sk, a ciphertext c, and an attribute set S as inputs. It
outputs the message m if the attribute set S complies with the access structure Γ of the
decryption key sk: if Γ(S) = 1, m := Dec(sk, c, S); otherwise it outputs ⊥.
4.1.1.3 Definition of a CP-ABE Scheme
A CP-ABE scheme also consists of four algorithms:
• Setup(1n): takes security parameter 1n as input and outputs the public parameters pk
and a master secret mk.
• KeyGen(mk, S): takes master key mk and a set of attributes S as inputs, and outputs
a decryption key sk.
• Enc(Γ, pk, m): takes an access tree Γ, the public parameters pk, and a message m as
inputs. It outputs the ciphertext c.
• Dec(sk, c, S): takes a private key sk, a ciphertext c, and a set of attributes S as inputs.
It outputs m if the attribute set S satisfies the access tree: if Γ(S) = 1, m := Dec(sk, c,
S); otherwise it outputs ⊥.
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4.1.2 Related Work
The concept of KP-ABE was first introduced by Goyal et al. [130]. The initial construction
of [116] can only handle one threshold gate in an access tree. The expressibility of the access
policy was greatly improved in [130]. The work of Goyal et al. [105] proposed a scheme that
supports a non-monotone access tree. The primary drawback of [105] is that the size of a
private key can blow up with the maximum number of attributes associated with a ciphertext.
Lewko et al. [80] improved [105] to dramatically reduce the size of private keys.
The first CP-ABE scheme was proposed by Bethencourt et al. [20]. This scheme allows an access
policy expressed by a monotone tree and uses a secret sharing scheme [121] in the construction.
Waters [135] took a different approach by using a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) [76] to
represent an access policy. This approach was later extended by Lewko et al. [82] and Okamoto
et al. [102]. Since [20] was only proved to be secure in the generic model, multiple approaches
were proposed to construct expressive and efficient CP-ABE schemes in the standard model
[62, 71, 82, 135]. Non-monotone access structures in CP-ABE were studied in Cheung et al.
[40]. The initial construction was proved to be CPA-Secure under the DBDH assumption, and
then was improved to be CCA-Secure by using the Canetti-Halevi-Katz technique [29].
The aforementioned ABE schemes focus on the expressiveness of the access policy and security.
However, the size of the ciphertext can grow linearly with the number of attributes. To improve
efficiency, schemes with a constant-size ciphertext have been studied in [14, 37, 47, 69] for
threshold access trees, and [13, 38] for non-monotone access trees.
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Multi-authority ABE (MA-ABE) schemes have been studied in [34, 35, 64, 81, 82, 84, 88]. In
a MA-ABE system, multiple AAs work together to generate user private keys, with each AA
being responsible for a disjoint set of attributes. One of the biggest challenges is to prevent
users from colluding. This requires that the key shares issued by different AAs are linked in a
unique way for different users.
4.2 Attribute-Based Signatures
In an ABS scheme, a central AA uses the master secret to issue private signature keys (in the
form of key shares) to signers according to the attributes that they have. A signer with an
attribute set ω can use his private key to sign a message with any subset of ω. Unlike digital
signature schemes [60, 112], an ABS scheme is capable of supporting a complex predicate
(expressing an access policy). For example, a signature can be produced by a user who is:
((Student) AND (in Department of Mathematics OR Department of Computer Science)). The
person who validates the signature can only know that the signature is generated by a user who
is a student in the Department of either Mathematics or Computer Science. No more attributes
or identity information are disclosed. In addition, an ABS scheme is collusion resistant, which
means that multiple parties cannot collude and combine all their attributes to produce a valid
signature if any one of them cannot generate the signature independently.
ABS schemes have three important properties [90] :
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• Unforgeability. Users cannot forge signatures with attributes they do not possess, even
through collusion.
• Signer privacy. A legitimate signer can remain anonymous. Signatures generated based
on a predicate are indistinguishable among all the users whose attributes satisfy the
predicate.
• Unlinkability. It is impossible to link different signatures to the same party who generates
the signatures, even for the signatures of a fixed message that are generated multiple times
by the same party.
4.2.1 ABS Scheme Definition
Generally speaking, an ABS scheme consists of four algorithms. Given a security parameter λ,
these algorithms are listed as follows:
• Setup(1n): The Setup algorithm takes the security parameter n as an input. It outputs
public parameters pkparams and the master secret key mk. The universal attribute set A
is also included in the public parameters pkparams.
• Extract(mk, pkparams, S ): The Extract algorithm takes the master secret mk, the public
parameters pkparams, and a user’s attribute set S ⊆ A as inputs. It generates the user’s
private key (in the form of attribute private key shares) sk.
• Sign(pkparams, m, Υ, sk): This algorithm takes a user’s private key sk for the attribute
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set S, and public parameters pkparams as inputs. It produces the signature σ on m if the
user’s attribute set satisfies the predicate Υ(S ) = 1.
• V erify(pkparams, m, Υ, σ ): On receiving a signature σ on messagem, the verify algorithm
takes the public parameters pkparams, and the signing predicate Υ to validate the signature.
It outputs a boolean value, either accept if the signature is validated or reject otherwise.
4.2.2 Related Work
A threshold ABS (t-ABS ) scheme was defined and formalized by Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini
[120]. Li et al. [83] proposed a scheme to reduce signature sizes of the scheme [120] by half.
Herranz et al. [68] constructed a constant-size signature scheme based on [63] and [127]. Ge et
al. [52] presented a construction that only needs three pairing operations.
Monotone predicate ABS schemes were studied in [30, 31, 53, 91, 126]. Maji et al. [91] proposed
a generic framework for constructing ABS schemes. Ge et al. [53] constructed a short signature
scheme in the standard model. Cao et al. [30, 31] proposed schemes in which the predicate can
be expressed in AND, OR, threshold gates. Su et al. [126] constructed a scheme supporting
AND, OR, and threshold gates in the standard model. A non-monotone predicate ABS scheme
was proposed by Okamoto [103]. This scheme combines inner-product with non-monotone
access tree, where attribute x for signing key skx is a tuple of attribute vectors, and predicate
v for verification is a span program (M , ρ) along with a tuple of attribute vectors.
The concept of multi-authority ABS (MA-ABS) was introduced by Maji et al. [90], where
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multiple authorities generate a user secret key together, with each authority only responsible
for issuing a partial secret key associated with a subset of the attributes. Cao et al. [32] proposed
a MA-ABS scheme with a centralized trusted authority for generating the secret keys used by
distributed authorities to derive user private keys. Okamoto and Takashima [104] removed
the dependency of the centralized trusted authority and proposed a completely decentralized
MA-ABS scheme, with each authority independently issuing a partial signing key to users.
Attribute-based group signatures (ABGS) [48, 79] and ring signatures (ABRS) [85, 134, 138] are
two variations of ABS. ABGS is based on the concept of the group signature (GS) [36], which is
a method allowing a member of a group to sign a message on behalf of the group. However, the
resulting signature keeps the identity of the signer secret. The main difference between ABGS
and ABS is that there is a group manager in ABGS, who can identify a signature and reveal
the identity of the signer when necessary. ABRS is based on the concept of a ring signature
(RS) [113], in which a signer can form a ring to include anyone whose public key is accessible
by the signer and verifiers. In ABRS, those users who form a ring are replaced by a set of
attributes that are additional to the necessary attributes.
4.2.3 Construction of an ABS Scheme Construction
In this section, we explain the threshold ABS scheme construction of [83]. We will use this
scheme to demonstrate our idea for providing anonymous user revocation in Chapter 7. There
are three constructions presented in [83]. The first construction is proved secure under the
random oracle model, while the second construction removed the random oracle assumption.
88
4.2. ATTRIBUTE-BASED SIGNATURES
Those two constructions use a central AA to manage and issue user private keys (or signing
keys). To reduce the trust of the central AA, they proposed a MA-ABS threshold scheme.
Since the second and third constructions are based on the first construction, we will only show
the first construction described in their paper as follows:
• Setup: First, randomly select an element from Zp for each attribute in the universe
attribute set U. A default set of d - 1 attributes from Zp is defined as Ω = {Ω1, Ω2, · · ·
, Ωd−1}. Two multiplicative cyclic groups G1 and G2 of prime order p are defined. A
bilinear map is defined as: e: G1× G1→ G2. Select a random generator g ∈ G1, a random
x ∈ Z?p , and set g1 = gx. Next, pick a random element g2 ∈ Z?p to compute Z = e(g1,
g2). Two hash functions are chosen: H1, H2: {0, 1}? → G1. The public parameters are
params = {g, g1, g2, Z, d, H1, H2} and the master secret is x.
• Extract: To generate a private (signing) key for an attribute set ω, the following steps
are taken:
– Randomly choose a d - 1 degree of polynomial q(y) and let q(0) = x;
– Generate a new attribute set ωˆ = ω ∪ Ω. For each i ∈ ωˆ, choose ri ∈R Zp and
compute di0 = g
q(i)
2 ·H1(i)ri and di1 = gri ;
– Finally, output Di = (di0, di1) as the private key for each i ∈ ωˆ.
• Sign: Suppose a user has a private key for his attribute set ω. To sign a message m
with predicate Υk,ω?(·), that is to prove owning at least k attributes among an n-element
attribute set ω?, select a k -element subset ω
′ ⊆ ω ∩ ω? and proceed as follows:
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– First, select a default attribute subset Ω
′ ⊆ Ω with ∣∣Ω′∣∣ = d - k, and n + d - k
random values r
′
i ∈ Zp for i ∈ ω? ∪ Ω′ ;
– Compute σ0 =
[∏
i∈ω′∪Ω′ d
4i,S(0)
i0
][∏
i∈ω?∪Ω′ H1(i)
r
′
i
]
H2(m)
s, {σi = d4i,S(0)i1 gr
′
i}i∈ω′∪Ω′ ,
{σi = gr
′
i}ω?/ω′ , and σ′0 = gs, with a randomly selected value s ∈ Zp;
– Finally, output the signature σ = {σ0, {σi}i∈ω?∪Ω′ , σ′0}.
• Verify : To verify the signature σ = {σ0, {σi}i∈ω?∪Ω′ , σ′0} of message m with threshold k
for attributes ω? ∪ Ω′ , check if the following equation holds:
e(g, σ0)
[
∏
i∈ω?∪Ω′ e(H1(i), σi)]e(H2(m), σ
′
0)
?
= Z .
4.3 Conclusions
In this chapter we provide an introduction to ABE and ABS schemes with some formal defi-
nitions. We also present the constructions of a specific CP-ABE and threshold ABS schemes
that will be used in subsequent chapters.
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In Chapter 4, we introduced ABE. As ABE schemes have the inflexible user, and attribute
management issues (see section 2.6.2.3), they are potentially not practical in cloud storage
environments. In this chapter, we construct two user revocation systems for ABE schemes
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to manage user revocations dynamically. Although user revocation has been studied in the
literature, most current user revocation systems only work with some particular ABE schemes,
and are not flexible enough to be adapted to work with general ABE schemes.
User revocation is the process of removing a user’s privilege of data access. In most cases, user
identities are used for user identification in the first part of revocation. However, in untrusted
cloud storage, user identities need to be protected and kept away from CSPs for the reasons we
specified in Section 2.5.1. Since most existing user revocation schemes have not considered user
privacy protection, a data owner has to mediate every request in order to protect user privacy.
This means that a user’s request needs to be routed from CSPs to the data owner before the
user’s privilege is determined. This is not scalable. Therefore a practical user revocation system
for ABE schemes in an untrusted cloud storage environment should be capable of identifying
a revoked user anonymously without including a data owner or a trusted party in the data
retrieval process.
With those aspects in mind, we design and build two dynamic user revocation systems working
with existing ABE schemes to protect data and user privacy in cloud storage. These two user
revocation systems have the following three features:
• Generic: the revocation capability can be directly applied to any ABE scheme.
• Dynamic: the revocation is instantaneous with no need to re-issue any ABE private key
to users.
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• Anonymous: users are anonymous to CSPs. A revoked user is anonymously prevented
from accessing data in the data retrieval or decryption process.
5.1 Related Work
There has been prior research into dealing with the practical problems with implementation of
ABE schemes, particularly with respect to revocation issues.
Pirretti et al. in [108] associated attributes with expiry times. This idea was enhanced by
Bethencourt et al. [20] who suggested to associate private keys (or key shares) with expiry
times. Both schemes require users to periodically contact the AA for new private keys (or
key shares), which has potential scalability issues as well as being incapable of revoking users
instantly.
Junod and Karlov [75] constructed a CP-ABE based broadcast encryption scheme that supports
direct (or instant) user revocation. In their scheme, each receiver’s identity is mapped to an
individual attribute. The access policy consists of a set of system attributes with a set of identity
attributes. Individual user revocation is achieved by updating the set of identity attributes in
the access policy. This scheme is not efficient when applied to cloud storage systems since
mapping each user’s identity to an attribute can make the ciphertext grow linearly. It also
discloses user identities to CSPs. In addition, data owners should not be directly involved in
controlling data distribution after the data has been stored at CSPs.
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Jahid et al. [72] achieved user revocation by utilizing a semi-trusted proxy to participate in
the decryption process. In their proposed scheme, each user obtains an identity key in addition
to their attribute key shares. The identity keys are generated by a data owner using a secret
sharing scheme. The data owner also generates a proxy key for the proxy, who uses the proxy
key to transfer the ciphertext in such a way that only non-revoked users with their identity
keys can decrypt the data. The proxy key is regenerated whenever a user is revoked. Although
the scheme achieves dynamic user revocation without attribute key regeneration, it can only
revoke a predefined number of users. In addition, adding a new user to the system can trigger
re-keying all the existing identity keys, which exhibits a potential scalability issue and some
key management issues.
Hur and Noh [70] used attribute key encryption keys (KEKs) to address user revocation for
BSW’s CP-ABE scheme [20]. Their scheme requires a data service manager (such as a CSP) to
generate attribute KEKs and distribute the keys to users. The attributes in the access policy
of a ciphertext are re-encrypted by their KEKs before the ciphertext is sent to a user. When
a user is revoked, the impacted attribute KEKs are updated and redistributed. This approach
brings potential management overheads. The attribute KEKs are generated and maintained via
a global binary tree that assigns users to the leaf nodes. For a large group of users, maintaining
the binary tree becomes much harder when the system needs to add or delete users. The data
service manager also has to know every user’s attribute set in order to generate and distribute
their attribute KEKs, which requires trust in the data service manager. This kind of trust does
not exist in untrusted cloud storage environments. In addition every user needs to have two
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sets of keys: secret attribute key shares and attribute KEKs.
Another user revocation approach is to associate ciphertext with expiration times. In this
approach, ciphertexts are encrypted with additional time stamp attributes along with periodic
key updates. Sahai et al. [117] proposed a revocable storage that prevents revoked users
from accessing the data once their access rights are removed. They introduced the notion of
ciphertext delegation, where a ciphertext encrypted under a certain policy can be re-encrypted
to a more restrictive policy using only public information. Using ciphertext delegation, CSP
can re-encrypt the ciphertexts from time t to time t + 1. However, this mechanism requires
user private keys to be updated periodically for all non-revoked users, which can potentially
create a key distribution overhead in a large group of users. Users also have to keep different
versions of the keys to decrypt the data.
As most of the existing user revocation schemes work with individual schemes, we proposed
a flexible revocation model (dynamic user revocation and key refreshment (DURKR)) which
can work with CP-ABE schemes for dynamic user revocation and key refreshing [141]. In the
model, the master secret is split into two parts. One part is used by CP-ABE schemes to
issue the attribute private keys. The other part is used to issue a proxy delegation key that
is used to re-encrypt ciphertexts of CP-ABE so that only non-revoked users can decrypt data
eventually. Although the model is intended to be flexible to work with any type of CP-ABE
schemes, it requires some modification of the underlying scheme to incorporate an additional
key share. In our other work [142], a generic framework was proposed to be adopted by any
type of ABE scheme. In addition, the framework also avoids the potential key escrow in ABE
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schemes with centralized AA settings. However, the framework does not effectively prevent
revoked and non-revoked users from colluding.
The application of ABE to cloud environments has been studied in the literature. Yu et al.
[147] proposed a scheme to protect data files in a semi-trusted cloud environment. Wang
et al. [132] built a hierarchical CP-ABE (HABE) model using the notion of a hierarchical
IBE (HIBE) scheme. Parno et al. [106] constructed a verifiable computation scheme with
public delegation and verifiability based on an ABE scheme. Yang et al. [145] proposed an
access control framework using a CP-ABE scheme for cloud storage systems. The framework
also enables dynamic attribute revocation. Yu et al. [146] proposed a CP-ABE scheme with
a hidden access policy for untrusted content distribution networks. Their scheme also uses
periodic key expiration to manage user revocation.
5.2 Our Contributions
We design and construct two data protection systems using ABE schemes in untrusted cloud
storage. As ABE protects data privacy, the newly developed systems focus on building generic
user revocation mechanisms that could work with any ABE scheme and also protect user privacy
during the revocation process.
To achieve the generic and anonymous user revocations, we aim at controlling the user access
to ABE ciphertexts. If a revoked user cannot obtain an ABE ciphertext, then the user will not
be able to decrypt the data even though the user might hold a valid ABE private (decryption)
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key. If such a control of ciphertext access is independent from ABE, then the revocation
mechanism can be generically applied to any ABE scheme. With these two considerations in
mind, our solution is to build an extra layer on the top of an ABE scheme to control access
to ABE ciphertexts. This layer, utilizing a dynamic and anonymous accumulator technique,
treats ABE as a black box. It removes the need of a data owner to mediate every data retrieval
and makes users anonymous to CSPs. Using this layer, two systems are built as follows:
• User Revocation via Ciphertext Re-encryption (UR-CRE): This system is to re-encrypt
ABE ciphertexts with accumulator (group) keys, so that only non-revoked users are able to
decrypt the re-encrypted ABE ciphertexts to get ABE ciphertexts. Users are anonymous
to CSPs during the data retrieval process. The benefit of this re-encryption system is
three-fold:
– It enables the desirable user revocation control (generic, dynamic, and anonymous)
for any type of ABE scheme.
– It protects the integrity and secrecy of the access policy embedded in ABE cipher-
texts. Since access policies of CP-ABE can be parts of the ciphertexts in plaintext
format, they are vulnerable to alteration and information leakage in regard to who
can decrypt the data. The same issue exists in KP-ABE, where attributes are also
in plaintext format.
– Data is self-protected. Revoked users are not able to decrypt the re-encrypted ci-
phertexts during the decryption process automatically.
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The drawback of this system is the overhead associated with the ciphertext re-encryption
and key management of accumulators on the data owner side.
• User Revocation via Cloud Storage Providers (UR-CSP): This system separates the user
revocation control from data encryption, and utilizes untrusted CSPs to eliminate the
overhead associated with ciphertext re-encryption. We use the anonymous accumulator
mechanism to achieve the desired user verification (generic, dynamic, and anonymous),
so that user privacy is protected during the verification process. Any revoked user is
anonymously verified by CSPs and prevented from accessing ABE ciphertexts after the
user’s revocation.
Since ABE ciphertexts are not re-encrypted when stored at CSPs, the possible downside
of this approach is that access policies included in ciphertexts are exposed to CSPs or any
adversary in the unencrypted channels during transmission. The integrity and privacy of
access policies are at risk.
As accumulators are the cornerstones of building our revocation systems, we will introduce the
dynamic accumulator concept first, followed by the algorithm construction used for the rest of
this thesis.
5.3 Accumulator
Accumulators were first introduced by Benaloh and de Mare [19] as a method to condense a
set of values (elements) into one value (referred as an accumulator’s aggregate value or simply
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an aggregate value in this thesis), such that a short witness is used to demonstrate that a value
has been condensed in an aggregate value. The witness has the following characteristics:
• It is unique if the value being aggregated is unique.
• It is infeasible to forge a witness for a value that has not been accumulated.
• No information about the accumulated value can be leaked through the value of the
witness or the aggregate value.
An accumulator is called universal if it supports efficient zero-knowledge membership and non-
membership proofs. An accumulator is called dynamic universal if the accumulator’s aggregate
value, membership, and non-membership witnesses can be updated efficiently.
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya introduced the notion of a dynamic universal accumulator (DUA)
[27]. The cost of adding or deleting an element is independent of the number of elements accu-
mulated. Using a zero-knowledge protocol, the scheme can prove whether a committed value is
in an accumulator or not. The scheme was constructed under the strong RSA assumption. A
DUA based on a bilinear map was proposed by Nguyen [100]. Au et al. [15] extended [100] to
build a DUA under the DDH assumption. The DUA has been used for anonymous credential
attestation [26].
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5.3.1 A Bilinear Map Based Accumulator
The accumulator scheme used in our systems is based on the scheme of Au et al in [15]. The
following algorithm descriptions come from the paper [15] directly.
• Setup(1n): This algorithm takes the security parameter 1n as the input. It initializes and
outputs system parameters as follows:
– Let e: G × G → GT be a bilinear map of prime order p.
– Let Ak: 2
Z?p → G be an accumulator’s function that is parametrized by a randomly
selected β ∈ Z?p : Ak(X ) = g
∏
x∈X(x+β), where x ∈ Zp, Ak(X) ∈ G, and β is the
trapdoor or auxiliary information.
– Finally output the system parameters: {G, GT , e, Ak, β}.
• MembershipV erification(w, x, v): The algorithm takes a witness w, element x, and
accumulator aggregate value v as the inputs. It proves the membership of x as follows:
– If e(w, gx· gβ) = e(v, g), output “true”;
– Otherwise output “false”;
• MembershipWitness(x): This algorithm takes an element x as input and computes the
witness of x as follows:
– For a set of elements Y = {x1, x2, ... , xn} ∈ Zp, a membership witness for x ∈ Y
is calculated as:
100
5.3. ACCUMULATOR
w =
[
g
∏n
i=1(xi+β)
] 1
x+β .
– Output the witness: w.
• UpdateAccumulator(x′ , v, Ops): The algorithm takes a new element x′ , an accumulator
aggregate value v, and the operation type Ops (“Add” or ”Delete”) as inputs. It updates
v to v
′
as follows:
– If Ops = “Add”, then v
′
= vx
′
+β;
– If Ops = “Delete”, then v
′
= v
1
x
′
+β ;
– Output v
′
.
• UpdateMembershipWitness(w, x, v, v̂, Ops, x′): This algorithm takes the original mem-
bership witness w of x with respect to the accumulator aggregate value v, the new aggre-
gate value v̂ having x
′
, the operation type Ops, and the element x
′
as inputs. It computes
the new witness of x in regard to v̂ as follows:
– If Ops = “Add”, then x
′
is the newly added element to v̂ . The new membership
witness w
′
of x can be computed as w
′
= vwx
′−x;
– If Ops = “Delete”, then x
′
has been removed from v, the new membership witness
w
′
of x can be calculated as w
1
x′−x v̂
1
x−x′ ;
– Output w
′
.
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5.3.2 Dynamic Accumulator (DA)
We build a dynamic accumulator (DA) using the scheme in [15] to manage user access to data.
We make the following adjustments to fit our systems:
• We remove the UpdateMemebershipWitness algorithm. Users and CSPs are neither
trusted in our trust models with the system parameters, nor allowed to update their
witnesses. Data owners are responsible for centrally managing accumulators and user
witness updates.
• We want to improve the efficiency and scalability of the scheme in [15]. Like most of the
existing accumulator schemes, the scheme in [15] has two potential limitations for large-
scale systems: i) an accumulator has a pre-defined number of elements to be aggregated;
ii) adding or deleting an element triggers witness updates of all elements aggregated in
the same accumulator. To make the scheme more practical and minimize the impact of
witness updates, we will use multiple accumulators to manage non-revoked users. This
adjustment can be scalable in the following ways:
– The witness update only impacts a small numbers of users. Non-revoked users will
be divided into groups. Each user only belongs to one group and is aggregated
to an accumulator. When a user is revoked, the user is removed from the user’s
accumulator. The witness updates thus only impact a smaller number of users.
– There is no limitation on the number of users in the system. The number of ac-
cumulators can be dynamically increased or decreased depending on the number of
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users in the systems.
– Each accumulator is associated with one internal identifier and one external identi-
fier. The differences between the internal and external identifiers are as follows:
∗ The internal identifiers (or indexes) are kept by data owners. They are static and
sequential. An accumulator is deleted when all associated users being removed.
However its index is not recycled.
∗ The external identifiers are given out to users and CSPs to identify or look up
accumulators. They are randomized every time when the associated accumula-
tors are updated, so that the static index numbers are not directly exposed to
users and CSPs for extra protection. Furthermore, the numbers used to ran-
domize external identifiers have two main purposes: 1) to randomize ciphertext
re-encryption keys when ABE ciphertexts need to be re-encrypted in UR-CRE
(Section 5.4.2); 2) to randomize accumulators’ aggregate values each time when
the aggregate values are updated in UR-CSP (in Section 5.4.3).
To achieve better efficiency and scalability, the actual implementations can delegate the man-
agement of accumulators, especially witness updates and distribution, to a data-owner trusted
third party.
Our modification does not change the mathematical and complexity theory that DUA [15] is
based on. Its security strength remains the same without relying on the number of elements
that can be accumulated into an accumulator, nor the number of accumulators in a system.
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Notation Description
gid A user’s global unique identifier
Φ Accumulator container containing a set of accumulators
k The maximum number of elements that can be aggregated into an accumulator
Ak The accumulator function
β The trapdoor value for the accumulator function Ak
α The container of an accumulator and its information
v An accumulator aggregate value
Ops The accumulator operational type - Add or Delete an element to or from an accumulator
ωα The witness container storing user witnesses of accumulator α
wgid User gid’s witness of an accumulator
Ind An integer counter storing the next created internal identifier (index) value for an accumulator
Table 5.1: DA Notation
5.3.2.1 Data Structure Definition
Table 5.1 lists the commonly used notation in this chapter.
The major data structures used by DA are defined as follows:
• An accumulator α contains: {v, {gidx}1≤x≤|{gidx}|, i, y}, where v denotes the aggregate
value by aggregating the elements in {gidx}, |{gidx}| denotes the number of gids in α, i
is the internal identifier (also referred as internal index) of α, y is randomly selected from
Zp to generate the external identifier in the form of g
y.
Each component of α can be further denoted as follows:
– α1 = v
– α2 = {gidx}1≤x≤|{gidx}|
– α3 = i
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– α4 = y
• Φ stores a set of accumulators: Φ = {αi}1≤i≤|Φ|, where |Φ| denotes the number of accu-
mulators included.
• wgid is the witness of user gid for an accumulator. Each witness consists of two parts:
wgid = {w1gid, w2gid}. The details can be found in Section 5.4.
• ωa is a witness container to store witnesses of the users in α: {{wgidi , gidi}1≤i≤|α2|}.
5.3.2.2 Algorithm Construction
Our DA consists of the following algorithms. The details of their usage and information sharing
among parties will be specified in the following sections.
1. AccSetup(G, g): takes a group G and a generator g of G as the inputs, as shown in
Algorithm 5.1. It defines the system parameters used by DA: the maximum number of
elements k in each accumulator, the trapdoor value β, the accumulator function Ak, and
the index counter Ind of internal accumulator identifiers. It initializes Φ and returns {k,
β, Ak, Φ}.
2. AccAdd(gid, Φ): takes a user’s global identifier gid and the accumulator container Φ as
the inputs, as shown in Algorithm 5.2. The algorithm finds the first accumulator in Φ
that has less than k gids. A new accumulator is created if none is found. The algorithm
adds the gid to the accumulator and outputs the updated accumulator and Φ.
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3. AccDelete(gid, Φ): takes a user’s global identifier gid and the accumulator container Φ
as the inputs, as shown in Algorithm 5.3. It looks for gid in accumulators stored in Φ:
(a) If an accumulator can be found, it removes the gid from the accumulator. If the gid
is the only element in the accumulator, the accumulator is emptied out. Finally, it
returns the accumulator and Φ.
(b) If no accumulator can be found, return ⊥.
4. AccWitUpdate(α): takes an accumulator α as the input, as shown in Algorithm 5.4. It
updates all the witnesses of gids in α, and outputs witnesses set ωα.
Algorithm 5.1 AccSetup
procedure AccSetup(G, g)
1: Begin
2: Select k to be the maximum number of elements aggregated in an accumulator.
3: Randomly select β ← Z?p ; // The trapdoor of the accumulator function.
4: Define Ak: 2
Z?p → G to be an accumulator function. // Ak(X ) = g
∏
gidi∈X(gidi+β), where g is
the generator of G.
5: Let v←g; α←{v, {}, 1, null}; Φ← {α}; // Initialize an accumulator and accumulator container.
6: Set Ind = 2; // Set the internal index counter to be the next value.
7: // Note: Ind is internally used. For simplicity, it is not returned.
8: Return {k, β, Ak, Φ};
9: End.
5.4 Generic User Revocation Systems
We design and construct two generic user revocation systems based on ABE schemes in un-
trusted cloud storage environments. In our systems, each user is given a unique global identifier
gid. Non-revoked users are randomly divided into groups so that each user only belongs to one
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Algorithm 5.2 AccAdd
procedure AccAdd(gid, Φ)
1: Begin
2: Let N = |Φ|; // Get the number of accumulators in Φ.
3: Set j = 0;
4: For i = 1 to N do // Find the first α that has less than k gids.
5: If
∣∣α2i ∣∣ < k then
6: j = i; abort For loop; // The accumulator is found.
7: end If;
8: End For
9: If j == 0 then // No accumulator is found. Create a new one.
10: j = N + 1;
11. αj ← {g , {}, Ind, null}; // Initialize an accumulator.
12: Ind = Ind + 1; // Increase the counter by 1, so it always points to the next value.
13: End If
14: // Add gid to t αj .
15: // α3j is static and not changed once it is set. α
4
j is dynamic and will be changed outside this
algorithm.
16: αj ←{vgid+βj , α2j + {gid}, α3j , α4j};
17: Update Φ with αj ; //Using α
3
j , the internal index, to find and replace the existing one, or add
the new one.
18: Return {αj , Φ}.
19: End.
group. Each group of user gids are aggregated into an accumulator. We may interchange the
terms of group and accumulator as they are one-to-one relationship with respect to a user. Each
accumulator is identified by one internal index (or identifier) and one external identifier. The
internal index is fixed when the accumulator is created. The external identifier is changed and
randomized each time a user is added or removed from the accumulator. Only external identi-
fiers are given to users and CSPs to request or locate the re-encrypted ciphertext in UR-CRE,
or to generate membership proofs in UR-CSP.
107
5.4. GENERIC USER REVOCATION SYSTEMS
Algorithm 5.3 AccDelete
procedure AccDelete(gid, Φ)
1: Begin
2: Let N = |Φ|; // Get the number of accumulators in Φ.
3: Set j = 0;
4: For i = 1 to N do
5: If gid ∈ α2i then // Find the the accumulator having the gid.
6: If
∣∣α2i ∣∣ > 1 then
7: vi = v
1
gid+β
i ; // Remove gid from the aggregate value α
1
i .
8: αi← {vi, α2i - {gid}, i, yi} ; // Update the values in αi.
9: Update αi in Φ.
10: Else
11: αi ← {g , {}, N , null}; // Empty the accumulator since gid is the last one.
12: Φ ← Φ - {αi}; // Remove αi from Φ.
13: End If;
14: j = i; abort;
15: End If
16: End For
17: If j > 0 then
18: Return {αj , Φ}; // Return the accumulator. αj can be an empty accumulator removed from
Φ.
19: Else return ⊥;
20: End if;
21: End.
5.4.1 Algorithm Definition and Construction
We define the commonly used algorithms in our two systems. Whether the algorithms are run
privately or publicly, and which information should be kept secret depend on the trust models.
These will be explained in the system design and construction sections of the corresponding
user revocation system.
Since our systems can work with any ABE scheme, the · will be used to generically denote the
parameters needed by ABE algorithms: Setupabe, KeyGenabe, Encabe, and Decabe.
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Algorithm 5.4 AccWitUpdate
procedure AccWitUpdate(α)
1: Begin
2: Let ωα = {}; // Start with an empty set.
3: Let N =
∣∣α2∣∣; // Set the number of gids to N .
4: For i = 1 to N // Compute witnesses.
5: w1gidi = v
1
gidi+β ; // v is the accumulator value: α1.
6: w2gidi = g
gidi+β;
7: wgidi = {w1gidi , w2gidi}
8: ωα ← ωα+ {wgidi , gidi}; // Add the user’s witness to ωα.
9: End For
10: Return ωα;
11: End.
Table 5.2 lists the commonly used notation in addition to table 5.1.
• Setup(1n): The algorithm takes the security parameter 1n as an input and proceeds as
follows:
– Let U contain the gids who are granted for data access: U = {gid1 , . . . gidn}, where
gidi ∈ Z?p (p is a n-bit prime).
– Call Setupabe (1
n) with input 1n to initialize the ABE scheme. It outputs an ABE
public key pkabe and master secret mkabe.
– Initialize DA using the security parameter 1n:
∗ Let e: G × G → G1 be a bilinear map for an n-bit prime p.
∗ Let g be a generator of G.
∗ Call AccSetup(G, g) (Algorithm 5.1) with G and g as the inputs. It outputs {k,
β, Ak, Φ}.
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Notation Description
c An ABE ciphertext
AA The ABE attribute authority
Setupabe The setup algorithm of an ABE scheme
KeyGenabe The key generation algorithm of an ABE scheme
Encabe The encryption algorithm of an ABE scheme
Decabe The decryption algorithm of an ABE scheme
pkabe The public key of an ABE scheme
mkabe The master secret of an ABE scheme
uskabe A user ABE private key
U The data set containing non-revoked gids in the system
CSP Cloud Storage Provider
DO Data owner
wskgid The witness private key of user gid
Λ The container storing accumulator aggregate values (v)
c
′
A re-encrypted ciphertext of c for an accumulator
C
′
The container storing multiple c
′
s.
Table 5.2: User Revocation System Notation
• KeyGenabe(·): This is the ABE key generation algorithm for generating user private keys.
The symbol · denotes the input parameters. It outputs a user private key uskabe if the
user is authenticated. Otherwise the output depends on the output of AA.
• UserManager(gid, Ops, Φ): The algorithm takes a user’s gid, an operation type Ops,
and the accumulator container Φ as inputs. It proceeds as follows:
– If Ops == “Add”, call AccAdd(gid, Φ) (Algorithm 5.2) to add the gid to an accu-
mulator:
{α, Φ} = AccAdd(gid, Φ).
– If Ops == “Delete”, call AccDelete(gid, Φ) (Algorithm 5.3) to remove the gid from
an accumulator:
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{α, Φ} = AccDelete(gid, Φ).
– If α2 6= {}, re-randomize the external identifier and issue a new witness for each gid
∈ α2:
∗ Select a random number uniformly: y ← Zp. Set α4 = y; update α in Φ.
We randomize an accumulator external identifier each time the accumulator is
updated. y will be used to generate the external identifier (in the form of gy)
for α.
∗ Call AccWitUpdate(α) (Algorithm 5.4) to re-compute all witnesses for users in
α2:
ωα = AccWitUpdate(α).
– Return {ωα, α} if α2 6= {}, otherwise return ⊥.
• WitnessKeyGen(ωα, α): The algorithm takes witnesses container ωα, and accumulator
α as the inputs. It generates witness keys as follows:
– Extract y from α4 and compute gy as the external identifier of α;
– Let witKeys = {} be the container to store witness keys of users in α2.
– For each gidi ∈ α2:
∗ Extract wgidi from ωα.
∗ Randomly select ri ← Zp, and compute the witness key as:
wskgidi= {wsk1gidi = (w1gidi)riy = g
riy(
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β))
gidi+β , wsk2gidi = (wgidi)
1/ri = g
(gidi+β)
ri ,
wsk3gidi = g
y};
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∗ Add the witness key to witKeys: witKeys ← witKeys + (gidi, wskgidi);
– Return witKeys.
• Encabe(m, ·): This is the ABE encryption algorithm. It takes data m and the rest of
parameters · as inputs. It encrypts data m and outputs the ciphertext c: {cm, ·}.
• ReEnc(c, Φ): The algorithm takes an ABE ciphertext c and the accumulator container
Φ as the inputs. It re-encrypts c for each accumulator αi ∈ Φ as follows:
– For αi ∈ Φ, re-encrypt c:
c
′
i = {ce(gα4i , α1i ), gα4i } = {ce(gyi , vi), gyi} = {ce(g, g)
yi
∏
gidx∈α2i
(gidx+β)
, gyi}.
Since · of c may contain the access policy or attributes in clear text format, there is
a possibility of leaking user information, such as user attributes, to untrusted CSPs.
Re-encrypting the entire c provides the protection of integrity and privacy for access
policies and attributes from malicious modifications.
Although this algorithm is only used by the ciphertext re-encryption system, a pos-
sible issue to consider is that ABE ciphertext c may have different message space
than the group G1 used in DA. One way to address this is to define a reversible
converting method that maps a ciphertext of ABE to a group element of G1 in the
process of re-encryption, then converts results back in the process of decryption. We
will not elaborate it here. It can be addressed in the actual implementation.
– Finally, output C
′
= {c′i}1≤i≤|Φ|.
• Dec(c′ , wskgid): The algorithm takes a re-encrypted ciphertext c′ and a user’s witness
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key wskgid as the inputs. It decrypts c
′
and outputs the ABE ciphertext c as follows:
– Decrypt ABE ciphertext c if wskgid is a valid key:
c
′
/ e(wsk1gid, wsk
2
gid)
= ce(g, g)y
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β)/e( g
riy(
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β))
gid+β , g
(gid+β)
ri )
= ce(g, g)y
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β)/e(g, g)y
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β)
= c
We want to point out a couple of details:
1. Every c
′
is tagged with an accumulator external identifier (described in ReEnc()).
c
′
is selected by the calling process based on a given external identifier. The details
will be specified in the system construction section.
2. Although some notations, such as y versus yi, c
′
versus c
′
i , or gid versus gidi, look
similar, the notation without subscript specifies individual entities, and the notation
with subscript indicates members inside an entity set. Therefore they may refer to
the same value in algorithms.
– return c. (Note: an incorrect or random string or value is returned if wskgid cannot
decrypt c
′
.)
• Decabe(c, ·): This is the ABE decryption algorithm. It takes the ciphertext c and the
remaining parameters denoted as · as inputs. A user’s ABE private key uskabe is assumed
to be a part of ·. It outputs m if uskabe can decrypt c. Otherwise the output depends on
the output of Decabe.
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5.4.2 User Revocation via Ciphertext Re-Encryption (UR-CRE)
Our first approach is to achieve user revocation through ciphertext re-encryption.
5.4.2.1 Trust Model
We assume that the storage system consists of four entities:
1. Attribute Authority (AA): This is the AA of an ABE scheme. It is trusted to generate
ABE private keys (or attribute key shares) for users, publish the ABE public key pkabe,
and protect the ABE master secret mkabe.
2. Data Owners (DO): DO is a trusted party who is responsible for data and user privacy
protection. DO initializes the system, defines data access policy, and centrally manages
user access rights to the encrypted data in cloud storage.
3. Cloud Storage Provider (CSP): CSPs provide cloud storage for a DO to store data and
fulfill user requests. It is considered to be untrusted by DOs.
4. Users: Users can decrypt data only if they are eligible and have attributes complying
with the access control policy of an ABE scheme. Users are considered to be untrusted
by DOs.
We assume that, where necessary, communications between entities in our system are protected
via suitable secure communication mechanisms, such as using SSL/TLS. We also assume that
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Data	Owner	
(DO)	
Users	Users	
Witness	private	key	over	SSL	
AA	 Cloud	Storage	
Authen>ca>on	and	a@ributes	over	
SSL	
Figure 5.1: Trust Model of User Revocation via Ciphertext Re-encryption for ABE in Cloud Storage
CSPs and users do not collude with each other during data retrieval process.
We assume that each user is assigned with a unique gid that is not linked to their true identity.
To simplify the description of our system, we do not elaborate the user verification process.
There are multiple ways to verify whether a gid belongs to a user or not.
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5.4.2.2 System Description
Figure 5.2 shows the interactions among a user, user groups, a DO, AA, and a CSP. The ABE
scheme might have multiple attribute authorities. However, since ABE schemes are treated as
black boxes, the AA in our description is the generic.
The system works as follows:
1. System setup. This is a private process run by a DO. The process takes in a security
parameter 1n, and initializes system parameters, an ABE scheme and DA. It then adds
eligible (non-revoked) users to accumulators, issues and sends witness private keys to
users, encrypts data using ABE, and re-encrypts ABE ciphertext c for each accumulator.
The outputs of the process are the following:
• The ABE public key pkabe and master secret mkabe are sent to AA. pkabe is public.
mkabe needs to be kept secretly.
• An witness private key wskgid is sent to each user and kept secretly.
• The re-encrypted ciphertext C ′ is sent to CSP and kept public.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• DO calls Setup(1n) to initiate an ABE scheme and DA. The algorithm returns the
ABE public key pkabe, master secret mkabe, and DA’s system parameters {k, β, Ak,
Φ}. DA’s system parameters are kept secretly by DO.
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• DO sends AA the public key pkabe and master secret mkabe.
• DO creates accumulators and issues witness private keys:
– Let U contain the existing non-revoked gids.
– Let WitnessSet = {} be the temporary data structure for the returned witnesses
of an accumulator.
– For each gidi ∈ U , DO adds gidi to an accumulator and generates its witness:
∗ Call UserManager(gidi, “Add”, Φ) and get {ωα, α} as the output;
∗ Check if α has been added to WitnessSet or not by using the internal index
α3.
· If α exists, then replace the existing {ωα, α} with the new one;
· Else WitnessSet = WitnessSet + {ωα, α}.
Note: This is a one-time bulk process to add users into accumulators. Although
each gid is newly added to the system, it could be added to an existing accu-
mulator. Therefore, the witnesses of the accumulator need to be updated. An
accumulator can be updated k - 1 times until gids in the accumulator reach the
maximum number k of the allowed elements k. Since this internal computation
takes place on the DO side, no user is aware of it until the next step. This
operation can be optimized in the actual implementation.
– DO issues the witness private keys as follow:
For each {ωα, α} ∈ WitnessSet:
∗ Call WitnessKeyGen(ωα, α) and get witKeys;
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∗ For each gidi ∈ witKeys, send the witness key wskgidi to user gidi.
• DO calls Encabe(m, ·) to encrypt the message m and gets ciphertext c.
• DO calls ReEnc(c, Φ) to re-encrypt c and gets C ′ = {{c′i, gyi}}1≤i≤|Φ|
• Finally DO sends C ′ to CSP.
2. A new user (gid) requests a witness private key. This process is privately run by DO.
If the user is eligible, the process will add the user to an accumulator. All users in
the accumulator are updated with new witness private keys. The ABE ciphertext is
re-encrypted.
The outputs of the process are the following:
• New witness private keys are sent to users of the updated accumulator and kept
secretly.
• The updated ciphertext C ′ is sent to CSP and kept public.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• The user sends a gid to DO.
• DO authenticates and validates the user:
– If the user is eligible, DO does the following:
∗ Call UserManager(gid, “Add”, Φ) to add gid and gets {ωα, α} as the
output.
∗ Call WitnessKeyGen(ωα, α) and gets witKeys.
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∗ For each gidi ∈ witKeys, send the witness key wskgidi to user gidi.
∗ Call ReEnc(c, Φ) to re-encrypt c for each αi ∈ Φ and get C ′ = {{c′i,
gyi}}1≤i≤|Φ|
We re-encrypt the ABE ciphertext c for every accumulator in Φ although
only one accumulator has been changed. In this way, CSP simply replaces
the previous C
′
with the newly received C
′
.
∗ Send C ′ to CSP.
– Otherwise DO returns⊥ to the user.
3. A new user (gid) requests an ABE private key. This is a private process run by AA.
The output of the process is one of the following:
• An ABE private key uskabe is sent to the user if the user is authenticated.
• Otherwise the output of AA, which could be ⊥ as an example.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• The user contacts AA to request his ABE private key.
• AA authenticates the user:
– If the user can be authenticated, then AA does the following:
∗ Call KeyGenabe(·) and generate uskabe.
∗ Send uskabe to the user.
– Otherwise AA returns its output.
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4. A user (gid) retrieves a ciphertext from CSP. This process is run publicly by CSP and
a user. The user sends CSP the external identifier included in the user’s witness private
key. CSP locates the re-encrypted ciphertext tagged with the external identifier if the re-
encrypted ciphertext exists. Upon receiving the re-encrypted ciphertext, the user decrypts
it by calling Dec to get the ABE ciphertext, and Decabe to decrypt the data.
The output of the process is one of the following:
• ⊥ if the re-encrypted ciphertext is not found.
• Otherwise, either data m if the user is not revoked and has a valid ABE private key,
or the output of Decabe.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• User gid sends the external accumulator identifier wsk3gid (gy ) to CSP.
• CSP returns the ciphertext c′ identified by gy if c′ exists, otherwise ⊥ is returned.
• If the return value is not ⊥:
– The user calls Dec(c
′
, wskgid):
∗ If wskgid is a valid witness key of gy, c is returned.
∗ Otherwise a random string is returned.
– The user calls Decabe(c, ·):
∗ If c is in a correct form and uskabe is able to decrypt it, m is returned.
∗ Otherwise the output of Decabe is returned.
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5. DO revokes a user (gid). This is a private process run by DO. DO removes the user from
the user’s accumulator, updates the remaining users with new witness private keys, and
re-encrypts ABE ciphertext c to C
′
.
The outputs of the process are the following:
• New witness private keys is sent to the users of the updated accumulator and kept
secretly.
• The re-encrypted ciphertext C ′ is sent to CSP and kept public.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• DO calls UserManager(gid, “Delete”, Φ) to remove the gid and gets the output
{ωα, α}.
• If α2 6= {}, DO does the following:
– Call WitnessKeyGen(ωα, α) to generate witness private keys witKeys.
– For gidi ∈ α2, send wskgidi to user gidi.
• DO calls ReEnc(c, Φ) to re-encrypt c and gets C ′ = {{c′i, gyi}}1≤i≤|Φ| as the output.
• DO sends C ′ to CSP for the update.
5.4.2.3 Security Analysis
The ciphertext re-encryption system (UR-CRE) enables an anonymous user revocation generi-
cally for ABE in untrusted cloud storage environments. The system is built on top of an ABE
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Figure 5.2: Interaction Diagram of User Revocation via Ciphertext Re-encryption for ABE in Cloud
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scheme and leverages a dynamic accumulator (DA) based on the scheme of ([15]). Therefore,
the fundamental security of the system relies on the security of the selected ABE scheme and
DA. We assume that:
• The ABE scheme is at least CPA-secure.
• The DA scheme is secure against the forgeability of witnesses and provides anonymity
protection for elements aggregated into accumulators.
The revocation capability aims to equip an ABE scheme with two additional security features:
• A revoked user is not able to access ABE ciphertext immediately after the revocation.
However, this protection does not apply to the ciphertext that has been requested or
possibly kept by the user locally before the revocation.
• Users can anonymously request re-encrypted ABE ciphertexts from CSPs.
The two security features require the system to have:
1. Dynamic user revocation: Revoked users, having valid ABE private keys, are immediately
prevented from being able to access ABE ciphertext.
2. Ciphertext indistinguishability: The re-encrypted ABE ciphertext should remain indis-
tinguishable against eavesdropping attacks.
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3. Unforgeability: Users should not be able to forge their witness private keys to decrypt
the re-encrypted ABE ciphertexts.
4. Anonymity: Users remain anonymous to CSPs. CSPs are not required for any user
management or administration to fulfill data retrieval requests. In addition, the privacy
and integrity of ABE access policies (expressed by user attributes) are protected by the
re-encryption.
The system security is analyzed as follows:
The Security of Dynamic User Revocation
Dynamic user revocation is realized by preventing the revoked users from accessing ABE ci-
phertexts.
Each user has two types of private keys: a witness private key for decrypting a re-encrypted
ABE ciphertext and an ABE private key for decrypting an ABE ciphertext. Once a user is
revoked, AA does not re-issue ABE private keys. Instead, DO takes the following actions to
invalidate the user’s witness private key:
• First DO removes the user from the user’s accumulator. Let us assume that accumulator
αi is the one containing the user. After the user is removed, αi is updated with the new
aggregate value (α1i = v
′
i). The external identifier g
yi is re-generated as gy
′
i , where y
′
i is
randomly selected from Zp. All accumulator data structures, α and Φ, are kept secret by
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DO. yi and y
′
i are not provided to users and CSPs. Only the external identifiers (in the
form of gy) are public and given to users and CSP.
• Then DO generates new witness private keys to the remaining users in αi. As being
described in the algorithm WitnessKeyGen (in Section 5.4.1), each user’s witness private
key is derived from the user’s new witness of αi by randomizing it with y
′
i and r
′
which
is also randomly and uniquely selected from Zp to each user every time.
As the revoked user is removed from αi and does not belong to any other accumulator,
the user is not updated with a new witness key. The user is not able to forge a witness
of any accumulator based on the unforgeability of DA. All numbers yi are kept privately
by DO. Based on the DLP assumption, the revoked user is not able to discover y
′
i even
though the user can obtain gy
′
i . Without the needed components: v
′
i (α
1
i ) and y
′
i, the
revoked user is not able to forge a valid witness private key once being revoked.
• The DO re-encrypts the ABE ciphertext with the new accumulator value v′i and the
external identifier y
′
i: c
′
i = ce(g
y
′
i , v
′
i). Although the revoked user is not able to forge the
new witness of an accumulator, the user can try to forge the new aggregate value. Let us
assume that this user is the only user who has been removed from the accumulator. As
the DA’s system parameters (such as accumulator trapdoor β and function Ak) are kept
secretly by DO, the user needs to get the previous vi from his witness private key obtained
before his revocation. Assuming the witness private key is: wskgid= {wsk1gid = (w1gid)r =
g
ryi(
∏
gidx∈α2i
(gidx+β))
gid+β , wsk2gid = (wgid)
1/r = g
(gid+β)
r , wsk3gid = (g)
α4= gyi}. Under the DLP
assumption, the user cannot get
∏
gidx∈α2i (gidx + β) to compute vi = g
∏
gidx∈α2i
(gidx+β)
.
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Therefore, the user cannot forge v
′
i, which is v
1
gid+β
i .
Based on the above analysis, the user cannot decrypt any re-encrypted ABE ciphertext,
since without the witness private key, the original ABE private key is insufficient for
decryption.
It is possible that a non-revoked user has a valid witness private key, but the attributes fail to
comply with the ABE’s access policy. This might happen because the witness private keys are
issued and used separately from the keys used in ABE. In this case, the security of the ABE
scheme should prevent the user from decrypting the ciphertext.
The Security of Ciphertext Indistinguishability
The system should resist eavesdropping adversaries.
The communication channels between DO and CSPs, or users and CSPs, might be unprotected.
An adversary can eavesdrop on ciphertexts sent in unsecured channels. Assume that an ad-
versary is able to get the ABE public (encryption) key and the re-encrypted ciphertexts from
unencrypted channels. If the adapted ABE is CPA-secure, ABE ciphertext is indistinguishable
against eavesdropping attacks. As the re-encryption keys (in the form of e(gy, v)) are random-
ized (by uniformly selected y ) for each accumulator as well as changed for every subsequent
ciphertext re-encryption, intuitively the re-encrypted ciphertext is also indistinguishable.
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The Security of Unforgeability
The system prevents a revoked user from forging the new ciphertext re-encryption key based
on the witness private key that the user acquired before the revocation. This security is based
on the membership unforgeability of the DA (scheme [15]) and the DLP assumption. We use
the following scenario to informally analyze this. Let us assume that a user (A) with gid is
aggregated in αi.
1. At the beginning, user A is given his witness key of αi as:
wskgid= {wsk1gid = (w1gid)r = g
ryi(
∏
gidx∈α2i
(gidx+β))
gid+β , wsk2gid = (wgid)
1/r = g
(gid+β)
r , wsk3gid =
(g)α
4
= gyi}.
2. When A is revoked, DO removes gid from αi and y
′
i is randomly selected. The accumulator
αi has the new external identifier g
y
′
i and the new aggregate value v
′
i. DO then refreshes
the witness private keys of the remaining members in α2i (which does not include the
revoked gid any more) .
3. A is free to retrieve any number of re-encrypted ciphertexts from CSPs within polynomial
time. As A is not a member of any accumulator, A is not able to forge any witness of an
accumulator based on the security of DA. A is also not able to extract vi from his previous
witness private key, as explained in the security of dynamic user revocation analysis (in
Section 5.4.2.3). Therefore A is not able to reconstruct any re-encryption key of the
ciphertext even though gy
′
i might be obtained by A.
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The Security of Anonymity
The anonymity protection is for users being anonymous to CSPs. Users identities are protected
in the following ways:
1. Each user is assigned a pseudo identifier gid that is unique and not linked to a real
identity.
2. An accumulator’s aggregate value (v) does not reveal any aggregated gids based on the
security of DA ([15]).
3. CSPs are provided with any accumulator value and information other than re-encrypted
ciphertexts.
Based on the above analysis, we can conclude that the proposed user revocation system has
met the security goals.
Although collusion protection is one of the security requirements of ABE schemes, our proposed
system does not consider it. This is because ABE schemes use one master secret to derive user
private keys. An encryption and decryption key can consist of multiple portions, each related
to a particular attribute. As attributes are shared by users, users without all valid key portions
or attributes can pool the key portions to construct a valid private key. Therefore collusion
prevention is a critical security requirement of ABE. However, this type of collusion does not
apply to our proposed user revocation system, which builds an additional layer above the ABE
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scheme. There is no attribute sharing between the ABE scheme and the revocation system.
5.4.3 User Revocation via Cloud Storage Providers (UR-CSP)
Although using the ciphertext re-encryption approach UR-CRE enables user revocation at
data item level and requires no user management on CSPs, it introduces extra overheads in the
following aspects:
• It requires CSPs to store multiple re-encryption copies of an ABE ciphertext.
• It requires a DO to re-encrypt the ABE ciphertext for an accumulator whenever it adds
or removes a user.
To eliminate the above overhead, the second generic user revocation system, UR-CSP, leverages
CSPs to anonymously identify revoked users during the ciphertext retrieval process. In this
way, one copy of the ABE ciphertext needs to be stored. Only non-revoked users can get the
ABE ciphertext from CSPs.
5.4.3.1 Trust Model
The trust model still has four entities (see Section 5.4.2.1). The only difference is that CSPs
become semi-trusted instead of being completely untrusted. The CSPs are trusted to perform
user management in regard to anonymously identifying a user’s eligibility to access an ABE
ciphertext.
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• Cloud storage provider (CSP): CSPs store ABE ciphertexts, validate user access rights,
and fulfill data retrieval requests. CSPs are semi-trusted entities to execute the assigned
tasks, but might be curious to know the data and user identities.
The communication channels between entities in our framework is assumed to be secure, as
showed in Figure 5.3. We also assume that CSPs and users do not collude with one another.
Each user is assigned a global unique identifier gid that is not linked to the user’s true identity.
We do not elaborate the verification process of identifying whether a gid belongs to a user
or not. There are multiple ways of verifying a user’s identity against the given gid, such as
certifications.
5.4.3.2 System Description
This second user revocation system, UR-CSP, still uses DA to manage user access rights as in
UR-CRE, except that users are given witnesses instead of witness private keys. Each witness
is used to prove a user (gid) being aggregated to an accumulator. If CSPs can validate a user’s
claim to an accumulator, the requested ABE ciphertext is returned.
The external accumulator identifiers are not tagged to any user witness and accumulators’
aggregate values. Instead, α4 (the randomly selected number when α gets created or updated)
is used to randomize the witnesses that are sent to users, and aggregate values (α1) that are
sent to CSP. In this way, the aggregate values and witnesses get further protection from CSPs
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and users.
One way for a user to attest the membership of an accumulator is to send his/her witness directly
to a CSP. Although each witness does not directly link to a user’s identity, it does identify the
individual user and the user’s access privilege to a ciphertext. Since CSP is not fully trusted,
directly sharing a witness with CSP could have potential risks, such as impersonation attacks
launched by the malicious insiders of CSP. Therefore, the witnesses are considered to be private
and kept secret by users.
Inspired by zero knowledge proofs [27], our approach is to make users compute witness proofs.
Each time a user requests the ABE ciphertext, the user computes a witness proof using his/her
witness. The witness proof is randomized each time, even on the same witness. The CSP is
able to validate the proof against the accumulators’ aggregate values provided by DO. Figure
5.4 shows the interactions between different parties in the system.
The details of the system construction are as follows:
1. System setup. This is a private process run by DO. It initializes the system by setting
up system parameters, an ABE scheme, and DA. It then adds non-revoked users into
accumulators, issues and sends witnesses, encrypts data using ABE, randomizes accumu-
lators’ aggregate values, and sends the ABE ciphertexts and randomized aggregate values
to CSPs.
The outputs of the process are the following:
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• ABE pkabe and mkabe are sent to AA. pkabe is public. mkabe is kept secretly.
• Witnesses wgid is sent to eligible users to be kept secretly.
• The ABE ciphertext c and Λ (the container described below for storing randomized
aggregate values) are sent to CSP. Values c and Λ can be public.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• DO calls Setup(1n) to initialize an ABE scheme and DA. The algorithm returns the
ABE public key pkabe, master secret mkabe, and DA’s system parameters {k, β, Ak,
Φ}. DA’s system parameters are kept secretly by DO.
• DO provides AA with the public key pkabe and master secret mkabe.
• Let U contain the existing non-revoked gids.
– Let WitnessSet = {} be the container to temporarily store the returned wit-
nesses of accumulators.
– For each gidi ∈ U , DO proceeds as the follows:
∗ Call UserManager(gidi, “Add”, Φ) to add gidi to an accumulator and get
{ωα, α} as the output;
∗ Check whether α has been added to WitnessSet or not by using the internal
index α3. If α exists, remove the existing {ωα, α}.
∗ Update WitnessSet: WitnessSet ← WitnessSet + {ωα, α}.
Note: This again is a one-time bulk process for adding all users into accumula-
tors.
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– For each {ωα, α} ∈ WitnessSet:
∗ For each gidi ∈ α2, DO re-computes wgidi = {(w1gidi)α
4
= (w1gid)
y, w2gidi}, and
sends wgidi to user gidi.
• DO calls Encabe(m, ·) to encrypt the message m and get ABE ciphertext c.
• Let Λ be the container to store all the current aggregate values.
– For each accumulator αi ∈ Φ:
∗ DO adds vi to Λ = Λ + {vyii }, where vi is α1i and yi is α4i .
We use yi to randomize aggregate values.
• DO sends {Λ, c} to CSP.
2. DO adds a new user (gid) to the system. This process is run by DO privately. It adds
the user to an accumulator and updates all users in the accumulator with new witnesses.
It then updates CSP with the new randomized aggregate values.
The outputs of the process are as follows:
• New witnesses of the updated accumulator are sent to users to be kept secretly.
• Updated Λ is sent to CSP. It can be public.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• DO first validates and authenticates the user gid.
• If the user is eligible:
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– DO calls UserManager(gid, “Add”, Φ) to add gid to an accumulator and has
{ωα, α} returned.
– For each gidi ∈ α2, DO gets y from α4, re-computes wgidi = {(w1gidi)y, w2gidi},
and sends the witness wgidi to the user.
– Let Λ = {}.
– For each αi ∈ Φ, DO adds vi to Λ: Λ = Λ + {vyii }, where vi is α1i and yi is α4i .
Note: The updated α has been included in Φ. Therefore, all the aggregate values
are currently in Φ. Although only one accumulator is updated, Λ is re-generated for
the CSP to simply replace the previous one completely.
– DO sends Λ to CSP to replace the previous one.
• If the user is not eligible, DO returns ⊥.
3. A new user (gid) requests an ABE private key. This process is the same as described in
UR-CRE.
The output of the process is one of the following:
• The ABE private key uskabe is kept secretly by the user if the user is authenticated.
• Otherwise the output is the output of AA, which could be ⊥ as an example.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• The user contacts AA with his/her attributes.
• AA verifies the user and his/her attributes.
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• If the user is successfully verified, AA calls KeyGenabe(·) and sends the user uskabe.
• Otherwise AA outputs its output.
4. A user gid requests an ABE ciphertext. This process consists of the following communi-
cations between CSP and the user :
• First the user computes a witness proof and sends it to CSP.
• Upon getting the request and the proof, CSP checks the proof against the accumu-
lator’s aggregate values.
• If the proof can be verified, CSP sends ciphertext c to the user. Otherwise CSP
returns ⊥.
• If the user gets c back, he/she calls Decabe to decrypt the data.
The output of this process is one of the following:
• Data m, if the user can prove his/her membership and has a valid uskabe.
• The output of Decabe, if the user can prove his/her membership, but does not have
a valid uskabe.
• ⊥, if the user cannot prove his/her membership of an accumulator.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• User gid computes a proof:
– Randomly select γ uniformly from Zp, and compute:
atte = e(w1gid, (w
2
gid)
γ) = e(v
y
gid+β , gγ(gid+β)) = e(g
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β), gγy)
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= e(g, g)ry
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β)
– Compute gγ;
• User gid sends {atte, gγ} to CSP;
• CSP validates atte:
– For each {vyii } ∈ Λ:
∗ Compute e(vyii , gγ) = e(vi, gyiγ) = e(g, g)
ryi
∏
gidx∈α2i
(gidx+β)
.
∗ Check whether atte ?= e(g, g)ryi
∏
gidx∈α2i
(gidx+β)
or not;
– If one match found, ABE ciphertext c is returned;
– Otherwise ⊥ is returned.
• If c is returned, the user calls Decabe(c, ·) to get m if skabe is able to decrypt c.
• Otherwise the output depends on the output of Decabe(c, ·).
5. DO revokes a user gid. This process is run by DO privately. It removes the user from an
accumulator and updates the remaining users with new witnesses. CSP is also provided
with the updates.
The outputs of the process are the following:
• New witnesses are sent users to be kept secretly, if the updated accumulator α has
the remaining users.
• Updated Λ is sent to CSP and can be public.
The detailed steps are as follows:
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• DO calls UserManager(gid, “Delete”, Φ) to remove gid from an accumulator and
has {ωα, α} returned.
• If α2 6= {}:
– For each gidi ∈ α2, DO gets the random number y from α4, re-computes wgidi
= {(w1gidi)y, w2gidi}, and sends the witness wgidi to the user gidi.
• Let Λ = {}.
• For each αi ∈ Φ, DO computes vyii and adds it to Λ: Λ = Λ + {vyii }, where vi is α1i
and yi is α
4
i .
• DO sends Λ to CSP to replace the previous one.
5.4.3.3 Security Analysis
As UR-CSP is still built on top of an ABE scheme and leverages DA to achieve dynamic and
anonymous user revocation, the fundamental security of UR-CSP still relies on the security of
ABE and DA. We assume that:
• The selected ABE scheme is at least CPA-secure.
• DA, which is build out of the scheme in [15], is secure against witness forgeability and
provides anonymity of elements aggregated into accumulators.
UR-CSP aims to achieve similar goals to the previous system, UR-CRE:
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• A revoked user is unable to decrypt ABE ciphertexts after the revocation.
• CSPs can anonymously identify revoked users during the ciphertext retrieval process.
These goals require the same security as for UR-CRE:
• Dynamic user revocation: revoked users, having valid ABE private keys, are prevented
from accessing any ABE ciphertext after the revocations.
• Ciphertext indistinguishability: The ABE ciphertext should remain indistinguishable
against eavesdropping attacks.
• Unforgeability: users should not be able to forge their witnesses to prove the membership
of an accumulator.
• Anonymity: users remain anonymous to CSPs in any user identification and data retrieval
request.
The detailed analysis is as follows:
The Security of Dynamic User Revocation
Assume a revoked user still holds a valid ABE private key for decryption, the system prevents
the user from accessing the ABE ciphertext as follows:
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• When the user (gid) is revoked, DO removes the gid from its accumulator. Suppose α is
the accumulator. The external randomizing number α4 is re-selected and the aggregate
value α1 is recalculated. Let y
′
and v
′
denote the updated values of α4 and α1. Each of
the remaining users gidi ∈ α2 receives a new witness w′gidi randomized by y
′
:
w
′
gidi
= {w′1gidi = v
′ y
′
gidi+β , w
′2
gidi
= ggidi+β}
The CSP is also updated with a new Λ (containing (v
′
)y
′
).
• The revoked user (gid) is not given any new or updated witness. Suppose that the revoked
user has the “old” witness and is denoted as follows:
wgid = {w1gid = v
y
gidi+β = g
y(
∏
gidi∈α(gidi+β))
gid+β , w2gid = g
gid+β}, where y and v are the “old”
values.
– Based on the DLP assumption, the user cannot extract
y
∏
gidx∈α(gidx+β)
gid+β
and gid+ β
from his/her witness.
– Suppose the user compute e(w1gid, w
2
gid) to get e(g, g)
y
∏
gidx⊆α(gidx+β). y
∏
gidx∈
∏
α(gidx+
β) cannot be extracted based on the DLP assumption, nor the original aggregate
value v. Since DA’s system parameters and data structures are kept secretly from
users, the user is prevented from computing v
′
.
– Based on the witness unforgebility of DA, the user cannot forge a witness of any
accumulator.
– Suppose that the user assumes him/her to be the only person removed from the
accumulator. The user tries to forge a proof (atte) by randomly select γ
′
and only
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uses w1gid as follows: atte = e(w
1
gid, (g)
γ
′
) = e(g, g)r
′
y
∏
gidx∈α(gidx+β). Since y has been
changed to y
′
, which is randomly selected and kept secretly by DO, the atte cannot
be validated correctly.
Based on the above analysis, the revoked user cannot generate a valid proof to CSP. He/She is
not given any ABE ciphertext after the revocation.
The Security of Ciphertext Indistinguishability
Since UR-CSP uses an ABE scheme for data encryption, we assume that the security of cipher-
text indistinguishability is provided by the ABE scheme selected by DO.
The Security of Unforgeability:
This security is based on the membership unforgeability of the scheme in [15]. Any user,
whether revoked or not, cannot forge a valid witness of an accumulator that does not have the
user’s gid aggregated in it.
The Security of Anonymity:
The user verification process does not need user identities or gids:
• Users use witnesses to compute a claim to prove their memberships of a particular accu-
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mulator:
atte = e(w1gid, (w
2
gid)
γ) = e(v
y
gid+β , gγ(gid+β)) = e(g, g)ry
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β).
γ is randomly chosen each time so that atte is differently formed even using the same
witness.
• Using the given aggregate values Λ= {{vyii }1≤i≤|Φ|}, CSP verify a claim by checking the
following:
For each vyii ∈ Λ:
– Compute e(vyii , g
γ) = e(g, g)
ryi
∏
gidx∈α2i
(gidx+β)
.
– Check whether atte
?
= e(g, g)
ryi
∏
gidx∈α2i
(gidx+β)
or not;
None of the above steps and information will disclose user identities to CSP. Thus, users remain
anonymously to CSP in the process of user versification and data retrieval.
Based on the above analysis, we can conclude that the second proposed user revocation system,
UR-CSP, has met the security requirements.
5.5 User Revocation Overhead Analysis
We are not aware any similar system that can generically work with any existing ABE scheme.
Thus, we simply compare our two systems in this section (in Figure 5.5).
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The user revocation systems add integration and management overheads. As we can see, the
overheads are mainly coming from the following aspects:
1. Accumulator management;
2. User witness or witness private key management;
3. Ciphertext re-encryption and re-encryption updates to CSPs;
4. User membership construction and verification;
5. Storage required for storing multiple copies of the re-encrypted ciphertext.
UR-CRE has the overheads 1, 2, 3, and 5. Most of those overheads, (1, 2, 3), are on the data
owner side. CSPs are only required to provide extra storage space for multiple copies of the
re-encrypted ABE ciphertexts (overhead 5). The data owner can be a potential bottleneck for
updates and witness private key management. However, the performance and scalability can
be greatly improved by delegating the witness private key updates and ciphertext re-encryption
to a trusted party or servers. Transferring updates to users and CSPs can also be out-of-band.
UR-CSP has the overheads 1, 2, and 4. Most of those overheads, (1, 2), are still on the data
owner side, but the data owner does not need to re-encrypt ABE ciphertexts. The data owner
can still be a bottleneck to manage accumulators and witness updates. Delegation can still
be the implementation strategy to reduce the bottleneck. Only one copy of ABE ciphertext
is stored at CSPs. However, ciphertext retrieval is a protocol of user membership verification
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process (overhead 4). It requires a user to construct a proof for a CSP to validate the proof
every time. CSPs are required to be semi-trusted to perform user membership verification.
This trust is not required in UR-CRE.
Overall, the overheads of UR-CSP appear to be more evenly distributed compared to UR-
CRE. It is slightly more scalable than UR-CRE, but UR-CRE can improve the scalability by
delegating the tasks and computations.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed two dynamic user revocation systems for ABE schemes. Our
systems are generic and can be applied directly to any ABE scheme. We build user privacy
protection into the data retrieval process, making ABE schemes more suitable and practical for
deployment in untrusted cloud storage systems.
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User revocation concerns user access rights being revoked from an ABE system. It might be
excessive in situations where a user has only a few attributes needing to be revoked, while
other attributes continue to satisfy certain access policies. Resolving this situation requires
revocation to be more granular, which means that revocation is required at both attribute and
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user levels, rather than only at the user level.
In ABE, an attribute can be shared by multiple users. Any shared attribute being revoked
from a user should not impact the use of the attribute by other users. In other words, attribute
revocation should allow any number of attributes to be revoked from one or multiple users
without impact on other users who share or use the same attributes for data decryption.
Attribute revocation has been studied in the literature, however most existing revocation
schemes only work with certain individual ABE schemes. Some are inflexible in the num-
ber of attributes that can be revoked, or not granular enough to support attribute revocation
both at user and attribute level (two-level revocation): revoking any number of attributes from
a user or revoking any attribute from a number of users. We propose an attribute revocation
system that is generic to all ABE schemes, and supports two-level attribute revocation. User
privacy is also protected in the revocation system.
6.1 Related Work
Yu et al. [148] proposed a CP-ABE scheme to accomplish revocation of user access rights
via attribute revocation. When a user’s access right is revoked, the AA generates a new re-
encryption key for the semi-trusted on-line proxy server. On behalf of the AA, the proxy server
generates and distributes new updated attribute key shares (private keys) to each non-revoked
user. Then the proxy server re-encrypts the data with the new encryption key. Although the
scheme oﬄoads the data and attribute private key updates to a semi-trusted proxy server, each
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revocation triggers a round of user attribute key updates and data re-encryption.
Yang et al. [145] proposed a CP-ABE revocation scheme which generates a new attribute
public key and private key whenever an attribute is revoked. The difference between this
scheme and [148] is that only those components associated with the revoked attribute in secret
keys and ciphertexts, instead of all the components in the secret keys and ciphertexts, need
to be updated. Users are required to obtain those updates of their private keys. Data is
re-encrypted by semi-trusted CSPs using the new attribute public key. While these schemes
enable instantaneous user revocation, each revocation still triggers a round of attribute key
share updates and ciphertext re-encryption.
Based on Hur and Noh’s user revocation system [70], Xie et al. [140] constructed a user and
attribute revocation system aimed at reducing the computational overhead of the data service
manager in [70]. The new construction in [140] improved the key update computation of the
data service manager by half. Despite this efficient new construction, it inevitably inherits the
potential issues of service managers discussed in Section 5.1.
Wang et al. [133] proposed attribute revocation for a KP-ABE scheme. In their scheme, each
user is associated with two access trees. Each tree has its own private key. The first tree is
used for data decryption if the user does not have any revoked attributes. Otherwise the second
tree is used as long as the user’s valid attributes still satisfy the policy of the KP-ABE scheme.
Although this revocation scheme does not require attribute key re-issuing, it only works for
revoking one attribute at a time.
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6.2 Our Contributions
We propose an attribute revocation system, AR-ABE, for ABE schemes with the following
characteristics:
• Generic: The revocation process can directly work with any ABE scheme.
• Dynamic: The revocation is instantaneous without requiring ABE private keys to be
re-issued or data to be re-encrypted.
• Granular: The revocation can take place at either attribute level or user level. At attribute
level, an attribute can be revoked from a user or a number of users. At the user level, a
user can have one or multiple attributes being revoked. Any level of revocation does not
impact other users using the same attributes.
• Collusion resistant for re-encryption keys: The revocation system utilizes ciphertext re-
encryption to control the access to ABE ciphertexts. Ciphertext re-encryption keys are
re-constructed by users with their attribute witnesses. The revocation system (AR-ABE)
prevents users from pooling their attribute witnesses to construct any ciphertext re-
encryption key. Re-encryption keys are completely independent with regard to ABE
private keys.
• Anonymous: Users are anonymous to CSPs.
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6.3 The Attribute Revocation System (AR-ABE)
Granular attribute revocation is not as straightforward as user revocation. In ABE schemes,
each user’s private key is uniquely formed. A special link is typically used to bind the private
key shares of a user’s attributes together so that users are prevented from pooling their key
shares together to construct a decryption key. This type of prevention is referred to as collusion
resistance. Revoking an attribute without re-issuing the private key can break the bond among
the attribute key shares, and prohibit the user from reconstructing other decryption keys. This
makes it difficult to implement a dynamic and granular revocation system.
To make an attribute revocation system dynamic and granular as well as generic to all types
of ABE schemes, we separate the revocation control from the underlying ABE schemes. This
revocation control is again achieved by controlling access to ABE ciphertexts via ciphertext re-
encryption. Re-encryption keys are randomly generated one-time keys. If a user does not have
the non-revoked attributes that are required by the ABE policy, the one-time re-encryption key
cannot be recovered during the decryption process, even though the user still possesses a valid
ABE private key. The proposed system still uses DA (defined in Section 5.3.2) to manage user
access to ABE ciphertext. Again, users are uniquely identified by global identifiers (gids) that
are not linked to their attributes and identities.
• At the attribute level, each attribute is associated with a set of accumulators aggregated
with users (gids) who possess the attribute that has not been revoked. When an attribute
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is revoked from a user, the user’s gid will be removed from its accumulator. The rest of
users of the accumulator will receive their new witnesses. When a new user is granted
access to an ABE ciphertext, the user will be added to an accumulator for each attribute
that the user has. Other users in those accumulators will receive new witness updates.
• At the user level, we employ an access tree called an attribute accumulator tree (AATree)
(see Section 6.2). AATree is constructed by a data owner (DO) with the attributes
required by the access policy of an ABE scheme. The tree is provided to CSPs.
The AATree is used for the following purposes:
– It contains the necessary attributes (via their accumulators) needed by the selected
ABE scheme. Although AATree is inspired by the access tree of ABE schemes, it is
completely independent in regard to the content and relationship with the underlying
ABE scheme. AATree is not used by any ABE scheme and does not replace any ABE
scheme’s access policy. It simply contains the necessary attributes that are used by
the selected ABE scheme in the decryption process.
– It is used to control user access to ABE ciphertexts. When a user requests an ABE
ciphertext, a CSP randomly generates a one-time re-encryption key, re-encrypts
the ABE ciphertext, and embeds the re-encryption key using the AATree in the
re-encrypted ciphertext. Only users who have non-revoked attributes with their ac-
cumulator witnesses satisfying the AATree are able to re-construct the re-encryption
key to get the ABE ciphertext.
– It is used to protect user privacy. As the AATree and accumulators are managed
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and updated by data owners, CSPs do not need to know, or keep a list of users with
their revoked attributes. A CSP only needs to be posted with the latest AATree and
uses it to embed re-encryption keys.
6.3.1 Trust Model
The trust model for AR-ABE is the same as the trust model of the one with UR-CSP described
in Section 5.4.3.1. Data owners (DO) and the ABE attribute authority (AA) are trusted, while
CSP are semi-trusted, and users are not trusted. Figure 6.1 is the diagram of the trust model.
The communications between DO and users, as well as AA, are protected via suitably secured
channels encrypted by SSL/TLS. We also assume that users are properly authenticated before
ABE private keys or attribute witnesses are issued.
6.3.2 Algorithm Definition and Construction
We first define the data structures and algorithms used in AR-ABE.
6.3.2.1 Data Structure Definition
There are two main data structures for AATree and accumulators. AATree data structures are
used for managing user access to ABE ciphertexts. Accumulator data structures are used to
manage user attributes and their revocation statuses.
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Figure 6.1: Trust Model of Attribute Revocation System for ABE in Cloud Storage
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• Attribute Accumulator Tree (AATree): Figure 6.2 shows an example of an AATree. The
internal nodes are attributes that are required by the selected ABE scheme to check for
the compliance of its access policy. Each leaf node is one of the accumulators of the
attribute. Since each user is only aggregated to one accumulator of an attribute, the
internal nodes (attributes) are 1 − out − of − n threshold gates. The n denotes the
number of accumulators for an attribute, that can be different among attributes. As the
number of accumulators for an attribute can be changed for adding or removing users,
each n is not static and subject to change throughout its lifetime. AATree is dynamically
updated by DO. Figure 6.2 also illustrates how a re-encryption key is split and embedded
into the tree.
• Data structures used to manage accumulators: the system and DO use the following data
structures to manage accumulators and user attributes.
– Let Att = {atti}1≤i≤|Att| contain attributes in the system. |Att| denotes the number
of attributes in the system.
– Let Λpolicy = {atti}1≤i≤|Λpolicy| contain the attributes that are used by an ABE access
policy. |Λpolicy| denotes the number of attributes included.
– Let UAttgid = {atti}1≤i≤|UAttgid| contain the attributes of user gid. |UAttgid| denotes
the number of attributes of user gid.
– Let α denote an accumulator as it is defined in Section 5.3.2.1:
α = {α1 = v, α2 = {gidx}1≤x≤|{gidx}|, α3 = i, α4 = y}.
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– Let Φatt denote the attribute accumulator container containing all the accumulators
of attribute att:
Φatt = {Φ1att = att, Φ2att = Φ = {αi}1≤i≤|Φ| }, where |Φ| is the number of the accu-
mulators of att.
– Let Ω = {Φatti}atti∈Att contain all the attribute accumulator containers.
– Let uwgid = {{atti, wgid, gyj}}1≤i≤|uwgid| contains the witnesses of the attributes that
user gid has had and not been revoked.
• Data structures used to express AATree: As accumulators are solely managed by a DO,
they are kept and stored on the DO side. But information, such as the accumulator’s
aggregate values and attributes required by ABE access policy, is needed by CSPs to
control user access to an ABE ciphertext. ∆ is for a DO to provide the information to
CSPs. Ψ is created by a CSP to embed re-encryption keys in the ciphertext based on
Λpolicy.
– ∆ is used to store accumulator aggregate values of attributes in Λpolicy :
∆ = {atti, {vyjj , gyj}1≤j≤|Φ2atti |}1≤i≤|Λpolicy | , where vj is the aggregate value of accu-
mulator αj for attribute atti, g
yj is the external identifier of accumulator αj, and
|Φ2atti | (= |Φ|) is the total number of accumulators for atti.
– Ψ is used to carry a ciphertext re-encryption key. An example is like the following:
Ψ = {{(e(g, g)si−gid·yj
∏
gidx∈αj
(gidx+β)
, gyj)}1≤j≤|Φ2atti |}1≤i≤|Λpolicy |, where si is a ran-
domly split share of a randomly selected s at the re-encryption time. Users re-
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construct re-encryption keys if their non-revoked attributes have the valid witnesses
of those accumulators.
Table 6.1 lists the commonly used notation in this chapter.
6.3.2.2 Algorithm Construction
We define the commonly used algorithms in our system. Whether the algorithms can be run
privately or publicly and which information is kept secret depend on the trust model. These
will be described in Section 6.3.3.
• Setup(1n): The algorithm takes the input 1n as security parameter and proceeds as
follows:
– Let U contain the existing user gids: U = {gid1 , . . . gidn}, where gidi ∈ Z?p (p is a
n-bit prime).
– Call Setupabe(1
n) to initialize the ABE scheme using the security parameter 1n. The
algorithm outputs the public key pkabe and the master secret mkabe.
– Initialize DA using the security parameter 1n:
∗ Let e: G × G → G1 be a bilinear map for p.
∗ Let g be a generator of G.
∗ Call AccSetup(G, g) (Algorithm 5.1) with G and g as the inputs. It outputs {k,
157
6.3. THE ATTRIBUTE REVOCATION SYSTEM (AR-ABE)
Notation Description
c An ABE ciphertext
AA The ABE attribute authority
Setupabe The setup algorithm of an ABE scheme
KeyGenabe The key generation algorithm of an ABE scheme
Encabe The encryption algorithm of an ABE scheme
Decabe The decryption algorithm of an ABE scheme
pkabe The public key of an ABE scheme
mkabe The master secret of an ABE scheme
uskabe An ABE private key of a user
gid A user’s global unique identifier
U The set containing user gids in the system
CSP Cloud Storage Providers
DO Data Owner
Φ Accumulator container used by Φatt to store the accumulators of attribute att
Φatt Accumulator container to store the accumulators of attribute att
Ω Accumulator container to store all the Φatt in the system
k The maximum number of elements that can be aggregated to an accumulator
Aκ The accumulator function to generate aggregate values
β The trapdoor value used by the accumulator function Ak
α The container of a particular accumulator and its information
v An accumulator aggregate value
Ops The operational type - Add or Delete a gid to or from an accumulator
ωα The witness container of α to store user witnesses
Att The set of attributes in the system
UAttgid The set of attributes for user gid
Λpolicy The container storing the attributes that may be required by the ABE scheme
uwgid The container storing attribute witnesses of user gid
∆ The data structure storing accumulator aggregate values of attributes in Λpolicy
Ψ The data structure storing shares of a ciphertext re-encryption key
C
′
The container storing the re-encrypted ABE ciphertext
Table 6.1: Attribute Revocation System Notation
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Figure 6.2: Attribute Accumulator Tree
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β, Ak, Φ}, where Φ is the container used by Φatt to store the accumulators for
attribute att. att is a generic notation of an attribute in the system.
• KeyGenabe(·): This is the ABE algorithm to generate user private keys. The · generically
denotes the input parameters. It outputs a user private key uskabe.
• UserAttributeManager(gid, Ops, Φatt): This algorithm takes a user’s gid, the operation
type Ops, and the accumulator container Φatt of attribute att as the inputs. It proceeds
as follows:
– Extract accumulator container Φ: Φ = Φ2att = {αi}1≤i≤|Φ2att|.
– If Ops == “Add”, the algorithm calls AccAdd(gid, Φ) (Algorithm 5.2) to add gid
to an accumulator: {α, Φ} = AccAdd(gid, Φ).
– If Ops == “Delete”, the algorithm calls AccDelete(gid, Φ) (Algorithm 5.3) to re-
move gid:
{α, Φ} = AccDelete(gid, Φ).
– Replace the old Φ in Φatt with the newly returned Φ: Φ
2
att = Φ.
– Set w
′
α = {}.
– If α2 6= {}, issue witness updates for the users in the accumulator:
∗ Select a random number uniformly from Zp: y ← Zp, and set α4 = y.
∗ Find and replace the old α in Φ2att (using the internal index α3).
∗ Call AccWitUpdate(α) (Algorithm 5.4) to compute witnesses of users:
ωα = AccWitUpdate(α).
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∗ Embed gids and accumulator random number α4 (y) in user witnesses to prevent
collusions and witness forgery:
· For each gidi ∈ ωα: re-compute witness as:
w
′
gidi
= {w′1gidi = (w1gidi)gidiα
4
= g
gidiy(
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β))
gidi+β , w2gidi = g
(gidi+β)};
add w
′
gidi
to ω
′
α: ω
′
α + {w′gidi , gidi}.
– Finally return {w′α, α, Φatt}.
• Encabe(m, ·): This is the ABE encryption algorithm. It takes the inputs of message m
and the rest of parameters denoted as ·. It outputs ABE ciphertext c.
• ReEnc(c, Λpolicy, ∆, gid): This algorithm inputs an ABE ciphertext c, the attributes
needed by the ABE access policy Λploicy, the aggregate values with external identifiers ∆,
and a user’s gid. It re-encrypts c as follows:
– Let Λpolicy = {atti}1≤i≤|Λpolicy | , and ∆ = {{atti, {vyjj , gyj}}1≤j≤|Φ2atti |}1≤i≤|Λpolicy| .
(Φatti cannot be accessed by this algorithm. We use this denotation to express the
total number of accumulators for attribute atti.)
– Randomly select s ← Zp, and re-encrypt c to c′ = ce(g, g)s.
– Embed s in Ψ:
∗ s is split into |Λpolicy| number of shares differently and randomly, so that no
share is equal to any other shares:
s= s1 + s2 + · · · + sI , where I = |Λpolicy| .
∗ Each share is assigned to an atti ∈ Λpolicy.
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∗ To prevent collusion, gid is embedded into shares. As accumulators’ aggregate
values do not disclose the aggregated gids, gid is blindly embedded in every
accumulator. However, this is not a concern. The AATree is 1 − out − of − n
threshold (described in 6.2). A gid can only belong to one accumulator at most.
Using the accumulators’ external identifiers, correct components can be located
for reconstructing the key in the decryption algorithm.
The following is the steps of building Ψ:
· For each atti ∈ ∧policy:
Find {atti, {vyjj , gyj}1≤j≤|Φ2atti |} in ∆:
For each accumulator of attribute atti, compute:
e(gsi , (v
yj
j )
−gid) = e(g, g)
si−gidyj(
∏
gidx∈α2j
(gidx+β))
, where j is the jth accumu-
lator αj for atti.
· The final Ψ is as the following:
Ψ = {{(e(g, g)si−gidyj(
∏
gidx∈α2j
(gidx+β))
, gyj)}1≤j≤|Φ2atti |}1≤i≤|Λpolicy|.
– Finally the algorithm outputs C
′
= {c′ = ce(g, g)s, Ψ}.
• Dec(C ′ , uwgid): This algorithm inputs the re-encrypted ciphertext C ′ , and attribute
witness set uwgid for user gid. It uses the attribute witnesses in uwgid to recover the
re-encryption key, and decrypts C
′
to get the ABE ciphertext c.
– Let uwgid be expressed as: {{atti, wgid, gyj}}1≤i≤|UAttgid| , where |UAttgid| is the
number of attributes of user gid, wgid is the witness of attribute atti, and g
yj is the
external identifier of the accumulator.
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– The re-encrypted key can be recovered as follows:
∗ For each atti in uwgid, use the external identifier gyj to find the re-encryption
key share in Ψ. If the share can be found, then proceed as follows:
· Compute the intermediate value using the witness:
e(w1gid,w
2
gid) = e(g
gidyj(
∏
gidx∈α2j
(gidx+β))
gid+β , g(gid+β)) = e(g, g)
gidyj(
∏
gidx∈α2j
(gidx+β))
.
· Recover the key share:
e(g, g)
si−gidyj(
∏
gidx∈α2j
(gidx+β))·e(g, g)gidyj(
∏
gidx∈α2j
(gidx+β))
= e(g, g)si .
∗ Reconstruct the re-encryption key if all the shares can be recovered:∏
1≤i≤|Λpolicy |e(g, g)
si = e(g, g)s.
– Decrypt c
′
, which is a part of C
′
, to get the ABE ciphertext: c = c
′
/ e(g, g)s.
– The algorithm returns c. Note: if the re-encryption key can be successfully con-
structed, c is a well-formed ABE ciphertext; otherwise c is a random string.
• Decabe(c, ·): This is the ABE decryption algorithm. It takes the ciphertext c and required
parameters denoted as · as the inputs. · should include the user’s uskabe. It returns data
m if uskabe can decrypt c, otherwise the output depends on Decabe.
6.3.3 System Description
Figure 6.3 illustrates interactions and communications between a DO, AA, a CSP, and users.
1. System setup. This is run by DO privately. It takes in a security parameter 1n and
initializes the system by setting up system parameters, an ABE scheme, and DA. It then
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adds users into accumulators, issues and distributes attribute witnesses, encrypts data
using ABE, and constructs data structures.
The outputs of the process are the following:
• pkabe and mkabe are sent to AA. pkabe is public. mkabe needs to kept secret.
• Non-revoked attribute witnesses are sent to users. They need to be kept secret.
• The ABE ciphertext c, data structures ∆ and Λpolicy are sent to CSP. They can be
public.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• DO calls Setup(1n) to initialize an ABE scheme and DA. The algorithm returns the
ABE public key pkabe, master secret mkabe, and DA’s system parameters {k, β, Ak,
Φ}.
• DO sends AA the ABE public key pkabe and master secret skabe.
• DO keeps the system parameters of DA privately.
• DO calls Encabe(m, ·) to encrypt the message m to c.
• DO creates the data structure Λpolicy = {atti}1≤i≤|Λpolicy| containing all the attributes
needed by the access policy of the ABE scheme.
• DO issues attribute witnesses to users:
– Let U contain the existing gids.
– For each gidj ∈ U :
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∗ Let UAttgidj contain all the attributes of gidj.
∗ For each atti ∈ UAttgidj :
· If atti has not been revoked:
Call UserAttributeManager(gidj, “Add”, Φatti) and have {wα, α, Φatti}
returned.
If α2 6= {}, compute the external identifier gα4 = gy; for each gidi ∈ α2,
send gidi the witness of atti:
{atti, wgidi , gy}.
Update Φatti in Ω, where Ω is the container containing all the Φatt in the
system.
• DO constructs ∆ = {atti, {vyjj , gyj}1≤j≤|Φ2atti |}1≤i≤|Λpolicy| using Φatti in Ω.
• DO sends c, ∆ , and Λpolicy to CSP.
2. A new user (gid) requests witnesses for the attributes he/she has. This process is privately
run by DO. It first validates the user’s eligibility of data access. If the user is eligible, the
process adds the user to an accumulator of each non-revoked attribute. DO then updates
attribute witnesses for all users in those changed accumulators. ∆ is also re-constructed
at the end.
The outputs of the process are the following:
• Attribute witnesses in the updated accumulators are sent to the users to be kept
secretly.
• Updated ∆ is sent to CSP. It can be public.
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The detailed steps are as follows:
• User gid contacts DO and with attribute set UAttgid = {atti}1≤i≤|UAttgid|.
• DO first authenticates the user and verifies the attributes in UAttgid.
• If the user is authenticated, DO issues the witnesses as follows:
– For every non-revoked atti ∈ UAttgid:
∗ Call UserAttributeManager(gid, “Add”, Φatti) and have {wα, α, Φatti} re-
turned.
∗ If α2 6= {}:
· Compute the external identifier gα4 = gy;
· For each gidi ∈ α2, send gidi the witness update of attribute atti:
{atti, wgidi , gy}.
∗ Replace the old Φatti with the new Φatti in Ω.
• DO re-constructs ∆ = {atti, {vyjj , gyj}1≤j≤|Φ2atti |}1≤i≤|Λpolicy| using Φatti in Ω.
• DO sends ∆ to the CSP to replace the previous one.
3. A new user (gid) contacts AA for an ABE’s private key. This is the private process run
by AA.
The output of the process is one of the following:
• uskabe is sent to the user and kept secretly if the user is authenticated.
• The output of AA is sent to the user otherwise.
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The detailed steps are as follows:
• The user contacts AA with the required input parameters.
• AA authenticates the user:
– If the user can be authenticated, AA:
∗ Call KeyGenabe(·) and generate uskabe.
∗ Send uskabe to the user.
– Otherwise the output depends on the output of AA.
4. A user (gid) retrieves ciphertext for decryption. This is a process run by CSP and a user.
The user contacts the CSP with his/her user gid to retrieve ABE ciphertext c. The CSP
re-encrypts c to c
′
using a randomly selected key. The re-encryption key is embedded
into the data structure Ψ. The user is provided with c
′
and Ψ that are stored in C
′
. If
the user has all the required attributes that have not been revoked, the re-encryption key
can be re-constructed. Once the user gets the ABE ciphertext c, the user calls Decabe to
decrypt the data.
The output of the process is one of the followings:
• Data m if the user has all the required witnesses and a valid ABE private key.
• The output of Decabe otherwise.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• User gid contacts CSP to request ABE ciphertext c with gid.
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• CSP calls ReEnc(c, Λpolicy, ∆, gid) and returns C ′ = {ce(g, g)s, Ψ} to the user.
• Let uwgid = {{atti wgid, gyj}}1≤i≤|UAttgid| denote the container having all the at-
tribute witnesses for gid.
• The user calls Dec(C ′ , uwgid). If uwgid has all the required and valid attribute
witnesses, the ABE ciphertext c is returned; otherwise a random string is returned.
• User gid calls Decabe(c, ·) to decrypt m if c is correctly returned and uskabe is able
to decrypt c according to the access policy of the ABE. Otherwise the output is the
output of Decabe.
5. DO revokes an attribute of user gid. This is the private process run by DO. The process
takes the user’s gid and the attribute att to be revoked as the inputs. It first removes the
gid from an accumulator for att, then updates the rest of users in the accumulator with
new attribute witnesses. It reconstructs ∆ and sends it to CSP.
The outputs of the process are as follows:
• Attribute witnesses in the updated accumulator are sent to the users and kept se-
cretly.
• Re-constructed ∆ is sent to CSP and can be public.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• DO extracts the attribute accumulator container Φatt of att from Ω.
• DO calls UserAttributeManager(gid, “Delete”, Φatt) and have {wα, α, Φatt} re-
turned.
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• If α2 6= {}, DO
– Compute the external identifier gα
4
= gy.
– For each gidi ∈ α2, send the updated witness: {att, wgidi , gy} to user gidi.
• DO replaces the old Φatt with the new Φatt in Ω.
• DO re-constructs ∆ = {atti, {vyjj , gyj}1≤j≤|Φ2atti |}1≤i≤|Λpolicy| using Φatti in Ω.
• Finally, DO sends ∆ to the CSP to replace the previous one.
6.3.4 Security Analysis
The goal of the generic attribute revocation system is to prevent users from using their revoked
attributes to decrypt ABE ciphertexts after revocations. As the revocation capability is built
on top of an ABE scheme and leverages a dynamic accumulator (DA) scheme ([15]) to achieve
dynamic and anonymous user revocation, the fundamental security of the system first relies on
the security of the selected ABE scheme and DA. We assume that:
• The ABE scheme is at least CPA-secure.
• The DA scheme is secure against any forgeability of the witnesses and provides the
anonymity protection for elements aggregated into the accumulators.
The attribute revocation capability aims to equip an ABE scheme with two additional security
features:
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Figure 6.3: Interaction Diagram of Attribute Revocation System for ABE in Cloud Storage
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• Any number of attributes revoked from one user or multiple users does not impact other
users using the same attribute or attributes. The users can still use their non-revoked
attributes despite of their other attributes being revoked. No ABE private key is required
to be re-generated after a revocation.
• Users can anonymously request re-encrypted ABE ciphertexts from CSPs.
With those in mind, the system should meet the following security requirements:
• Dynamic attribute revocation: Users are prevented from using their revoked attributes
to decrypt ABE ciphertexts, even the users hold valid ABE private keys. However, this
protection applies to the ciphertexts retrieved after the revocation.
• Witness unforgeability: Users should not be able to forge their attribute witnesses.
• Collusion prevention: A user cannot combine his/her attribute witnesses with other users’
to successfully construct a re-encryption key.
• Anonymity: Users remain anonymous to CSPs.
• Ciphertext indistinguishability (CPA-Secure): The re-encrypted ABE ciphertext is CPA-
secure against eavesdropping attacks.
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Dynamic Attribute Revocation and Collusion Prevention
This security feature relies on the ciphertext re-encryption to control the access of ABE ci-
phertext, in particular, the inability of recovering ciphertext re-encryption keys using forged
attribute witnesses. The witnesses unforgeability of DA should prevent users from forging any
attribute witness.
We use the following scenario to informally analyze that a user is prevented from using revoked
attribute(s) to recover any re-encryption keys. The system is assumed to be concerned with
PPT adversaries.
1. Assume user gidA has a set of attributes which can be denoted by UAttgidA = {atti}1≤i≤|UAttgidA |.
They are not revoked at the beginning. gidA is given the witnesses of his/her attributes:
{{atti, wgid, gyj}}1≤i≤|UAttgidA |.
2. Suppose user gidA has attribute attj ∈ Λpolicy revoked. DO removes gidA from the accumu-
lator for the attribute attj and re-generates the witnesses for the remaining users in that
accumulator. DO also updates and sends CSP: ∆ = {atti, {vyjj , gyj}1≤j≤|Φatti |}1≤i≤|Λpolicy|
, which contains the accumulator’s updated aggregate value.
3. User gidA can freely ask for any number of re-encrypted ciphertexts from CSP within
polynomial time. Each time the re-encryption key is randomly generated and embedded
in Ψ. Since the attribute attj for user gidA is not a member of any accumulator in ∆
after its revocation, gidA does not have the valid witness of an accumulator for attj.
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(a) Suppose user gidA still holds the old witness of attj. Based on the membership
unforgeability of [15], user gidA should not be able to forge any valid witness of any
accumulator if gidA is not aggregated to any accumulator for attj.
(b) Suppose user gidA tries to re-construct the re-encryption key using either his old
attribute witness or colluding with other users. (Assume that αi, one of the accu-
mulators for attj, has gidA removed.)
As it has been described in Dec algorithm, the following steps recover a share of the
re-encryption key:
• The external identifier gyi provided in the witness of the attribute: {attj, wgidA
= (g
gidAyi(
∏
gidx∈α2i
(gidx+β))
gidA+β , ggidA+β), gyi} is used to locate the share in Ψ.
• Then, a share for this attribute attj can be recovered as follows:
1. e(w1gidA ,w
2
gidA
) = e(g
gidAyi(
∏
gidx∈α2i
(gidx+β))
gidA+β , g(gidA+β)) = e(g, g)
gidAyi(
∏
gidx∈α2i
(gidx+β))
2. e(g, g)
si−gidAyi(
∏
gidx∈α2i
(gidx+β))·e(g, g)gidAyi(
∏
gidx∈α2i
(gidx+β))
= e(g, g)si .
If user gidA has the old witness, he/she does not have the accumulator’s correct
external identifier gyi as this identifier has been changed after his/her revocation.
Since yi is randomly selected from Zp and kept secretly by DO, gidA is not able to
guess the new gyi within PPT, assuming the prime number p is large enough. Even
though user gidA can collude with other users to get the new g
yi , gidA cannot forge
a valid witness of an existing accumulator under the witness unforgeability of DA.
Suppose user gidA can get the user gidB to share his/her valid witness of attj to
compute #1: e(g, g)
gidB ·yi
∏
gidx∈α2i
(gidx+β))
(Note: α2i here does not contain gidA
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as his/her attribute has been revoked). But with gidB being embedded into the
share, gidA and gidB cannot be cancelled out in #2. Furthermore, based on the
DLP assumption, A should not be able to recover the aggregate value vi by given
e(g, g)
gidByi(
∏
gidx∈α2i
(gidx+β))
(#1) within polynomial time. Therefore, A cannot col-
lude with other users to reconstruct the re-encryption key.
Let us assume that gidA is the only one removed from αi for attj. Given g
yi , gidA
can not extract yi under the DLP assumption. Therefore gidA cannot replace the
old yi with the new yi in his/her w
1
gidA
.
(c) As re-encryption key is a one-time randomly selected key, the key and shares are
different each time the ABE ciphertext is requested. If gidB can provide gidA a share
of attj from his/her retrieved ciphertext, the share cannot work with the rest of shares
gidA has to recover the ciphertext re-encryption key. The previous re-encryption keys
recovered by gidA also cannot decrypt the newly retrieved ciphertext.
Based on the above analysis, the system achieves dynamic user attribute revocation and collu-
sion prevention.
Witness Unforgeability
This protection is assumed to be provided by the scheme [15] that DA is built upon.
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Anonymity:
The anonymity protection is the same one as in the user revocation system, UR-CSP (see
Section 5.4.2.3). We omit the analysis here.
Ciphertext Indistinguishablilty (CPA-Secure):
Ciphertext sent over the various channels can be eavesdropped by an adversary. Although the
adversaries can obtain the ABE public keys, all the re-encryption keys are one-time keys that
are randomly and uniformly generated. Assume that the selected ABE scheme is CPA-secure.
Intuitively the re-encrypted ciphertext should remain CPA-secure.
The user attribute revocation control is implemented on top of an ABE scheme which is treated
as black boxes and “wrapped” by the revocation layer. ABE private keys are generated inde-
pendently from the attribute witnesses. Although an adversary may be given valid witnesses
for their attributes, if those attributes do not comply with the ABE access policy, the adversary
should not be able to decrypt an ABE ciphertext due to the security of the underlying ABE
scheme. The control layer only manages user access to the ABE ciphertext.
Based on the above analysis, we conclude that the proposed attribute revocation system, AR-
ABE, has met the security requirements.
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6.4 Attribute Revocation Overhead Analysis
To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware any similar system that can generically work
with any existing ABE scheme. The analysis below is only pertaining to our system.
Adding the attribute revocation system to an ABE scheme introduces the following overheads:
1. Accumulator management
2. Attribute witness updates and management
3. One time encryption key generation and ciphertext re-encryption
Data owners are responsible for managing item 1 and 2. As was discussed in our user revocation
systems (see Section 6.3), the overheads associated with items 1 and 2 potentially have scala-
bility issues if a user’s attributes or status is changed frequently. Delegating management tasks
to a trusted entity and servers can dramatically improve the scalability. The third overhead is
at CSPs and takes place whenever a CSP fulfills a data retrieval request. This can also become
a bottleneck during a peak time of data retrieval. However, parallel processing in re-encrypting
ciphertext and constructing the data structure to carry the re-encryption key can help ease the
bottleneck.
Figure 6.4 shows the overheads incurred by different entities in the system:
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Figure 6.4: Overheads of the Attribute Revocation System (AR-ABE)
6.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we propose an attribute revocation system (AR-ABE) for ABE schemes. Our
system is generic and can be directly applied to any ABE scheme without the need to modify
the underlying ABE scheme. The revocation is dynamic. It neither requires the ABE scheme
to re-issue user private keys, nor requires it to re-encrypt the message for any revoked attribute.
There is no limitation on the number of attributes to be revoked from a user or multiple users.
AR-ABE also protects user privacy and is thus practical for deployment in untrusted cloud
storage environments.
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Attribute-based signature (ABS) schemes allow a party to sign a message with fine-grained
control over a set of defined attributes. When an ABS scheme is used for access control in a
cloud storage environment, a data owner specifies an access policy defined by system attributes.
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This access policy is also referred to as the predicate. The CSP is given the predicate and its
verification key. During an authentication process, the CSP challenges a user by giving the user
a piece of data to sign. The user uses his/her private key to generate a signature of the data
based on the given predicate. The CSP validates the signature using the verification key. The
signature can be verified if the user has the attributes complying with the predicate. Since the
user owns his/her private key, the user is authenticated if the signature is validated. On the
other hand, the CSP gains no more knowledge other than the fact that a signature is generated
by a user who has attributes satisfying the predicate.
Since attributes are not associated with any user’s identity, an ABS scheme provides anony-
mous access control over an expressive fine-grained policy. It seems to be a promising access
control method for use in untrusted cloud storage environments. However, like ABE, basic ABS
schemes have fundamental issues in regard to dynamic user revocation, especially anonymous
user revocation.
We propose a model (AUR-ABS) for ABS schemes to enable an anonymous and dynamic user
revocation feature. The AUR-ABS model is flexible and can be applied to different ABS schemes
with minimum modifications to the underlying ABS schemes. The content of this chapter has
been published in [143].
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7.1 Related Work
Dynamic user revocation for ABS has been investigated in the literature. Escalate et al. [49]
proposed a revocable ABS scheme, assigning a randomly selected identifier to each user in
addition to their attributes. An external entity keeps a secret verification key and a list of
identifiers for the revoked users. The verification key can trace a signature to its signer to
identify the signatures generated by revoked users. However, this revocation method relies
on an external trust entity with a verification key. The verification process conflicts with the
unlinkability and anonymity properties of ABS schemes.
Cao et al. [44] proposed a user revocation scheme that also uses an external party (a mediator).
In their scheme, the AA issues two parts of attribute private keys for each user. One part is
sent to the user, and the other part is given to the mediator. Every signature consists of two
parts. One part is generated by a user, and the other part comes from the mediator. A revoked
user cannot obtain the signature portion from the mediator. Letting the mediator keep every
user’s partial private key increases the workload on key management and distribution tasks.
This approach also introduces performance and scalability overheads.
Lian et al. [87] proposed a user revocation scheme using timestamps. Each user’s private key
is tagged with a timestamp via a time attribute. The time attribute is added to the user’s
private key. The predicate also includes an attribute for the expiration time. User attribute
private keys are therefore updated periodically. Revoked users are prevented from obtaining
new private keys. Periodic key re-issuing cannot immediately revoke users. It also has a
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potential performance impact.
User revocation has also been studied in a special type of ABS scheme called an Attribute-
Based Group signature (ABGS) scheme. We can view ABGS schemes as a special type of group
signature (GS) scheme [36] that consists of members who generate signatures corresponding to
a predicate. Khader [79] constructed a revocable ABGS scheme. However, this scheme relies on
the group manager to link a signature to a signer, so the signature can be verified and revoked
if that is the case. The approach also violates the unlinkability of ABS.
Applying ABS to data protection in a cloud environment has also been studied. Ruj et al. [115]
designed a privacy preserving authentication scheme that was built in [81] and [91]. Zhao et al.
[150] proposed a data sharing protocol using ABS to anonymously identify readers and writers
who can modify and re-encrypt data. Liu et al. [89] used ABS to construct an attribute-based
proxy signature system. This allows a data owner to delegate signature generation to a cloud
proxy. Li et al. [86] leverage the computing resource of the cloud to propose a mechanism that
allows a signer to outsource intensive computation during the signing process.
7.2 Our Contributions
Most of the existing user revocation proposals for ABS take one of the follow approaches:
• Periodically updating user private keys. This approach generates a new master secret
periodically, and reissues user private keys to all non-revoked users. It is simple and
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straightforward, but potentially very expensive and not instantaneous [87].
• Using a third party to identify a revoked user or a signature generated by a revoked user.
This approach requires a signature being linked to a user [44, 79], which violates the
anonymity property of ABS schemes.
Ideally any revocation approach should retain all the ABS properties. The revocation approach
should meet the following requirements:
1. Dynamic: Any user can be instantaneously revoked. The revocation process does not
require regeneration of the master secret or user signing keys.
2. Anonymous: A verifier, regardless of whether trusted or not, should be able to anony-
mously identify whether a given signature is generated by a revoked user or not. This
verification process does not need to know user identities and have a trusted party as a
mediator in the process.
As unlinkability is one of the core properties of an ABS scheme, it makes user revocation hard
to meet the anonymous requirement. Although a number of schemes have been proposed to
achieve dynamic user revocation, none of them meets the anonymous requirement.
We propose a user revocation model for ABS schemes, referred to as the ABS-AR model. This
model makes the following contributions:
• It meets the two defined requirements: dynamic and anonymous.
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• It is sufficiently flexible and requires only minor changes to an ABS scheme.
Since each ABS scheme is differently constructed, we will illustrate our AUR-ABS model on
the scheme of Li et al. [83].
7.3 Anonymous User Revocation Model (AUR-ABS)
To meet the anonymous user revocation requirements, we introduce a witness attribute that will
be included in every user’s attribute set. This attribute is also “AND”ing with the predicate
of an ABS scheme. A data owner (DO) centrally manages this attribute and issues each user
a unique witness private key (referred as witness key) for this attribute.
To issue witness keys of the introduced attribute, we split the ABS master secret into two parts.
One part of the secret is used by the ABS AA to issue user signing (private) keys. This key
issuing process remains the same as it is in the original ABS construction. The other part of
the secret is used by DO to derive witness keys. Thus, each user is given two kinds of private
keys: an ABS signing key and a witness key. Both keys are used to produce signatures. Users
are also identified by their unique global identifiers (gids). These gids are randomly selected,
but not linked to the true identities of users. They are used to tie the two types of private keys
together uniquely for each user to prevent collusions. A revoked user cannot get his up-to-date
witness private key and is not able to generate a valid signature immediately after revocation.
For simplicity, the details of user authentication to AA and DO have been omitted in our
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description. The authentication and user gid validation are orthogonal to this AUR-ABS
model.
7.3.1 Trust Model
The AUR-ABS trust model consists of four entities: AA, CSP, users, and DO, as shown in
Figure 7.1. The entities and their trustworthiness are the same as they are defined in the trust
model of Section 5.4.3.1.
7.3.2 Algorithm Definition and Construction
7.3.2.1 Data Structure Definition
The data structure for accumulators
The data structures used by DA algorithms are the same as they are defined in Section 5.3.2.1.
Although we will build the AUR-ABS model into the scheme of Li et al. [83] (described
in Section 4.2.3), we will follow the commonly used notations in this thesis, which means that
some of the denotations or notations used in [83] will be changed without impacting the original
scheme.
Table 7.1 lists the commonly used notation in this chapter.
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Figure 7.1: Trust Model of Anonymous User Revocation Model for ABS in Cloud Storage
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Notation Description
Att All the attributes in the system. |Att| donates the total number of attributes.
d The minimum number of attributes for generating a signature
dAtt A default set of d - 1 attributes that are required to generate the signature
UAttgid An attribute set of user gid
uskgid User gid’s signing key issued by AA
mkabs A portion of the master secret used by AA to generate user signing keys
mkacc A portion of the master secret used by ABS-AR model to derive witness (private) keys
∆ A data structure for storing accumulator aggregate values
Ops The operational type - Add or Delete a gid to or from an accumulator
ωα The witness container for storing witnesses of users in the accumulator α
wgid The accumulator witness of user gid
Table 7.1: Anonymous User Revocation Model Notation
7.3.2.2 Algorithm Definition and Construction
We construct the algorithms and build the model into the scheme in [83]. The AUR-ABS
model adds IndAcc algorithm to the scheme. Changes to the algorithms of an ABS scheme
are demonstrated using the scheme in [83]. Whether those algorithms can be run privately or
publicly, and which information is kept secretly or can be public will be described in the system
construction section.
• Setup(1n): The algorithm takes the input 1n as security parameter and proceeds as
follows:
– Let Att contain all the attributes in the system and d be the minimum number of
required attributes for generating a signature.
– Let p be an n-bit prime.
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– Use the security parameter 1n to generate a bilinear map e: G × G → G1.
– The following steps work in the same way as in Setup algorithm of [83]. The only
change made is to split the master secret into two parts: mkabs and mkacc.
∗ Map each attribute in Att to an element in Zp uniquely: Att = {atti}1≤i≤|Att|.
∗ Let dAtt = {atti}1≤i≤d−1 be a d - 1 default attribute set in Zp.
∗ Select a random generator: g ∈ G, and two random numbers uniformly: x1, x2
∈ Z?p .
∗ Let mkabs = x1 and mkacc= x2.
∗ Let mk = mkabs + mkacc and set g1 = gmk.
∗ Pick a random element g2 ∈ G and compute Z = e(g1, g2).
∗ Choose two hash functions H1, H2: {0, 1}∗ → G.
– Initialize accumulator algorithms:
∗ Call AccSetup(G, g) (Algorithm 5.1) to set up DA. It returns the system pa-
rameters: k, β, Ak, Φ.
– Finally, output:
∗ ABS verification key: paramsabs = (G, G1, g, g1, g2, Z, d, H1, H2).
∗ Master secrets: mkabs and mkacc.
∗ DA’s system parameters: {k, β, Ak, Φ}.
• KeyGen(mkabs, UAttgid, gid): This algorithm inputs master secret mkabs, a user’s at-
tribute set UAttgid, and gid. It issues ABS signing key as it does in [83], except that user
gid is embedded into q(0) for preventing collusions:
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– Choose a d - 1 degree polynomial and set q(0) = mkabs - gid.
– Generate a new attribute set UAtt
′
gid = UAttgid ∪ dAtt.
– For each i ∈ UAtt′gid, randomly choose ri ∈ Zp and compute: di0 = gq(i)2 (H1(i))ri and
di1 = g
ri .
– Output user’s signing key uskgid: {Di = (di0, di1)}1≤i≤|UAtt′gid|, where |UAtt
′
gid| is the
number of attributes in UAtt
′
gid.
• IndAcc(mkacc, gid, Ops, Φ, β): This algorithm is added to insert ABS-AR model into
the scheme. It inputs master secret mkacc, a user’s gid, the operation type Ops, the
accumulator container Φ, and the accumulator trapdoor β. It generates the witness
private keys as follows:
– If Ops == “Add”, call AccAdd(gid, Φ) (Algorithm 5.2) to add gid to an accumulator:
{α, Φ} = Add(gid, Φ).
– If Ops == “Delete”, call AccDelete(gid, Φ) (Algorithm 5.3) to remove gid from an
accumulator: {α, Φ} = AccDelete(gid, Φ).
– Set witKeys = {}.
– If α2 6= {}, do the following:
∗ Select a random number: y′ ← Zp.
∗ Set α4 = y′ and update α in Φ.
∗ Compute gy′ as the new external identifier of α.
∗ For each gidi ∈ α2:
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· Randomly select ri ← Zp.
· Compute wskwgidi= {wsk1gidi = g
ri(
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β)+mkacc+gidi)
gidi+β
2 , wsk
2
gidi
= g
(gidi+β)
ri ,
wsk3gidi = g
y
′}.
· Add the witness private key to witKeys: witKeys ← witKeys + {gidi,
wskgidi}
We embed gidi in the witness private key for collusion prevention.
– Return witKeys.
• Sign(m, uskgid, wskgid , Υk,Att? , UAttgid, d): This algorithm inputs message m, ABS
signing key uskgid, witness key wskgid, predicate Υk,Att? , attributes UAttgid, and the
number of attributes d required in the signature. It generates a signature consists of
two portions: the portion generated by [83] remains exactly the same as in the original
scheme, and the portion generated by AUR-ABS model is ϑ. Although both portions
are generated independently, they are linked by a user gid which has been embedded to
uskgid and wskgid.
– Select a subset with k number of attributes: Att
′
= UAttgid ∩ Att? ; (Note: Υk,Att?
specifies the attribute set Att∗ and the threshold value k).
– Select a default attribute subset dAtt′ ⊆ dAtt so that ∣∣dAtt′∣∣ = d − k.
– Randomly select γ
′
i ∈ Zp for all atti ∈ Att′ ∪ dAtt′ .
– Randomly select s ∈ Zp.
– Compute σ0 =
[ ∏
i∈Att′∪dAtt′
di0
][ ∏
i∈Att?∪dAtt′
(H1(i))
γ
′
i
]
H2(m)
s, {σi = di1gγ
′
i}i∈Att′∪dAtt′ ,
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{σi = gγ
′
i}i∈Att?/Att′ and σ′0 = gs.
– Compute ϑ = { ϑ0 = (wsk1gid)s = g
sri(
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β)+mkacc+gid)
gid+β
2 ,
ϑ1 = (wsk
2
gid)
1
s = g
(gid+β)
sri )} .
– Finally, output the signature: σ = {σ0, {σi}i∈Att∗∪dAtt′ , σ′0, ϑ}.
• V erify(m, σ, paramsabs, Υk,Att? , v): The algorithm takes the inputs of message m, signa-
ture σ, ABS verification key paramsabs, predicate Υk,Att? , and the accumulator aggregate
value v. It validates the signature as follows:
– Verify the input signature σ= {σ0, {σi}i∈Att?∪dAtt′ , σ′0, ϑ} on message m over the
predicate Υk,Att? , (for attribute set Att
? ∪ dAtt′) by checking whether the following
equation holds:
e(g,σ0)e(ϑ0,ϑ1)
[
∏
i∈Att?∪dAtt′ e(H1(i),σi)]e(H2(m),σ
′
0)e(g2,v)
?
= Z. (Note: only two components: e(ϑ0, ϑ1)
and e(g2, v), are added by ABS-AR to the equation.)
(7.3.1)
– Output “Accept” if the above equation holds; otherwise output “Reject”.
7.3.3 Correctness
The above equation (8.3.1) can be verified as follows:
e(g,σ0)e(ϑ0,ϑ1)∏
i∈ω?∪Ω′
e(H1(i),σi)e(H2(m),σ
′
0)e(g2,v)
190
7.3. ANONYMOUS USER REVOCATION MODEL (AUR-ABS)
=
e(g,
 ∏
i∈Att′∪dAtt′
di0
 ∏
i∈Att?∪dAtt′
(H1(i))
γ
′
i
H2(m)s)e((wsk1gid)s, g (gid+β)sri )[ ∏
i∈Att?∪dAtt′
e(H1(i),σi)
]
e(H2(m),gs)e(g2, v)
=
e(g,
 ∏
i∈Att′∪dAtt′
g
q(i)
2 H1(i)
ri
 ∏
i∈Att?∪dAtt′
(H1(i))
γ
′
i
H2(m)s)e((wsk1gid)s, g (gid+β)sri ) ∏
i∈Att?∪dAtt′
e(H1(i),σi)
e(H2(m),gs)e(g2, v)
=
e(g,g
x1−gid
2
 ∏
i∈Att′∪dAtt′
(H1(i))
ri+r
′
i

 ∏
i∈Att?/dAtt′
(H1(i))
γ
′
i
)e(g,H2(m)s)e((wsk1gid)s, g (gid+β)sri )
 ∏
i∈Att′ ⋃ dAtt′e(H1(i),g
ri+r
′
i )
e(g,
 ∏
i∈Att?/Att′
(H1(i))
γ
′
i
)e(H2(m),gs)e(g2, v)
=
e(g,g
x1−gid
2 )e(g,
 ∏
i∈Att′∪dAtt′
(H1(i))
ri+r
′
i
)e(g,
 ∏
i∈Att?/Att′
(H1(i))
γ
′
i
)e(g,H2(m)s)e((wsk1gid)s, g (gid+β)sri )
e(
 ∏
i∈Att′ ⋃ dAtt′e(H1(i)
ri+r
′
i ,g)
e(g,
 ∏
i∈Att?/Att′
(H1(i))
γ
′
i
)e(H2(m),gs)e(g2, v)
=
e(g,g
mkabs−gid
2 )e(g
sri(
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β)+mkacc+gid)
gid+β
2 , g
(gid+β)
sri )
e(g2, g
(
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β)))
=
e(g,g
mkabs−gid
2 )e(g2, g)
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β)+mkacc+gid
e(g2, g)
(
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β))
=e(g, g2)
mkabs−gide(g, g2)mkacc+gid
=e(g, g2)
mkabs−gid+mkacc+gid
=e(g, g2)
mk
=e(g1, g2)
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= Z.
7.3.4 System Description
Figure 7.2 shows the interactions between a user, DO, AA, and CSP. Some ABS schemes may
have multiple AAs. It makes no difference in regard to adopting AUR-ABS model. We can
generically refer to AA regardless. The system in a cloud storage environment works as follows:
1. System setup. This is a private process run by DO. It takes in a security parameter 1n
and initializes system parameters, ABS scheme, and DA. It then adds non-revoked users
into accumulators, issuing witness keys to users.
The outputs of the process are the following:
• The versification key paramsabs and a portion of master secret mkabs are sent to AA.
paramsabs is public. mkabs is kept secretly.
• Witness keys are sent to users and kept secretly.
• ∆, which contains aggregate values tagged with their external identifiers, is sent to
the CSP. It can be public.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• DO calls Setup(1n) to initiate the ABS scheme and DA. The process returns the
ABS verification key paramsabs, master secrets mkabs and mkacc, and DA’s system
parameters {k, β, Ak, Φ}.
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• DO provides AA with paramsabs, and mkabs.
• Let U contain non-revoked gids.
• For each user gidi ∈ U , DO adds gidi to a group: RtWitKeys = IndAcc(mkacc,
gidi, “Add”, Φ, β).
• If RtWitKeys 6= {}:
– For each gidi in RtWitKeys (={gidi, wskgidi}1≤i≤|RtWitKeys|), DO sends the
witness key wskgidi to the user.
• Using Φ, DO creates ∆ = {vi, gyi}1≤i≤|Φ|, where vi is the ith accumulator aggregate
value α1i , and g
yi is its external identifier (αi ∈ Φ).
• DO sends ∆ to CSP.
2. A new user (gid) requests a witness key. This process is privately run by DO. It first
validates the user’s eligibility. If the user is eligible, the process will add the user to an
accumulator and update users of the accumulator with new witness keys. It also updates
the CSP with new aggregate values.
The outputs of the process are as follows:
• ⊥ if the user is not authenticated or verified.
• Otherwise, the updated witness keys are sent to users to be kept secretly, and the
updated ∆ is sent to CSP. ∆ can be public.
The detailed steps are as follows:
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• The user gid contacts DO for his/her witness key.
• If DO can authenticate the user and validate gid, DO proceeds as follows:
– Add gid to an accumulator: RtWitKeys = IndAcc(mkacc, gid, “Add”, Φ, β).
– If RtWitKeys 6= {} , then:
∗ For each gidi in RtWitKeys, send the witness key wskgidi to the user.
∗ Create a new ∆ = {vi, gyi}1≤i≤|Φ|
∗ Send ∆ to CSP to replace the previous one.
• Otherwise DO returns ⊥ to the user.
3. A new user (gid) requests an ABS signing key. This is the private process run by AA.
The output of the process is one of the following
• The user’s signing key uskabs is sent to the user and kept secretly if user is authen-
ticated.
• The output of AA is sent to the user otherwise.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• A user contacts AA with gid and UAttgid for an ABS signing key.
• If the user is authenticated, AA calls KeyGen(mkabs, UAttgid, gid) and sends uskgid
to the user.
• Otherwise AA returns its output.
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4. A user authenticates to a CSP. This is a process run by the CSP and a user. The CSP
requires the user to make a signature on a randomly generated message. The user signs
the message and sends the signature back to the CSP. The CSP can verify and detect
whether the signature is valid or signed by a revoked user.
The output of the process is one of the following:
• ”Accept” if the signature is valid and generated by a non-revoked user.
• ”Reject” otherwise.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• CSP randomly generates a message m and sends m and predicate Υk,Att? to the user.
• The user calls Sign(m, uskgid, wskwgid , Υk,Att? , UAttgid, d) to generate the signature
σm.
• The user sends σm and gy to CSP, where gy is the external identifier of gid’s witness
key.
• CSP uses gy to locate v in ∆.
• If v can be found, CSP calls Ret = V erify(m, σm, paramsabs, Υk,Att? , gy, v).
– If Ret = “Accept”, the user is authenticated.
– Otherwise the user is rejected.
• CSP send Ret to the user.
5. DO revokes user (gid). This process is privately run by DO. It removes the user from
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an accumulator and updates other user new witness keys. It also updates CSPs with the
new aggregate value.
The outputs of the process are as follows:
• Updated witness keys are sent to users and kept secretly.
• New ∆ is sent to CSPs. ∆ can be public.
The detailed steps are as follows:
• DO removes gid: RtWitKeys = IndAcc(mkacc, gid, “Delete”, Φ, β).
• If RtWitKeys 6= {} , then:
– For each gidi in RtWitKeys, send witness private key wskwgidi to the user.
– Create a new ∆ = {vi, gyi}1≤i≤|Φ|
– Send ∆ to CSP to replace the previous one.
7.4 Security Analysis
The AUR-ABS model enables dynamic user revocation and anonymous signature verification
for ABS schemes. However, this model has to be built into an ABS scheme. We assume that
the ABS scheme adopting AUR-ABS model meets the security properties of ABS:
• Collusion Resistance
• Unforgeability
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An Anonymous User Revocation Model for ABS in Cloud Storage (AUR-ABS)
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Figure 7.2: Interaction Diagram of Anonymous User Revocation Model for ABS in Cloud Storage
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• Anonymity (unlinkability)
With those in mind, the security goals of the AUR-ABS model equip an ABS scheme with
three additional features:
• No ABS signing key needs to be re-generated because of a user revocation.
• A revoked user is not able to generate a verifiable signature with or without colluding
with a non-revoked user;
• Users are anonymous to CSP in the signature verification process. No other party needs
to be involved in the process.
Therefore, the security of the AUR-ABS model requires:
• Collusion Prevention: Users cannot collude with each other to produce a valid signature.
• Unforgeability: Users, including revoked users having valid ABS signing keys, should not
be able to forge any valid signatures.
• Anonymity (unlinkability): The AUR-ABS model extends anonymity to user revocation
for ABS schemes. Users are anonymous during the signature verification process, even
for a signature generated by a revoked user. No signature can be linked to a particular
user.
We assume that ABS schemes with AUR-ABS model only resist PPT adversaries.
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Collusion Resistance
Collusion prevention is implemented by using user identifiers (gids) to link ABS signing keys
with witness keys. We assume that AA validates users against their submitted gids prior to
issuing the keys. We also assume that the underlying ABS scheme has been built with collusion
prevention. That is, users are prevented from pooling their partial ABS signing keys together to
generate any valid ABS signature. AUR-ABS model does not change the way how the adapted
ABS scheme generates signatures. Any signature generated by an ABS scheme using an ABS
signing key is intact. It is one portion of an outputted signature of Sign algorithm. The other
potion of the signature is generated by AUR-ABS model using a witness key. If we can stop
users from combining a witness key with an ABS signing key to generate a verifiable signature,
then the whole system is protected from collusion.
It is not difficult to see that the system indeed prevents users from colluding as follows:
• Suppose that user gid1 has the ABS signing key: uskgid1 : {Di = (di0, di1)}1≤i≤|UAtt′gid1 |,
and user gid2 has the witness key: wskgid2= {wsk1gid2 = g
ri(
∏
gidx∈α(gidx+β)+mkacc+gid2)
gid2+β
2 , w
2
gid2
= g
(gid2+β)
ri , w3gid2 = g
y
′
) .
• Suppose that user gid1 colludes with gid2 by using gid1’s ABS signing key and gid2’s
witness key to sign a message m. Then a signature is of the form: σm = {σ0, {σi}i∈ω∗∪Ω′ ,
σ
′
0, ϑ}.
• When σm is verified, the signature is calculated and comes to the following result:
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e(g, g2)
mkabs−gid1e(g, g2)mkacc+gid2 .
Since each gid is unique, gid1 6= gid2. Therefore the two gids cannot cancel each other
out. At the end, the signature cannot be validated as e(g, g2)
mk.
Based on the above analysis, we conclude that an ABS scheme within the AUR-ABS model
prevents users from colluding.
Unforgeability
In order to simplify our analysis, we use the following game to analyze unforgeability. The game
involves a challenger C and a forger F over a selected predicate Υ∗k,Att? . At the beginning, F
submits Υ∗k,Att? to be challenged.
1. Setup: C sets up the system by running Setup(1n) to generate the verification key
paramsabs, master secrets mkabs, mkacc, and DA’s system parameters. C gives paramsabs
to F, and keeps the rest information.
2. Queries: F is allowed to query polynomial times to the following:
(a) Request signing keys and witness keys for a set of gids with the restriction that the
attributes owned by a gid either do not comply with Υ∗k,Att? , or comply withΥ
∗
k,Att? ,
but the gid is revoked.
(b) Request a signature on a message m over predicate Υk′ ,Att′ , or Υ
∗
k,Att? with witness
keys of revoked users. Note: Υk′ ,Att′ 6= Υ∗k,Att? .
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(c) Make multiple calls on the choices of different m over different Υ
′
k′ ,Att′ as long as
Υ
′
k′ ,Att′ 6= Υ∗k,Att? ; or over Υ∗k,Att? as long as the witness private key is from a revoked
user.
3. Challenge: At the end, F forges a signature σ? on m∗ for the predicate Υ∗k,Att? with the
restriction that m∗ has never been submitted. If σ? can be validated by V erify algorithm,
then F wins the game. That is F successfully breaks the unforgeability of an ABS scheme
with AUR-ABS model in PPT.
The unforgeability of AUR-ABS relies on the possibility for an F , as described above, to be
able to forge a valid signature. We use the security assumptions to analyze the possibility as
follows:
Suppose F repeatedly makes requests to obtain private keys for a selected gids with those
restrictions. There are two possible cases for C to generate private keys as follows:
Case 1: A non-revoked user does not have the attributes satisfying the predicate: Υk,Att? . As
gid does not have attribute set complying with the policy, based on the security of ABS scheme,
the signature portion generated by ABS scheme (σ0, {σi}i∈ω∗∪Ω′ , σ′0 ) should not be able to
verified, even though the user can generate a valid portion of signature by a valid witness key.
Case 2: A revoked user has the attributes satisfying the predicate Υ∗k,Att? . Since the user
is removed from his/her accumulator, his/her witness private key is invalid. Based on the
witness unforgeability of DA, F is not able to forge the witness of any accumulator that is not
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aggregated with the user’s gid. F can try to forge a witness key as follows:
Suppose F has a revoked user’s witness private key before the revocation:
wskwgidi= {wsk1gid = g
ri(
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β)+mkacc+gid)
gid+β
2 , wsk
2
gid = g
(gid+β)
ri , wsk3gid = g
y}
Under the DLP assumption, F is not able to extract ri(
∏
gidx∈α2(gidx + β) + mkacc + gid). F
may try to compute e(wsk1gid, wsk
2
gid) = e(g2, g)
∏
gidx∈α2 (gidx+β)+mkacc+gid and still cannot extract∏
gidx∈α2(gidx + β) + mkacc under the DLP assumption, even he can get rid of e(g2, g)
gid.
Without being able to forge a valid witness private key, the signature portion generated by
witness private key, ϑ, cannot be correctly verified.
Based on the above intuitive analysis, we conclude that an ABS scheme with AUR-ABS model
meets the unforgeability requirement.
Anonymity (unlinkability):
User privacy protection of an ABS scheme makes the signature reveal nothing about the identity
or the attributes of a signer beyond what is explicitly revealed by the attributes used in a
predicate. The AUR-ABS model preserves this kind of user privacy and further extends it to
the user revocation process.
The ABS scheme in [83] is attribute-signer private. Adding AUR-ABS model does not change
the way of the scheme in [83] for generating and validating signatures. It only adds an additional
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portion in a signature.
Let us assume the following as an example of signatures:
σ= {σ0, {σi}i∈Att?∪dAtt′ , σ′0, ϑ}
where ϑ is the portion of the signature generated by AUR-ABS model and the rest of the
signature is generated by the scheme in [83]. As described in the Sign algorithm, ϑ is considered
to be independently generated using a witness key. User gids, which do not contain any user
identifies, are embedded into portions of signatures for collusion prevention. They cannot
disclosed under the DLP assumption. No user identities is used or embedded in signatures
and witness keys. Accumulators and witnesses based on the scheme of [15] provide anonymity
protections, so does ϑ. Signature verification process and algorithms do not require any user
identity information, no matter if a user is revoked or not. Further, signatures are randomized
every time to make them different even though they are generated by the same user with the
same witness key. In this way, signatures are unlinkable. Therefore the ABS scheme within the
AUR-ABS model protects the privacy of signers and revoked signers.
Based on the above analysis, we conclude that AUR-ABS model meets the security require-
ments.
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System	 Signature	Size	 P-Key	size	 Signing	Time	 Veriﬁca6on	
Time	
ABS	Scheme	in	
[89]	
O(N)	 O(A)	 O(S)	 O(V)	
ABS	with	AUR-
ABS	
O(N+3)	 O(A+2)	 O(S+2)	 O(V+2)	
Figure 7.3: Performance Comparison of ABS and AUR-ABS
7.5 Performance Analysis
Integrating a dynamic accumulator into an ABS scheme incurs a small amount of overhead,
part of which comes from the witness attribute. Figure 7.3 indicates the overheads for a typical
ABS scheme adopting the revocation model. Suppose the ABS scheme in [83] has O(N) size of
signature, O(A) size of attribute private key, O(S) time of signing, andO(V ) time of verification.
An ABS scheme with the AUR-ABS model has O(N + 3) size of signature, O(A + 2) size of
private key (attribute private key + witness key), O(S+ 2) time of signing, and O(V + 2) time
of verification.
The other overhead comes from the accumulator management and witness key updates. To
reduce the overhead of witness key updates, each user is assigned to one of n accumulators.
For example, users can be grouped by regions, or their roles. As a result, the average number
of updates is about n - 1 times fewer than the one for a single accumulator. Also the witness
key update can be conducted out-of-band.
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7.6 Conclusions
Attribute-based signature schemes seem to be a promising mechanism for fine-grained anony-
mous access control in untrusted cloud computing environments. We have designed and con-
structed a dynamic user management and anonymous revocation model (AUR-ABS) while
integrating a dynamic accumulator into an ABS scheme. This AUR-ABS model is efficient
and scalable. It does not use a third party in the signature verification path to identify a
revoked signer. We use accumulator clusters to reduce the overheads of witness key updating
and believe that AUR-ABS model is practical for cloud storage systems.
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Chapter 8
Concluding remarks
My research journey started from developing a survey paper [144] of security controls and
technologies in distributed storage systems. As a type of distributed storage system, cloud
storage provides many potential benefits (see Section 2.5). However, cloud storage providers
might not be trusted by users. This leads to concerns about data and user privacy protection,
which are the focus of this thesis.
While cryptography supports data confidentiality and integrity, attribute-based cryptography
provides particularly promising mechanisms for facilitating access control to protect data that
has been placed in cloud storage.
In this thesis, we have considered how to make ABE and ABS more practical for providing
distributed data and user privacy protection in an efficient and flexible manner in untrusted
cloud storage environments.
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As the security concerns about cloud storage arise from two major aspects: the trust of service
providers and multi-tenant storage environments, we identified the required characteristics for
using attribute-based cryptography to protect data and user privacy in untrusted cloud storage
environments. We identified two major requirements:
• Flexible user and attribute management: This requires user access management to be dy-
namic and scalable, in particular to avoid user private key re-issuing in user and attribute
revocation processes. Users are highly distributed in cloud storage environments. Re-
issuing user private keys everytime when a user or an attribute is revoked has scalablility
and performance issues (see Section 2.5).
• Protecting user access privacy: This requires user access privacy to be properly protected
during authentication and data retrieval processes.
Although user and attribute revocations have been studied in the literature, these are generally
considered with respect to particular schemes. User access privacy protection has not been
previously considered. In this thesis we focused on providing general mechanisms for supporting
revocation which are independent of underlying schemes, and on user access privacy protection.
The core adopted approach is to build a revocation control layer on top of an ABE or ABS
scheme, so that the scheme can be treated as either a complete or partial black-box. (By the
latter we mean that only minimum modifications need to be made to the underlying scheme.) A
modified dynamic accumulator scheme [15] is used in our user and attribute revocation systems,
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which provides dynamic user and attribute management in anonymous ways.
Two dynamic user and one attribute revocation systems for ABE, and a model for anonymous
user revocation for ABS have been proposed. Their security features have been analyzed against
the defined security requirements.
We have shown that attribute-based cryptography can be made more practical for deployment
in cloud storage environments with small additional costs. There are a number of potential
areas for continuing this work. A natural next step is to implement simulations of the proposed
systems and models, and assess their performance in real systems. Several other features could
also be examined in order to further enhance the usability of ABE and ABS in cloud storage.
Those include:
• Privacy and integrity protection of access policies in ABE schemes: In ABE, access policies
are attached to ciphertexts in clear text. When data is updated, the data needs to be re-
encrypted based on its access policy. This raises a concern if a user could have a malicious
intent to alter the access policy and prevent legitimate users from accessing data or enable
non-legitimate users to access data. When ciphertexts are stored in storage controlled
by an untrusted CSP, the access policy can be changed by malicious insiders to launch a
denial-of-service (DoS) attack. In addition, an access policy itself may be sensitive since
it can leak information concerning user identities or the criticality of the data.
• Composable decryption keys: In ABE schemes, all the data is encrypted by a system
public key and parameters. Decryption keys are derived from a master secret. Users who
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comply with the access policy can reconstruct their decryption keys. However, it might
be possible that different sets of data require different sets of encryption and decryption
keys. This requires the reconstructed keys to be different. Therefore encryption and
decryption keys may need to be derived or composed from multiple pairs of public and
master keys. ABS schemes face the same situation.
• Non-repudiation using ABS schemes: In ABS schemes, a group of users share the same
master signing key, although each user’s private (signing) key is constructed uniquely
from the same master key. Although this mechanism protects user privacy for generating
a signature, it does not prevent users from sharing their private keys with anyone outside
the group. Thus the concept of non-repudiation or accountability does not exist.
• Combining attribute-based encryption and attribute-based signature schemes together:
There may be situations where a user needs to either encrypt data or make digital sig-
natures. It is desirable that the user only needs one pair of keys, instead of two pairs
of keys. However, some existing schemes, such as [51], use one pair of keys associated
with an ABE scheme to encrypt data, and the other pair of keys associated with an ABS
scheme to generate signatures.
It is our opinion that attribute-based cryptography is an extremely useful tool for protecting
data in cloud storage environments. It is hoped that the research in this thesis has helped
further this case by making its deployment more practical.
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